CASADE

Nigerians head to the polls this month to elect a new president, this time a nasal test maybe their best guide

Editorial Commentary.

To state that Nigerians are resilient and resourceful would be a grand understatement, for both adjectives fail to capture the enviable depth and breadth of brilliancy that define their collective lot (What they have done with this attribute on the international scene is a different consideration).  Equally enviable is the variety of natural resources nature has endowed the geographic and territorial competence they claim and occupy. But this is where a generous description ends, and a nightmarish tale becomes the appropriate literature genre to effectively narrate the current state of affairs of the average Nigerian. By all reasonable expectations, Nigerians should by now have at their disposal the various social amenities that commonly define advanced economies…an economy that furnishes good employment opportunities, reasonably safe cities and towns, a functional healthcare sector, good network of roads, steady-state electricity, a good educational system, affordable housing, and more. The country has within it and outside its shores the requisite human capital to industrialize its economy and manage a sustainable trajectory of growth that would afford its citizens these amenities with relative ease. Reasons for the catastrophic failure to achieve this expectation are too numerous to adumbrate here but chief amongst them is the bad choice of leadership the electorate has consistently made or imposed on them over the past decades. This is unfortunate, but the electorate now has an opportunity afforded by this election to make a course-correction that would ultimately define Nigeria’s future as a viable nation-state or default to one of confederacy with independent nations loosely connected by jointly held infrastructures and assets.

In the normal run of things, making the right choice of leadership in national elections is a difficult one, and once again, Nigerians have managed to present to the electorate three presidential candidates each as unappealing as the other but for different reasons. As the cacophony of unreasoned pronouncements from the candidates and their campaign staff daily assault the auditory and optical senses of the electorate, a reasoned certainty is that one of the candidates would be elected president of the country. This choice would be made from an assortment of polished curriculum vitae of the candidates (as most CVs tend to be), unverifiable claims of capabilities, actual resumes that would impress the most unrepentant money launderers, and acts of bureaucratic corruption that would make their predecessors cringe with affectations of modesty. At least one of these attributes applies to one of the candidates, and all apply to two. The options are rotten but left with a Hobson’s Choice of ‘choose one or none,’ the electors would go to the polls armed with the sensitivity of their nostrils and choose the least pungent. We turn now to specificities.

Begin with the perennial candidate for the presidency, Mr. Atiku Abubakar. At 76 Years, this election cycle will be his sixth attempt to ascend to the top political position in the country. He has name recognition, served as the country’s vice president for eight years, and has shown through visible acts of philanthropy a strong interest in higher education. His generous financial contributions to UK and US universities, and the establishment of an American university presence in Nigeria are at once applaudable and yet raise concerns on the source of funds expended so generously. While his intentions in this regard are at best ambiguous, the direct benefits and attendant positive externalities to Nigerians are not. His lavish lifestyle within and outside Nigeria has also been a source of concern and speculation for years; the fact that he lives in Dubai and occasionally comes to Nigeria to oversee his business interests and run for the presidency subtracts from his reservoir of goodwill amongst the electorate. To these add the fact that in 2010 a US Senate Committee detailed his complicity in the transfer of over $40 million of suspect funds to various banks in America. But all these subtractions may not be enough to derail or handicap his ambitions and electability.

The most significant obstacle Mr. Abubakar faces in this election is the undeniable need for the country to break the umbilical cord that connects it to its past, a past that cannot be considered good for Nigerians even under the most unreasonable standards of measurement. Mr. Abubakar personifies this past because he was part of its architecture and played a significant role in the mismanagement of the country’s finite resources, principally in his role as the vice president in Mr. Obasanjo’s administration. In a free and fair election Mr. Abubakar’s chances of winning the presidency this time around would be very slim, but in Nigeria the concept of a free and fair election is very subjective and malleable to a variety of interpretations. This should be encouraging to Atiku Abubakar’s campaign.

Governor Tinubu, who governed the affairs of Lagos State for eight years, is one of the three serious contenders for the presidency. His personal background is as unclear as his record as governor of a state that houses the country’s financial center. His reported age of 70 and his full name have been subjects of speculation, so has the state of his health. What is verifiable is that he studied at a community college in Chicago and earned a bachelor’s degree in accountancy at Chicago State university in 1979; in 2022 he settled a lawsuit that accused him of owning 70% of a private company contracted to collect taxes for Lagos State while he was in office as governor. His indictment for trafficking in illicit drugs in Illinois by US federal prosecutors is a matter of public record. But these and the absence of a clear record of public service are not disqualifying factors in Nigeria. What matters and indicative of how he would run the affairs of the country if elected is his past performance as a public servant. His youthful indiscretion in Chicago may be forgiven and is not determinative of how he would govern.

But he, like Atiku Abubakar, was a major presence in the country’s disgraceful past and present. His reported ownership of numerous real estates in Lagos while serving as governor raises serious questions of his ability to break from Nigeria’ past and liberate the country from the stranglehold of crippling bureaucratic corruption. This is the major challenge he faces; the electorate would need to be convinced that he has the capacity to evolve from his past experiences as a public servant. His chances of winning the presidency are as good as those of his opponents.

Governor Peter Obi at 60 is the youngest amongst the serious contenders for the presidency and has the least experience in public office. These are his strongest attributes. As governor of Anambra State, his reported record is one of frugality and reconstruction of the state’s crumbling road infrastructure and prudent investment that accrued significant balances in the state coffers when he left office. He is reported to be very wealthy and had been so before he took office as governor. His resume is one of accomplishments as a businessman, and a lengthy record of continuous investment in human capital in reputable institutions of higher learning. But this much is the substance of what we know about him, and while his record in public office is scandal-free, it is not enough to ask the electorate to trust him with the stewardship of a country that would challenge the most gifted public administrator. The report contained in the Pandora’s papers that he had offshore assets that were not reported in the required filing by public officials before he took office as governor is troubling; his responses to this revelation do not absolve him of the legal duty to report such assets.

Mr. Obi, as Abubakar and Tinubu, was also part of the political machinery that oversaw Nigeria’s troubled past (He was Atiku’s running mate in the last election). While his exposure to this past is not as deep and broad as those of his rivals, it is still a past the country seeks to put behind it. His task now is how to convince the young voters who are solidly behind his rising popularity that he would not disappoint them and would stick to his publicized image of a clean and competent administrator. His effort and messaging so far in this regard have been weak and scrambled, even though he is the only candidate who has been fully accessible to the press and has willingly answered questions directed at him on his campaign trails. His prospects are good, but he needs to deliver a coherent narrative on how he intends to address the country’s myriad of economic and security concerns if elected.

All these subtractions aside, Nigerians are not seeking a saint to govern their affairs for the next four years; one with integrity and has the competence to marshal the country’s vast reservoir of talents necessary to revitalize the economy, secure lives and refurbish the country’s image would do. While a choice from the options presented to the electorate must be made, it may be the case that voters would ultimately choose one that is least offensive to their olfactory sensibilities.

*Photo credits, Vanguard, Getty Images.

by CASADE

Polygamy as further subjugation of African women, and its toll on national economies

John O. Ifediora

As Nigerians head to the polls to elect a new president in February, the most populous country in Africa that sheperds the continent’s largest economy would once again have the opportunity to grapple with a vexing man-inspired and socially debilitating problem that continues to burdened half of its population….the anachronistic practice of polygamy. Nigeria, with its variety of social and economic problems aside, still wields substantial influence on the continent and if it decides to make  equality of the sexes a public policy priority through its choice of governance, a latent powerful economic transformation atrophied in the continent by years of regressive customary practices would be awakened. Who the country chooses to lead it for the next four years would be a litmus test of its readiness for progressive initiatives that protect and empower women. But first, a look at polygamy, its incidence and burden.

In its definitional and operational sense, polygamy is a matrimonial indulgence by which any of the sexes takes on multiple wives or husbands; the latter, however, is rare and seldom the case. While such formal and informal family arrangements are not exclusive preserves of Africans, they are nonetheless enduring and pervasive in all African nation-states with no clear signs of abatement. Of immediate interest is the case where a man takes on two or more wives in exercise of his customary rights, and the desire to put in public view his ability to sustain such burden. That this is the case is of ancient origin in the continent, but so are the unimaginable consequences on the lives of women, who, by cultural prescriptions or by force of economic necessity, find themselves in the arduous task of polygamy. But from whence does the appeal for such family arrangement originate, and how does it benefit society? These questions need not detain us here, for of immediate concern is the welfare of the women involved, and the impact on national productivity.

The abysmal economic performance by African States in past decades is attributable to a host of known factors – mismanagement of resources, graft, and bureaucratic corruption; but of all the known culprits that have so far suppressed economic growth, none is more intransigent, and yet least addressed, than Africa’s patriarchal customary practices, and traditional observances. These pervasive practices are traceable, with relative facility, to controlling traits of antiquity that have remained resilient to the moderating effects of education, and experiments with ‘democratic’ forms of governance. The failure to incorporate cultural sensibilities, and to see things from the point of view of Africans continue to frustrate all otherwise reasonable attempts at development. Amongst experts in the development community, it is widely acknowledged that a major cause of economic underdevelopment in modern Africa is the relative absence of industrialization, and lack of demonstrable opportunities for effective employment of both capital and human resources. But while capital accumulation and industrialization are mutually self-sustaining and fundamental to development, how a society treats and deploys its human capital ultimately determine its development trajectory.

By testimony of evidence, it may now be forcefully declared that among the known culprits, the chief hindrance to social and economic development in the continent can be found in the cultural norms that regulate the relations between the sexes —– the quasi legal subordination of women to men that informs past and current understanding of polygamy. This state of affairs in which African societies have perennially subjected women, instructs African women of their roles in society; which are, in the main, directly opposite to those reserved for men. They are informed, in this regard, on how to perfect the art of subservience to their male counterparts, not to aspire to self-governance, or act in manners indicative of self- will. They are told that morality requires of them to faithfully execute the function nature has reserved for them, which is to reproduce; and by abnegation of self, to nourish both husband and children through affection and dedication. For centuries, this understanding has defined the collective lot of African women, and sadly, it remains a debilitating influence on development efforts in the continent. The fact that many modern African women have excelled in various professional endeavors is encouraging, but does not define the collective lot of many more.

A question of immediate urgency, however, is how to further explore the effects of culturally induced disparate treatment of African women on economic development, and how the ensuing inequality of opportunities between the sexes detracts from development efforts. The thesis here is that the denial of fair and equal treatment to women in African societies is a major contributing factor to perceived and actual economic underdevelopment, and that real and sustained socio-economic development is achievable only when such unjust practices are allowed to elapse into disuse. This work provides a brief guidance on the effects of subjection on development, and how such effects may be ameliorated by gender-sensitive public policies in education, and employment opportunities. The analytic approach adopted is necessarily informed by a liberal interpretation of justice that presumes a moral equality of the sexes, and admits of no preference or natural disability of one or the other.

In early human societies, especially in ages long past, the ‘law of superior strength’ defined inter-personal or inter-community relations; indeed it was the rule that governed human existence and had public approbation as a source of sustenance. The African experience in this regard is no different. That the physically weaker sex came to be subordinated to the stronger one was a natural outcome of this primeval system of social discourse and relations; a system of subjection and inequality derived, not from formal deliberation or forethought on what conduces to the social good, but from a prevailing social conditioning and the understanding that women have value to men, and through brute force placed women in a state of semi bondage. With time, this state of affairs became socialized and accepted as the norm of social relations between the sexes; and as is customary in all other human activities, laws and customs that now govern the relations between the sexes took hold by formalizing what they found already in existence in society. What began as a physical reality is turned into a legal one; women, once compelled into submission and obedience by superior physical strength are now bound to them by operation of customary laws, and tradition.

Historical social positioning of African Women and the effects on Development

In modern liberal democracies, the a priori presumption leans in favor of equality in treatment, and freedom; by insisting on the equal distribution of these basal ‘primary goods,’ a special sense of social justice is prescribed. It is hence presumed, as a matter of public policy, that constraints on basic liberties are morally unacceptable; but if any is necessary for the social good, it must be properly balanced against individual liberties. Furthermore, rules and laws that regulate public discuss and relations must be impartial unless justice dictates disparate treatment in favor of the disadvantaged. This Rawlsian interpretation of justice informs this work, and has also been a guiding influence on recent policy initiatives in modern Africa, where proponents of progressive liberalism have not only urged the protection of individual rights from state practices, but have shaped the debate on human rights with a strong sense of justice that insists on protection from oppressive social roles and practices that developed under conditions of inequality.

The chief distinguishing feature of social institutions in modern societies is the ability to generate and encourage divergent views on important social issues that progressively move societies farther away from the past and into more enlightenment. This separation from the past enables the dissolution of cultural bonds that chained people to the life they were born into, and frees them to apply their natural or refined intellect in any social endeavor they see fit. But history reminds us that this separation from the past is a slow and painful process, for no subordinated group ever began their quest from oppression by seeking complete freedom and equality immediately. The almost inevitable path is that those who are under any sort of oppression through power of ancient origin begin by complaining, not of the power itself, but of the excessive application of it. It is only after the exercise of such oppressive power is successfully challenged is the initial right to such power subjected to social scrutiny, and if found in discord with modern liberal sentiments, it is then pressed into disuse.

With time, and through the modernizing effects of human struggles for freedom and independence, it has become increasingly clear, even to the most disinterested observer, that individual liberty and freedom of choice are the best means to promote the economic welfare of societies. By enabling individuals to engage in activities best suited to their natural talents and acquired skills, society procures for itself the highest possible level of social productivity. It is thus counterintuitive, and self- defeating for the same society to arbitrarily impose limitations on what half of its constituent members can, and cannot do on the grounds of unproven assumptions of capabilities. And even if the assumption that the sexes are suited for different productive activities is shown to hold, there would be exceptions; and to forbid those who fall outside this socialized assumption the opportunity to participate fully to their abilities is not only unjust, but also operates in detriment to individual benefits, and to those of society. Will Kymlicka , in his book entitled, ‘Contemporary Philosophy,’ goes a step further:

“The ideology of equal opportunity seems fair to many because it ensures that people’s fate is determined by their choices, rather than their circumstances; success or failure is determined by performance, not by race or class or sex. If I fail it is not because I was born into the ‘wrong’ group, thus success is earned and merited through one’s own efforts. It would be unfair for individuals to be disadvantaged or privileged by arbitrary and undeserved differences in their social circumstances.” (Kymlicka, 2002).

What is being asked, within the context of a just society, is not that special privileges and benefits be conferred on women; it is rather that the special benefits and privileges conferred on men so far be withdrawn to enable fair and equal participation by women in matters of social and private consequence. It is still an observable fact in Africa that social institutions, with varying degrees of vitality and longevity, continue to impute right to might, and make it possible for those who originally acquired power through morally unjust avenues to retain it as a matter of course. And while other social institutions are gradually yielding to modern dictates by becoming less rigid, and accommodating of change, the ones more directly relevant to the relations between the sexes remain peculiarly intransigent, and less responsive to reformed sensibilities. That women, who make up more than half of Africa’s population, remain largely in the unnatural state of inequality, and subordinated to their male counterparts in both familial and public spheres are manifestations of, and a cause of significant social and economic dislocations in the continent.

Differences in Years of Schooling As a Contributing Factor

The socially ascribed roles as now exist between the sexes did not originate from legitimate differentials on natural talents or capacities, but arose instead on assumed limitations on the part of women, and privileges advanced to men. The assumptions and privileges are further advanced by the differential treatment of the sexes within the family unit. In Africa, it has always been the case, until lately, that boys receive disproportionate portions of a family’s resource in all manners of investment in human capital or in training necessary for independent pursuit of career choices. It is only after the educational or training requirements of the boys have been reasonably satisfied would those of the girls receive attention, assuming the family’s resources are not yet depleted or severely constrained. This disparity in treatment is based on the customary belief that investments in girls are unwise, for once of the age of maturity, they are expected to leave their homes of birth by way of marriage, taking with them any investment in human capital, and all prospects for future returns on such investment. A parallel view does not apply to boys, for tradition requires of them to sustain their family of birth, and to do so in perpetuity. It is this initial distortion in resource allocation between the sexes at the family level that further aggravates the already compromised social and economic status of women. Lacking in skills and educational credentials, they are compelled to employ their substantial natural talents in domestic activities, petty trading, or in subsistence farming. While honorable, in the sense that these activities make for a reasonable livelihood, and help support immediate and extended family networks, they are not undertaken by ‘free’ choice, and hardly conduce to high-income growth rates or self-fulfilling careers necessary for sustained economic self-sufficiency, and national economic growth.

There is now near universal consensus that both the level of education attained by citizens of a country, and the quality of education so received are major determining factors of domestic productivity. The comparative levels of educational attainment in different countries are not, however, determinative of differential economic growth rates, but are strongly correlative. In instances where the family of birth has sufficient resources to provide tertiary education for the girls, a major consideration that would discourage such commitment arises, not from the presumed absence of future returns on such expenditure, but from the pragmatic consideration of ‘marriageability.’ For, sadly, many African men are yet to be comfortable with the idea of marrying African women with advanced degrees; thus, to avoid educating herself out of marriage prospects, the family withholds needed support for education beyond a certain level. This cut-off line is in many instances a secondary school level certification. But this need to preserve marriage prospects for daughters by limiting the level of education they may acquire is not without cost; for it is this need to be eligible for marriage that deprives women of the skills they need to be economically self-sufficient, and once married become completely dependent on the husband for sustenance. In the many instances where the wife lacks marketable skills, the economic burden on the husband is low, thus he can afford to marry more and enjoy enhanced domestic services by doing less; herein lies the economistic incentive for polygamy. This dependence on husbands for economic well-being is a primary source of subjection of the African woman who fulfills both her wishes and those of society by becoming a wife; it is also from this source that some of the most vicious human rights abuses emanate, specifically the emotional and physical abuse visited upon many African women through privation and want of self-fulfillment. It is also through this vantage point that progressive public policy may be profitably implemented.

**Photo credit: Getty images.

by CASADE

Religion as a source of social neurosis in times of collective stress; its inspiration to violence is not of recent origin

John O. Ifediora.

In all nations, the quality and relevance of countervailing social institutions matter. That this is the case is particularly of import since institutions are rules that govern individual and collective behavior in any society. In this regard reference is here made to primary and enabling rules and observances that inform and guide conduct, specifically religious, political and economic institutions. In nations where these social institutions have evolved to the point where individual rights and freedom of choice are accorded universal cognizance with appropriate checks and protection, the polity is reasonably well-adjusted, informed and productive. Under this state of affairs, malfunctions in any of the constituent institutions are unlikely to have lasting effects, and minimal corrective measures are needed to restore normalcy; this sentiment enjoys durable currency in advanced democracies such as the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and the United States, where abnormalities are generally reflections of discontent, and may pose no serious danger to established norms unless left unattended. It is thus presumed that advanced democracies have built-in mechanisms that inexorably return them to long-run equilibrium in the event of temporary malfunctions in any of its institutions. Events within the last decade, however, have made this presumption less serviceable.

Religion-inspired violence is of ancient origin, and has found expression in many established faiths. In the normal run of things, malfunctions in religious and political institutions are always and everywhere responsible for all forms of societal neurosis that inflict a nation’s psyche in times of stress and uncertainty. That individuals, in extreme cases, are willing to kill the innocent in order to advance religious and political goals attest to the potency of deranged and malfunctioning institutions that guide and inform collective action. Suicide bombers readily come to mind; but whether society acknowledges it or not, these suicide bombers, once well-functioning members of society, were mentally deranged. No well-adjusted person wants to die; only the neurotic choses to die. And to a large extent, they are victims of distorted religious and political institutions that cut across nations at various stages of socio-political development. The ancient relationship between Christians and Jews provides an excellent context to this narrative, and would be used as a case-in-point in this discourse.

The Essence of Religion

Religion encompasses much; but chief among its defining features are rituals, symbols, practices, and a body of beliefs that afford meaningful interpretations of the meaning and purpose of human existence. Everything else associated with religion is only meaningful within the context of this defining belief system, for it provides the rationale by which rituals and symbols are reasonably apprehended. It is in this sense that theology is regarded as the foundation for faith; it is also in this regard that the search for the roots of violence inspired by religion must necessarily begin with the foundational theology, and doctrines that inform any religion’s answer to the question of salvation.

Certain types of theologies define precise and constrained bounds within which individual practitioners of the faith are accepted as true believers, and are thus deemed religiously legitimate. Such religious perspective is often accompanied by a strong belief of exclusive ownership of the ‘true’ meaning and purpose of human existence in relation to the Divine; but almost invariably this belief system implicates self-righteousness and exclusivity, both of which, under the right circumstances, are conducive to fanaticism. The intolerance of other faiths generated by such exclusive claim to the ‘truth’ has been the source of unimaginable inhumanity visited upon individuals, groups, and communities throughout history.

Of particular relevance to the discourse of theologically induced intolerance is what Glock and Stark referred to as ‘religious particularism.’ By this they mean a doctrinal claim that redemption or salvation is available only to certain individuals that meet specific criteria. More specifically, “religious particularism is the belief that only one’s own religion is legitimate. To the particularistic mind there are no faiths, but one true faith”(Glock and Stark, 1966).

The ardent believer thus sees himself as one of the select few that comprise the  chosen, ‘the salt of the earth, the light of the world, a prince disguised in meekness who is destined to inherit this earth and the Kingdom of heaven’(Hoffer, 1951). But in modern societies that accommodate pluralistic views, particularism may be liberally or conservatively expressed. A liberal expression is more likely to accept all religious faiths as legitimate so long as they subscribe to the existence of one God; whereas a conservative strain of particularism may insist that religious legitimacy resides only in one faith, and delegitimize all other expressions of religiosity. It is in this regard that Colerideg writes, “He who begins by loving Christianity better than the truth, will proceed by loving his own sect or church better than Christianity, and end in loving himself better than all”(Mailer, 1963). Whether liberally or conservatively expressed, particularism delegitimizes all religions that are outside the confines of what is deemed the proper faith. The practical implications of the breadth of particularism are substantive, for they implicate exclusivity, and the potential for conflict amongst people of faith.

So far, the impression of particularism is that one who holds such view is very likely to view his religious status superior to others, and engage in invidious self-righteous judgment of the legitimacy of other faiths. But it is one thing to hold such view and altogether another to act on such held belief of superiority. It is when both are combined that particularism is especially potent and dangerous. The implication here is that some people of faith are perfectly capable of harboring particularistic views but do not act on them; while this capacity is atypical, it holds a powerful means by which people of differing religious status can reach a common understanding and acceptance.

But of import to this discourse is the situation where particularism leads to hostility, specifically its manifestation in Christendom dating from early antiquity. In this regard, the troubling questions are: how did Christian particularism lead to antisemitism, and what factors made it possible? In the Christian tradition an overarching issue involves the matter of salvation, and what practitioners need to do to be redeemed, and ultimately saved. Thus in order to uncover the factors that led to Christian particularism, it is necessary to look at its criteria for salvation, and what existing social conditions would enable its implementation. Thus, to generate and sustain particularism, the controlling Christian theology must first sow the seeds of particularistic ideas that consist of a generality of doctrinal claims informed by a body of beliefs that are proclaimed to be universally true, and contain the only ‘truth’ that is exclusive of those held by other faiths. Existing social factors and conditions would then limit the extent to which such particularistic ideas are implemented.

Once universality of a body of beliefs is claimed, the extent to which Christian theology may engender particularism is determined by the degree of specificity of its theological tenets. Thus, the more elaborate and detailed the tenets are, the greater the specificity of the theology. But specificity alone is not a sufficient condition for Christian particularism; there must be, in addition, a clear conception of people who do not meet the requirements of Christian religiousness as articulated by the tenets of its theology. It is this last step that makes Christian particularism partially whole. But being particularistic does not automatically lead to hostility towards the Jewish faith or Islam. The history of paganism and cultism shows that both belief systems were sufficiently detailed in their claims and doctrinal values of their gods; this is especially true of African, Roman, and Greek gods but none claimed universality of their beliefs. And as such, they were all able to co-exist peacefully. Only when the Christian theology was imbued with the aura of universality did it become fully particularistic.

Once the Christian church had developed its particularistic sensibilities, there remained a question of how to implement it. The missing ingredient in this regard was power – the ability to impose Christian ideology on non-believers, in this case the Jews. It must, however, be noted here that the question of how a particularistic body wields power in society is a function of its numerical status. A majority with a particularistic idea has the potential to be both violent and vicious in the face of resistance from bodies with opposing beliefs; indeed a majority need not have a particularistic theology to be violently repressive. On the other hand, when a minority is particularistic, it risks hostile confrontation with the majority that may oppose such imposition on several grounds, one of which is a perceived threat to  existing ways of life informed by socio-cultural institutions. A historical case in point is the attempt to impose Judaism on the classical world. Olson explains:

“The ancient Jews having spread colonies throughout the Mediterranean world, armed with their particularistic view of a true and only god, embarked upon a campaign of active proselytization although in a minority status. The antagonistic response of the classical society followed. Even Rome, with its permissive, and eclectic, and somewhat instrumental approach to religion, Rome which boasted of raising temples to the gods of every conquered nation, found itself unable easily to accommodate a religion that claimed not merely to be true, but to be singularly true” (Olson, 1962).

Emperor Constantine’s conversion to Christianity gave the Church the requisite instrumentality for the enforcement of its particularistic theology; for it then rose in triumph over the remains of the Roman Empire, which, by all accounts, was one of the most militaristic and efficiently organized pre-modern societies in human history. The outcome was a vicious and brutal imposition of the Christian version of the means to salvation. The hierarchical organization of the Church facilitated concentration of power in a Supreme Pontiff, which enabled both a monolithic expression of the Christian ideology, and effective suppression of internal dissent (internal dissent appeared much later). The Church was now a combination of potent social factors ---a particularistic theology, a majority status, centralized internal power, and derived external power. History shows that the early Church did not wield these powers with care or restraint.

With the historic Jews in a minority status, two dominant issues defined their relationship with Christians. One pertained the mutual claim to the Old Testament by both Jews and Christians as their common heritage. But in order for Christians to claim this heritage, they would also have to claim descent from Judaism, the faith of Moses, and by extension, recognize that ancient Jewry enjoyed a unique religious status that pre-dates Jesus, and had exclusive claim on the Old Testament. The second issue was the assertion that the Jews had fallen out of favor with God, thus leaving Christians as the sole inheritors of God’s grace and favor. This claim was based on interpretations of events in the Old Testament as the means through which the Jews forfeited their special relationship with God. On these disquieting issues, Hilberg elaborates:

“A crucial issue in the theological disputes between Jews and Christians during the first three centuries C.E. concerned legitimate succession from the Old Testament faith. Having emerged from its initial status as a Jewish sect, when Paul won Peter and his followers to the doctrine that gentiles could come into the faith without adopting Mosaic Law, Christianity, nevertheless, was irrevocably committed to the Old Testament as a prophetic basis for New Testament fulfillment. The proclamation of the divinity of Jesus was not to be taken as raising up a new god; rather Jesus was claimed to be the Son of the Old and eternal Yahweh, and Christianity the final resolution of an established religious tradition”(Hilberg, 1961).

Jews’ rejection of the claim made by the Church would not settle the matter, nor was it the answer the mighty Christian majority expected from Jews; the Church needed legitimacy, but more importantly, it needed the Jews’ approbation of its theological formulation to affirm its claim as the legitimate heir to God’s favor. Something had to be done, but the extension of a friendly hand of persuasion was not part of the devised means; meanwhile more rejections of other aspects of Christian orthodoxy were to come, and the consequences would be unimaginable. The grounds for sustained repression of the Jews were now being laid.

Christianity’s Regime of Intolerance And Brutality in Early Antiquity

The Old Testament is essentially the history of the Jews, and without equivocation proclaimed Jews as the Chosen People of God. But the same Hebrew texts are indispensible to Christianity, thus acceptance of the primary thrust of the Old Testament would threaten the legitimacy of Christianity, a non-Jewish faith. The question to be resolved by the early Church was how to reconcile its non-Jewish status with the doctrine of the Chosen People. The theology developed by the Church as a solution to this unsettling issue was simple enough: Jesus was God’s revelation to the world, thus fulfilling the prophesies of the Old Testament, and marks the beginning of a new set of rules for God’s relationship with humanity. The death of Jesus of Nazareth was atonement for sins committed in the past, and now only through the Son of God, Christ, and his acceptance as the Messiah would one qualify for the Kingdom of God. Given that Jews have rejected the Messianic status of Jesus, they are hence unredeemed, and until such time as they see fit to accept Christ as the Saviour, they remain fallen from grace and out of God’s favor. Legitimate succession has now passed from Jews to Christians, and the Old Testament has been fulfilled in the New Testament, thus preserving its continuity. The Church thus staked its claim, and justified its existence.

But the Church was not done; the most powerful charge against the Jews was yet to be incorporated into its orthodoxy--- the charge of deicide. For more than two millennia the crucial issue that strained Jewish-Christian relations was the presumed collective role played by Jews in the crucifixion of Jesus. Early Church writers strongly believed that the Jews were responsible for this act, and should be held accountable. The ensuing vitriolic, and persecution were brutal and bloody, and culminated in the most unspeakable horror visited upon Jews both in medieval times and in recent history.

The charge of deicide undergirded antisemitic actions against Jews by early Christians, and continues to inspire modern day antisemitism. The Council of Nicaea’s 325 C.E. creedal proclamation of Jesus as the “Very God of Very God” and “One of substance with the Father” provided strong justification for early Christian belief that Jesus, being the Son of God, was an extension of Divinity. Killing him was akin to killing the Divine (Gager, 1983). The statement by Stephen in the Book of Acts did not help matters:

“You stiff-necked people, uncircumcised in heart and ears, you are forever opposing the Holy Spirit, just as your ancestors used to do. Which of the prophets did your ancestors not persecute? They killed those who foretold the coming of the Righteous One, and now you have become his betrayers and murderers”(Acts 7:51-52, NRSV).

 The canonization of New Testament Scriptures at the urgings of the Councils of Laodicea in 363 C.E, Hippo in 393 C.E., and Carthage in 397 C.E. further exacerbated the inexorable deterioration of Jewish-Christian relations (Grosser, 1983). The individual Christian who played a significantly noticeable role in damaging Jewish-Christian relations, and the consequent attacks on Jews is John Chrysostom (ca. 345-407). While in Antioch, he produced a series of eight sermons directed against Jews or Judaizers. His first Homily read as follows:

“Do not be surprised if I call the Jews wretched. They are truly wretched and miserable for they have received many good things from God yet they have spurned them and violently cast them away – The Jews were branches of the holy root, but they were looped off” (Chrysostom, quoted in Littell, 1975).

The theological antisemitism inspired by the Church, in due course, became the inspiration for secular antisemitsm. Beginning in the fourth century, Church leaders began to put in place restrictive measures against Jews, for if conversion of Jews would take longer than desirable, they felt it wise to prevent Jews from ‘contaminating’ Christians. Some of the more draconian measures put in place precluded intermarriage, sexual intercourse, eating together, and all significant social contacts between Jews and Christians. The Third Synod of Orleans, in the sixth century, banned Jews from employing Christian servants, and prohibited their presence on the streets when Passion Week was being observed. The Talmud, the Jewish Holy Book, was ordered burned in the seventh century, and in about the same period the Synod of Clermont prohibited Jews from holding public offices (Rothman, 1982). These edicts from the early Church formed the basis of cultural traditions of discriminations against Jews, and ultimately provided sustenance for Nazi atrocities in the mid 20^th century. The following edicts are illustrative:

“We decree and order that from now on, and for all time, Christians shall not eat or drink with Jews, nor admit them to feasts, nor cohabit with them, nor bathe with them. Christians shall not allow Jews to hold civic honors over Christians, or to exercise public office in the state.”

                                                                     ----------- Pope Eugenius IV, Decree, 1442.

1. Marriages between Jews and citizens of Germany or kindred stock shall be prohibited. Marriages concluded despite the law shall be considered void even when they were concluded abroad.
2. Nonmarital sexual intercourse between Jews and citizens of Germany or kindred stock shall be prohibited.
3. Jews shall not employ in their households female citizens of German or kindred stock under 45 years of age.

                                                      ------ German law enacted September  15, 1935.

Antisemitism has been, and would remain in the foreseeable future, the ‘elephant in the room’ in any serious discussion of Jewish-Christian relations; recent neo-Nazi activities in Europe and the United States of America furnish grounds for such pessimism. The source of Christian antisemitism may still be found, with relative facility, in the body of beliefs that inform Christianity, and its traditional orthodoxy.

The point of this historical narrative is to allay any presumption that religion inspired intolerance and violence is of recent origin. What the world is now witnessing is a different strain of particularism; this time it is extremist interpretation of Islamic theology in contradistinction to other faiths, and Western cultural and social sensibilities. The relevant question now is what inspired it and how will it end? The perception of unfair treatment by adherents may not be unreasonable.

Bibliography

Berhard, Olson E. Faith and Predujice. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.

Beare, F.W. The Earliest Records of Jesus. New York: Abingdon Press, 1962.

Earkin, Frank. What Price Prejudice? Christian Antisemitism in America. New York: Paulist Press, 1998.

Gager, John. The Origins of Anti-Semitism: Attitudes toward Judaism in Pagan and Christian Antiquity. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Glock, Charles Y., and Rodney Stark. Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.

Grosser, Paul and Egwin Halperin. Anti-Semitism: Causes and Effects. New York: Philosophical Library, 1983.

Hilberg, Raul. The Destruction of the European Jews. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961.

Hoffer, Eric. The True Believers. New York: Mentor Books, 1951.

Ifediora, John O., “The Blood Libel Legend: Its Longevity and Popularity.” Position Paper, University of Cambridge Program on JCR (2013), pp. 1-14.

Langmuir, Galvin. Toward a Definition of Antisemitism. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990.

Lieu, Judith. “The parting of the Ways: Theological Construct or Historical Reality?” Journal for the Study of the New Testament 56, (1994): 101-119.

Littell, Franklin H. The Crucifixion of the Jews: The Failure of Christians to Understand the Jewish Experience. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1975.

Mailer, Norman. The Presidential Papers. New York: Putnam, 1963.

Prager, Dennis and Joseph Telushkin. Why The Jews? The Reason for Antisemitism. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003.

Rothman, Stanley, and Robert Lichter. Roots of Radicalism: Jews, Christians, and the New Left. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

Ruether, Rosemary. Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism. New York: The Seabury Press, 1974.

**Photo credit: AFP/Getty images.

by CASADE

Ghana Secures a Bailout from the IMF, Again.

Ken ofori-atta, Ghana’s finance minister, is fond of invoking scripture in speeches on the economy. Recently, as the country defaulted on its domestic debt, he found solace in the first book of Samuel saying “nothing will be lost, nothing will be missing.” Yet the Bible is a poor guide to macroeconomics. Holders of domestic bonds stand to lose a good chunk of money. Now foreign creditors are getting a buzz cut, too. On December 19th Ghana suspended interest payments to foreign creditors, in effect defaulting, pending talks.

It has also appealed to the high priests of economic orthodoxy, agreeing to a preliminary $3bn bail-out (about 4% of GDP) from the IMF. It needs the help. Public debt is above 100% of gdp and local and foreign interest payments eat up 70-100% of revenue, according to Mr Ofori-Atta. Inflation is running at 50% and the central bank has raised its main interest rate to 27%. In past crises Ghana has wisely called in the IMF early to head off trouble and avoid spending cuts that were too painful. This time, however, it dallied for so long that austerity alone will not save it.

The government blames covid-19 and surging global inflation for its pickle. Yet its troubles can also be traced to overspending, excessive borrowing and overconfidence. This is hardly new. Ghana’s governments tend to blow their budgets to win votes in election years. But recent splurges were funded largely by foreign-currency bonds, making Ghana especially vulnerable to swings in exchange rates.

Nonetheless Mr Ofori-Atta was far from contrite as he announced the deal with the IMF “Let us all gather the harvest with joy,” he proclaimed. He even thanked his disgraced deputy, Charles Adu Boahen, who was sacked by President Nana Akufo-Addo last month after being accused of asking for a $200,000 fee to set up a meeting with the vice-president. The triumphalism will rile long-suffering Ghanaians. Many think Mr Ofori-Atta, a cousin of the president, should himself have been fired for poor management of the economy.

The fund’s deal will bring pain. But it also offers hope. It aims to slash debt to 55% of gdp in the medium term, perhaps by 2028, and the costs of servicing foreign-currency debts to 18% of government revenue. Next year’s budget includes spending cuts worth 2% of gdp. (A vast national cathedral that Mr Ofori-Atta lavished $58m of public money on will remain a stalled building site.) Social programmes will be protected, says the fund, though some worry Mr Ofori-Atta’s promise to review them for efficiencies may be a pretext for more cuts. The agreement is already boosting confidence in Ghana’s economy. The currency, the cedi, had slumped all year but has leapt since the bail-out was announced.

The government is trying to make progress on a debt restructuring, a condition of the deal. In early December Mr Ofori-Atta said the holders of domestic bonds worth 137bn cedis ($15.2bn) should swap these for ones paying a lower rate of interest and that will be repaid over a longer period. The exchange, which was meant to be completed by December 19th, would represent a loss of about 50% of the value of the bonds, reckons J.P. Morgan, a bank.

This would create a new set of problems. Ghana’s banks are heavily exposed to government debt. For some it represents more than half of total assets. A huge hit to the banking system could cause lending to plunge, which would in turn hurt the wider economy. The biggest danger will be next year, when the government’s replacement bonds will pay no interest at all, warns Ernest Addison, the governor of the Central Bank of Ghana. “Straight away there are issues of liquidity,” he says.

Ghanaians are already pulling money out of mutual funds, says Frederick Duvor of Apakan Securities, a brokerage firm in Ghana. “People want to salvage what’s left of their investments.” Pension schemes will be hit, too. By the time many pensions are paid out, “it will be worth close to nothing,” he worries. Banks, pension funds and insurers have all demanded better terms. Last week the government blinked and extended the deadline to the end of the year. It may also tweak the scheme.

Nervous policymakers are trying to prop up the banks. The central bank will loosen liquidity and capital-adequacy requirements. The government promises that a donor-backed fund worth 15bn cedis will help ensure financial stability. Mr Addison says the World Bank has committed $250m to it. All this should help. Yet when asked if he is therefore not too worried, Mr Addison simply says, “It is early.”

Garnering debt

Investors holding $13bn of Ghana’s foreign-currency bonds will not get off lightly, either. The government has previously floated talk of a 30% cut to the face value of the debt it will repay and suspension of some interest payments. This, too, may result in a fight, though some bondholders say they expect a relatively quick deal.

There are plenty of longer-term obstacles to Ghana’s recovery. Badly hit banks will not lend much for as long as it takes them to rebuild their balance-sheets. Interest rates will remain eye-watering for some time. Government spending will be austere for years. And the weak global economy will be a drag on growth, too.

Yet Ghana has been here before—16 times in fact. All those crises and bail-outs have not stopped it from becoming the richest country in continental west Africa as measured by income per head. It has a relatively educated workforce and widely available (if pricey) electricity. Some of its loose spending went on much-needed infrastructure. “We could actually get quite nice growth within two or three years,” reckons Charles Robertson of Renaissance Capital, an investment bank, “led by cheap currency and a low debt overhang.”

Ghana has one other formidable advantage: a surprisingly resilient reputation with donors and foreign investors based on its robust democracy, record of development and its leaders’ knack for selling a good-news story about the country. That Ghana managed to clinch a deal with the imf in less than six months suggests its reputation as a country worth backing remains miraculously intact. Other donors are likely to follow suit.

The recent surge in the cedi suggests some investors are already believers again. If the global economic picture improves, more may be tempted back. That would give Ghana a leg-up. But before it is able to emerge into this promised land of growth, its people face a painful journey. For this they blame the government, despite its repeated appeals to a higher authority.

*Courtesy of The Economist, Dec. 20, 2022. **Photo credit: Getty Images.

by CASADE