The assumed Boko Haram influence in the Fulani herdsmen’s clashes with settled communities is misguided
Sola Tayo.
There have been long-standing tensions between nomadic pastoralist Fulanis, one of the dominant ethnic groups in Nigeria and the ruling class of much of the north, and their settled counterparts, centred on the use of land for grazing livestock. But recently, the frequency and intensity of the violence has increased, causing alarm and potentially spurring a dangerous securitized approach to the clashes that could wreak havoc on Nigeria’s fragile economy and have devastating consequences for the majority of peaceful Fulanis.
Violence has certainly claimed hundreds of pastoralist and settler lives this year alone, but precise information is scarce. It is still not clear whether this is a product of long-standing inter-community tensions, exacerbated by climate change and land-grabbing by politicians, simple banditry or overspill from the Boko Haram crisis – or a complex mix of all of these factors. A knee-jerk response from the Nigerian government to poorly informed media speculation could further alienate an entire ethnic group and result in serious human rights abuses, as has been seen in the northeast of the country during the conflict with Boko Haram. Rather than reducing violence, it could catalyse the degeneration of the current crisis into real conflict.
Fulani tensions
Pastoralist Fulanis in Nigeria engage in a centuries-old seasonal migration pattern in which they move their cattle south during the dry season when the supply of fodder for livestock is scarce in the north.
Traditionally pastoralist Fulani communities paid a fee to the leaders of local settlements in exchange for the right to graze their cattle in their territories. This was the historical grazing arrangement and remains operational in some areas.
As Nigeria developed after independence, the government designated several hundred grazing reserves across the 19 northern states in a bid to prevent clashes between pastoralists and settled communities. However, many of the designated grazing reserves were viewed as lucrative investments by some politicians and had their usage changed, creating a shortage of land, water and other resources necessary for the grazing of livestock. Pastoralists were forced to search for water and pasture for their animals outside the designated reserves, pushing them into confrontation with settlers.
Several contemporary factors play into the worsening of these long-standing tensions. Environmental degradation is playing a role in fuelling the crisis, with desertification and the shrinking of Lake Chad forcing many pastoralist communities to move even farther into areas outside regular migration routes. Another dynamic is the religious divide between both sides, with the pastoralist Fulanis being religiously and culturally Muslim, while the settled farmer communities have either been wholly Christian or to a large extent so. Further muddying the waters are the activities of cattle rustling militias and other mercenary criminal elements who for the past seven years have exploited tensions and carried out a campaign of violence against pastoralist and settled farmer communities in an arc from the far northwest to the north central zone of the country.
Recent violence
Recently, groups of men thought to be pastoralists have attacked settlers with sophisticated weapons not normally associated with herders, spreading fear and anxiety across farming communities. Some pastoralists, in turn, claim to have acted in self-defence after attacks on them by settlers.
As the clashes have become more deadly, elements within Nigeria’s national security establishment have pointed to alleged links between ‘Fulani herdsmen’ and the Boko Haram insurgency. The allegation is that Boko Haram fighters fleeing the war in the northeast have moved south to the north central region where they are carrying out attacks on civilian communities under the guise of herdsmen.
Newspaper headlines are fuelling public anger. The classification of ‘Fulani militants’ by the Global Terrorism Index 2015 as the world’s fourth-deadliest terror group also stoked the flames, increasing fear and anxiety in a region regularly terrorised by jihadist sects. This was the first time this activity had been described as terrorism, with the index unhelpfully listing pastoralist-linked clashes alongside established terrorist groups such as ISIS and al Shabaab.
Avoiding a one-sided response
As public support grows for a government intervention, lawmakers will need to be mindful of avoiding a one-sided approach to resolving this conflict. The Fulani ethnic group has on many occasions called for the Nigerian government to intervene in the conflict − but as an impartial mediator between all sides rather than an antagonist, to provide security and protection for both herdsmen and settled farmer settlements and clamp down on the criminal gangs and opportunists. A security policy seen to be against a single party in this crisis effectively dismisses the grievances of the Fulani.
In a country with a history of sectarian violence, the crisis is gradually being seen through an ethno-religious prism. There is a historical trust deficit between the Muslim and Christian communities, and an approach that is seen to be one-sided risks perpetuating the development of a siege mentality within the wider Muslim communities. Should the government resort to a military response against the Fulani pastoralist community, there is a risk the conflict could spread further − drawing in other Fulani communities from across the region and causing widespread instability.
At Last; Nigeria finds the will to end fuel subsidy
Tom Moss.
After several starts and stops, the Nigerian government has finally removed fuel subsidies, resulting in an overnight price hike of 67 percent. The economic logic of subsidy reform is clear. Fuel subsidies were costing the government about $5 billion per year while the benefits accrued mostly to the non-poor. Nigeria’s particular scheme was also riven with corruption; a 2012 parliamentary inquiry found that the government was paying daily subsides on 59 million liters even when consumption was only 35 million liters. In recent weeks, the country was further hit by debilitating fuel shortages.
Politically, however, the subsidy was generally popular, in part because many citizens saw cheap fuel as one of the only tangible benefits from the state. For that reason, the January 2012 attempt at subsidy reform sparked riots and a partial policy reversal. This time, there are some indications that labor unions may protest again, but we’ll have to see whether opposition gains momentum and how President Buhari responds.
What’s notable, and potentially problematic, is that the government is planning to use any savings from lifting the fuel subsidy in the regular budget. Nigeria could have instead learned lessons from places like India and Iran, which each replaced a costly, poorly-targeted subsidy with a targeted cash payment. In Iran, fuel subsidy removal was preceded by deposits into tens of millions of bank accounts, some of them created especially for this purpose, which created pro-reform political momentum.
India suffered from the same market failures in cooking gas canister distribution as Nigeria’s petroleum sector, leading to gross misallocation and mistargeting of subsidies for decades. After a few false starts, the government rolled out the subsidy reform in 2015 as part of a broader policy to move towards direct benefit transfer, leveraging universal biometric ID and financial inclusion as the new pipeline for delivery. India’s LPG gas canister reform is now the world’s largest cash transfer scheme at 150 million beneficiaries, and has had an estimated 24 percent budget savings.
Could Nigeria launch a national cash transfer scheme in lieu of fuel subsidies? Back in 2012, Moss proposed a 20-20-20 scheme to provide the equivalent of US$0.20 per day to all Nigerians under the age of 20 using a set-aside of 20 percent of government revenue. In Nigeria’s current fiscal environment, this might be tougher to achieve. But using subsidy reform to build a national ID and transfer system would have lots of knock-on benefits, including on other public services, voting, and eventually taxation. Moreover, for a President who has prided himself on anti-corruption, such a system could weed out scams and bolster the integrity of the state.
India’s experience replacing an in-kind subsidy with a cash transfer shows that energy subsidy reform is very much possible, and that efficiencies can even be popular. And that sometimes it’s better to build a new pipeline than to constantly try to fix the leaks.
How to win a cosmic war: A special book review
The history of religion is a history of schisms. You can make a case that every great religion is a heresy of some previous one: exactly as Christianity is a heresy of Judaism, which itself is a reworking of Ancient Babylonian myths. In the sibling rivalry that exists between Jews, Christians and Muslims, we are all descendants of Abraham one way or another, like three children competing for a father’s attention. What we need to learn is how to get on with each other without resorting to violence – a massively tall order, as these books reveal.
Faith is a dangerous thing. “God, grant me unbelief,” may be the reaction of some readers to Reza Aslan’s clear-headed overview of the “cosmic war” in which we have been engaged since September 11 2001. “This crusade,” pause, “this war on terror,” pause, “is going to take a while.” With those words, George W Bush set the tone for the first global conflict of our century. Aslan, an Iranian scholar who arrived in the United States in 1979, returns us to the dictionary. “Crusade (noun): One of the medieval wars of religion waged by Christians against Muslims.”
Bush’s war was waged on a particular brand of terrorism, exclusively Islamic, and deployed the same rhetoric as his enemy. When Bush said: “Either you are with us or with the terrorists,” Osama bin Laden exclaimed: “I say either you are with the crusade, or you are with Islam.” Both invoked the same God to Satanise the other.
What is refreshing about Aslan’s analysis is its breadth and impartiality. He reminds us that jihadism is rooted in modernity, not tradition. After the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood became the only truly transnational Islamic movement. In 1981, disaffected members of the Brotherhood invoked “a more or less forgotten” schismatic theologian (Ibn Taymiyyah), dead for 600 years, to kill President Sadat and begin a revolution across the Arab world.
Meanwhile, the founder of modern political Zionism, the Austrian journalist Theodor Herzl, had earmarked a site for the Jewish state. In June 1895, he wrote in his diary: “We must expropriate gently the private property” and “spirit the penniless population across the border”. Aslan corrects a carefully constructed Zionist narrative that maintained that the Arab population in Palestine were not Palestinians but “part of the global ‘Arab nation’ and thus held no claim to the land on which they lived”. He shows how similar they all are – the Zealots of ancient Palestine, the radical religious Zionists of modern Israel, the cross-marked knights of the Christian crusades, the military missionaries of today’s US armed forces: “They cannot be negotiated with because they want nothing – at least nothing that this world can offer them.”
Bin Laden performed the clever trick of convincing young Muslims to stop obeying traditional religious leaders while assuming their authority for himself. His Jihadism – exclusive to Muslim’s Sunni sect – is a war that transcends not merely borders but the bounds of history, of which he has, like of Islamic law, the haziest notion. It also throws up some idiosyncratic models among his followers. “Remember Jack the Ripper,” urges Mohammed Hamid, a British Muslim who ran terrorist training camps in Wales. “Remember this people that never get caught, right.”
Hamid is one of 54 “British born or raised Muslims” analysed in Martyrdom, who were convicted of terrorism or died in pursuit of it. In sifting a “dataset” compiled from publicly available information, Jon and Benjamin Cole attempt to answer this question: why did these individuals raised in Britain seek to kill their fellow countrymen? In what is essentially an inconclusive cuttings job, the Coles make a collage of a typical member of this group: a disaffected and rootless 25-year-old working-class British Muslim male, of rural Pakistani descent, living in and around London. The decision to engage in violence is taken, apparently, “very quickly”.
Mohammed Siddique Khan, one of the suicide bombers on July 7 2005, was a second-generation Pakistani-Briton from West Yorkshire who, on a visit to the Wailing Wall, witnessed an old Palestinian man being manhandled by a nervous Israeli soldier. In that fateful moment, Khan felt neither British nor Pakistani. He was, to quote Aslan, “simply a Muslim: a member of a fractured, imaginary nation locked in an eternal cosmic war with a Jewish ‘nation’ just as imaginary and just as fractured”. For Khan as for Hamid, the version of Islamism peddled by bin Laden was, according to the authors of Martyrdom, “a natural way of transcending this cultural dislocation because it offered a new social identity that transcended both nationality and ethnicity”. Central to this global jihadism was a) the internet and b) martyrdom – a package that includes, supposedly: immediate admission to Heaven, marriage to 72 heavenly maidens and permission to bring along to Paradise 70 family members. One can’t help being reminded of Graham Greene’s idea of Hell, likened by George Orwell to a high-class nightclub, entry to which was reserved for Catholics only.
An illuminating first-hand account of someone who has, so to speak, got inside their moccasins and walked as they talked is Confessions of a Mullah Warrior, by a Harvard-educated Afghan who took part in the resistance against the Soviet occupation of his country. That invasion gave a perfect pretext for jihad to those like bin Laden. Masood Farivar reveals how deeply his fellow mujahideen despised these foreign “war tourists” seeking martyrdom. Others were there for the thrill of it, like the charismatic warrior and quondam heroin addict who recruited Farivar to Harvard: an Old Etonian Greek-Mexican, ex-boyfriend of Annabel Heseltine and former Wall Street bond trader, known as Karimullah.
The first British suicide bomber died in 2000 in Kashmir, the site of Jesus’s tomb according to the Islamic sect, the Ahmadi. Their belief that Jesus did not perish on the cross but lived to 120, in Srinigar, has made Ahmadis a persecuted group within mainstream Islam. Dr Simon Ross Valentine, a Methodist preacher and schoolteacher, spent 18 months living among the Ahmadi in Bradford. His charming, riveting, sympathetic and scholarly account serves to emphasise that Muslims are not homogenous, but, like Christians, composed of multiple ethnicities, cultures and factions.
For those attracted to the idea of jihad/crusade, the dehumanisation of non-Muslims is an integral part of indoctrination. As Valentine demonstrates in his appraisal of a peace-loving minority sect, one possible answer lies in rehumanisation: to believe a little less stridently in an unprovable God, a little more in an improvable humankind.
Somali piracy and terrorism in the Horn of Africa
Christoper L. Daniels.
Reviewed By John Hoist.
Christopher L. Daniels’s timely book on piracy and terrorism in the Horn of Africa provides detailed, valuable information on a poorly understood and under-studied region that is attracting growing international attention. Analysts and policy makers will undoubtedly find this to be a very useful book. Unlike many authors, who are reluctant to make explicit policy recommendations, Daniels is overt in his support for U.S. and international anti-terrorist and anti-piracy operations in Somalia, and ends the book with a clear prescription for greater international aid for the sake of “truly eradicating the terrorist threat worldwide"....The author does an excellent job of accurately and carefully synthesizing the latest journalistic accounts and UN documents on the Horn of Africa...Daniels has provided a valuable resource for those seeking an orientation to the subject and a timely contribution to the body of literature on the civil war in Somalia.
A well-informed and authoritative account of the origins and magnitude of the threat of Somali piracy and terrorism plaguing the waters of the Horn of Africa. The author explains how the collapse of the Somali state and the ensuing chaos and anarchy created the environment for piracy and terrorism to proliferate and become major threats – embodied in the rise of terrorist groups such as al Shabaab and sharp spike in pirate attacks off the Somali coast. The author concludes with a critique of the measures employed to mitigate such security threats and offers a series of recommendations, such as establishing an all-inclusive reconciliation process, increased funding for peacekeeping operations, port security, eliminating ransom payments, challenging the religious legitimacy of terrorist organisations, monitoring and countering the internet propaganda by terrorist organisations, and developing other long-term strategies. The appendices include a timeline of major events in Somalia, a listing of the country’s clans, key people and institutions, and definitions of terms and acronyms.
Understanding Poverty
Edited by Abhijit Vinayak Banerjee, Roland Bénabou and Dilip Mookherjee.
Understanding poverty and what to do about it, is perhaps the central concern of all of economics. Yet the lay public almost never gets to hear what leading professional economists have to say about it. This volume brings together twenty-eight essays by some of the world leaders in the field, who were invited to tell the lay reader about the most important things they have learnt from their research that relate to poverty. The essays cover a wide array of topics: the first essay is about how poverty gets measured. The next section is about the causes of poverty and its persistence, and the ideas range from the impact of colonialism and globalization to the problems of "excessive" population growth, corruption and ethnic conflict. The next section is about policy: how should we fight poverty? The essays discuss how to get drug companies to produce more vaccines for the diseases of the poor, what we should and should not expect from micro-credit, what we should do about child labor, how to design welfare policies that work better and a host of other topics. The final section is about where the puzzles lie: what are the most important anomalies, the big gaps in the way economists think about poverty? The essays talk about the puzzling reluctance of Kenyan farmers to fertilizers, the enduring power of social relationships in economic transactions in developing countries and the need to understand where aspirations come from, and much else. Every essay is written with the aim of presenting the latest and the most sophisticated in economics without any recourse to jargon or technical language.
Security and Political Economy outlook in Africa in 2016
Ray Cummings.
Just as its physical landscape, the political environment of sub-Saharan Africa in 2015 varied greatly from country to country. On a positive note, elections in politically polarized countries such as Nigeria, Tanzania, Guinea, and Cote d’Ivoire concluded relatively peacefully, despite the shadow of political violence looming large. Burkina Faso, which entered the year in political limbo following the ousting of long-serving president Blaise Compaoré, also elected its first, democratic government thwarting a coup attempt by the deposed leader’s presidential guard in the process.
In another encouraging development, 2015 also marked the nadir of the West African Ebola outbreak, which killed more than 11,000 people since the virus was first reported in the region in early 2012. Just today, the World Health Organization declared Liberia—the last affected country—Ebola-free. However, while last year saw Sub-Saharan Africa overcome a number of important challenges, it also saw the continuation and often the creation of social, political, and economic obstacles that will define the continent’s security outlook in 2016.
In West Africa, 2015 saw the threat posed by Islamist extremist groups both evolve and expand across the region. This was best exemplified by developments linked to Boko Haram, which not only pledged its allegiance to the so-called Islamic State (ISIS)—becoming that group’s largest affiliate in the process—but also exported its insurgency outside of Nigeria’s borders. With punitive measures by Nigeria and its Lake Chad Basin neighbors expected to continue in the coming year, retaliatory attacks in the form of suicide bombings, kidnappings, and armed raids will likely persist, if not increase, in parts of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger in 2016.
Of particular concern is the possibility that Boko Haram will attempt to adopt the operating protocols of ISIS-affiliates elsewhere, targeting Western interests in the respective areas of operation. This year may also see groups affiliated with al-Qaeda continue to demonstrate their relevance in the international jihadi fraternity now dominated by ISIS and its various wilayats, or provinces. Mali’s desert north will likely remain the primary operational theater for al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its affiliates, for example. As demonstrated in 2015, further devastating attacks in the south of the country, including Bamako, are also possible, as is the expansion of militant activity to neighboring countries such as Mauritania, Niger, and Burkina Faso.
Islamist extremism is also expected to remain a feature of East Africa’s security environment. However, the coming year may see the primary driver of that threat, al-Shabaab, being as much at war with itself as with its primary adversaries, namely the governments of Somalia, Kenya, and their African Union (AU) allies. A tug-of-war between ISIS and al-Qaeda for control of al-Shabaab leadership could see the movement fracture, pitting opposing factions against each other in a war for ideological and territorial supremacy. While this could potentially weaken al-Shabaab, it could also make the group deadlier, with opposing factions using acts of violence as a yardstick for gaining pre-eminence.
In Central Africa, 2015 concluded with a fragile peace being forged in the conflict-ridden nations of South Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR). In both of these, warring factions have committed to ceasefires and democratic processes aimed at finding a binding peace. However, the disparate and decentralized nature of their primary actors raises concerns as to the willingness to adhere to these processes. Furthermore, the devastating socioeconomic impacts of the wars could themselves serve as catalysts for chronic political instability and associated insecurity in 2016.
While conflict may have declined by the end of the year in South Sudan and CAR, they certainly increased in Burundi. Pierre Nkurunziza’s re-election to an unprecedented third successive presidential term continues to incite violence against and in support of his regime. This unrest has killed 400 people, and displaced 220,000 others, since April 2015. With concerns that the country may be regressing to a civil war fought along ethnic and political lines, the AU has pledged to deploy a peacekeeping force mandated to protect civilians. This proposal has been vehemently rejected by Nkurunziza, who will likely persist in suppressing both opposition to his regime.
In the Great Lakes, 2016 will more than likely be shaped by elections to be held in several states. The first poll is set for Uganda, where President Yoweri Museveni will face the greatest challenge to his near three-decade long rule on February 18th. The incumbent will find an opponent of equal political and financial clout in prominent businessman and fellow National Resistance Movement stalwart Amama Mbabazi, whom Museveni removed as prime minister in September 2014. Both camps have already accused the other of sponsoring militias to incite violence in the lead-up to the election. There are credible concerns that a win for either leader could have violent repercussions for Uganda.
Landmark elections are also scheduled to take place in both the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and neighboring Republic of the Congo. While the outcome of these polls has the potential to shift the political trajectories of both countries, the period leading up to the elections will be equally defining, with Joseph Kabila in the DRC and Denis Sassou-Nguesso in the Republic of the Congo both seeking contentious third terms that will require constitutional amendments. Attempts to facilitate this have already seen, and will likely continue to see, both leaders face widespread and violent opposition.
In southern Africa, faltering economic conditions brought about by dwindling oil prices, environmental conditions, and infrastructure carry the potential to catalyze civil unrest. Angola, whose peacetime economy was rebuilt almost solely off oil revenue, is facing rising inflation, a depreciating currency, and burgeoning unemployment as a result of the falling prices. The Angolan government, already beset by accusations of corruption, maladministration, and repression, may find it difficult to placate an increasingly vocal and frustrated citizenry should the economic downturn persist.
In South Africa, finally, a combination of water and power shortages could also restrict economic growth, cut food production, and lead to job losses in sectors dependent on the provision of these resources. Apart from leading to an uptick in protest activity and increasing already substantial crime rates, the prevailing economic conditions could influence voting behavior in the country’s forthcoming municipal elections. Some analysts believe that a poor showing for the ruling African National Congress in the local elections could lead to the recalling of controversial president Jacob Zuma—a move which itself could see violent reprisals by his supporters.
Why We Should Care About ISIS Recruiting
Dustin Henry.
The Islamic State, also known as ISIS/ISIL/IS, is renowned for their recruiting. Al-Qa’ida was known for recruiting people from around the Muslim world, but ISIS has successfully reached out into the West and pulled people in. But where did ISIS originate? In a twisted way the United States and Coalition members who operated in Iraq can be blamed for ISIS. It was discovered that at least 12 of ISIS' core leadership were prisoners in Camp Bucca [i]. Thus, the 2010 boom of ISIS can be directly attributed to a Western held POW camp in Iraq, where ISIS leadership, met, conspired, and planned. When the US moved out of the region and Iraq was left to govern itself, the Syrian conflict exploded because of a pro-democracy resistance.
ISIS moved into the destabilized region to start a caliphate. While it would be fantastic to iterate why the Islamic State wanted to establish a caliphate and how it relates to Islam, this is not the forum for it. Unfortunately, that topic cannot be truly discussed in brief. But as the organization moved from Iraq and into Syria, it began to grow. They met resistance but were able to expand their new ‘state’. Not only did the organization (and arguably small new nation) increase geographically, it grew in population and fighters. How did they expand from a core group of a dozen men, to an army?
The CIA gave an estimate of how many ISIS members there were in 2014, and it ranged from 20,000 to 31,500. This was up from the 9,000 to 18,000 that US intelligence reported less than a year prior [ii]. This increase is significant, but how did they do it. It’s very well documented that the Islamic State has been producing phenomenal recruitment videos. Recently, al-Qa’ida shot back at ISIS for their highly staged videos [iii]. Regardless, they have been fruitful. That being said, their methods should be analyzed.
Professor Mohammed Hafez stated that two primary means of radicalization exist in the Middle East. The first was called the top-down method and the second is called the bottom-up approach [iv]. But how does this apply to our case study? The top-down method is defined by recruiting methods conducted by the organization. The bottom-up approach is the exact opposite, where potential recruits seek out the organization. This may seem strange for some; however, we see this commonly in American culture. Every time you sit on your couch, watch The Walking Dead on Sunday night, and happen across a US military commercial, you have been hit with the top-down. It’s recruiting 101. However, when a young man (or woman) lives in a bleak environment and needs a decent job, but does not have an opportunity, he may walk into a military recruiting office. This would give the person a chance at education, meaning, training, skills, travel, etc… this is also a perfect example of the bottom-up approach.
Now that we have an understanding, we have to look at how this is occurring in the Syrian/Iraqi region. ISIS has moved into several locations that were destabilized. Sometimes they destabilized the area, and other times they moved into a vacuum. However, when they take control, they immediately enforce strict Sharia Law (another topic that cannot be explained in brief), among others. This makes it difficult to find work, or even live life normally. Therefore, the locals do not have many options at providing for themselves or their families. The Syrian/Iraqi region is also being destroyed by other Islamic radicals, US backed forces, European forces, Russian & Iranian forces, and forces backed by Russians & Iranians. There are more militaries involved in the area than anywhere else in the world. Thus, the locals become more prone to radicalization because their way of life and culture is threatened every day. Feeding off of this, ISIS takes advantage of the desperate situation by broadcasting propaganda. Their recruitment attempts promise the populace a chance at making money, making a difference, and finding a way out of desperation.
In Syrian civil war, the bottom-up and top-down feed off of each other. It’s a disgusting cycle of despondency. Therefore, while destroying the caliphate is important, it is just as important to instill stability in the region. Until it is safe to live in Syria, Iraq, and surrounding states, there will always be radical Islam. While radical Islam exists, there will threats to safety around the world.
Citations:
[i] Ward , C. (2014, November 4). The Origins of ISIS: Finding the Birthplace of Jihad. Retrieved February 27, 2016, from CBS Evening News: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-origins-of-isis-finding-the-birthplace-of-jihad/
[ii] Gartenstein-Ross, D. (2015, February 9). HOW MANY FIGHTERS DOES THE ISLAMIC STATE REALLY HAVE? Retrieved from War on the Rocks: http://warontherocks.com/2015/02/how-many-fighters-does-the-islamic-state-really-have/
[iii] Chiramonte, P. (2016, February 25). ISIS, Al Qaeda point fingers in Yemen over 'fake' propaganda videos. Retrieved from Fox News: http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/02/25/isis-al-qaeda-point-fingers-in-yemen-over-fake-propaganda-videos.html
[iv] CSIS. "Pathways to Muslim Radicalization." CSIS Congressional Forum on Islam. Washington, D.C., 2007. 1-2.
Negative Interest rates are for developed economies; African Countries should stay far away from them
Economists are usually, in the main, a reasonable sort. But their persistent inability to speak uniformly on critical matters of global interest or the inability to approximate the final value of an economic variable is beginning to wear thin on policy makers who depend so heavily on their expertise. Take the current rage of negative interest rate; economists had emphatically said it could not (or at least should not) happen. Yet rich-world central banks are starting to impose negative interest rates. In June 2014 the European Central Bank (ECB) began paying -0.1% on deposits held in its vault, before lowering the rate to -0.2% in September. Denmark and Switzerland have negative rates, as well. And on February 12th the Swedes joined the party: the Riksbank cut its benchmark interest rate to -0.1%. Central bankers hope that moving into negative territory will boost their economies in a number of ways. Will it?
When an economy is struggling, it is standard practice for a central bank to cut interest rates. That makes saving less attractive and borrowing more so, boosting the amount of money being spent and kick-starting an economic recovery. But very low inflation can make a central bank's life harder. Many big economies are now experiencing “deflation”, where prices are falling. In the euro zone, for instance, the main interest rate is at 0.05% but the "real" (or adjusted for inflation) interest rate is considerably higher, at 0.65%, because euro-area inflation has dropped into negative territory at -0.6%. If deflation gets worse then real interest rates will rise even more, choking off recovery rather than giving it a lift. Desperate to avoid this trap, ever more European central bankers have waded into the unfamiliar territory of negative interest rates.
Some economists consider this dangerous. Some reckon it shouldn't be possible at all. Since cash carries an implicit rate of interest of 0%, consumers might well respond to negative rates by withdrawing money from banks and stuffing it in their mattresses. The resulting shortage of loanable funds would push interest rates up (though perhaps not before causing an economy-crushing bank run). Central banks are now betting that savers won’t run for the hills—after all, storing money is costly and risky. But negative rates may create financial instability in other ways. Banks may be reluctant to pass negative rates on to depositors, lest they lose customers to other financial institutions (or the mattress). But those same banks may earn returns on their assets which vary with interest rates. Building societies, a type of mutually owned bank in Britain, are particularly dependent on their deposits, so they are reluctant to reduce deposit rates below zero. But they have assets, like mortgages, with interest payments contractually linked to the interest rate. For institutions in that position, negative rates would lead to lower profits and, eventually, to erosion of capital. Damaged financial institutions are unlikely to power a rapid recovery.
Whether other effects might prove more benign remains to be seen. The boldness of the move to negative interest rates could convince consumers that central banks are serious about beating deflation—or lead them to conclude that even zero cannot keep inflation and interest rates from tumbling. The best hope for success, however, lies in foreign-exchange markets. Negative rates might send investors in search of better returns abroad, leading to depreciation of the currency. That would raise the price of imports, helping to combat deflation and giving a growth-enhancing boost to exporters. Since the ECB introduced negative deposit rates the euro has fallen against the dollar by nearly 20%. It is no coincidence that the Danish central bank has pursued negative interest rates so zealously—its sole objective is a fixed exchange rate with the plunging euro. If currencies fall by enough, then negative rates might just pay off—provided that sinking prices elsewhere don't lead ever more of the global economy to take the plunge into sub-zero waters.
Negative interest rate as a trend in the global economy
Kashik Basin.
It is time for the annual Spring Meetings. Many of the world’s finance and development ministers, along with business and civil society leaders, are here is Washington and have been meeting with us at the World Bank this week to discuss what we can do to rise up to these challenging times. Most conversations have come to land on two important questions, namely: What is happening around the world in different regions? And: what can we do to stem the slowdown and disunity around the right policy way ahead?
The global economy has hit a difficult patch. We at the World Bank have had to lower our global growth forecast from 2.9%, as recently as January, to 2.5%. There was pressure on us in January that we were being too pessimistic when we put out the forecast of 2.9%. In retrospect, we were not pessimistic enough.
Let me clarify, this is a matter of concern but not a crisis. It is, instead, a festering wound from the earlier sub-prime crisis and the sovereign debt crisis that is refusing to heal. It is not a situation that should give us sleepless nights but could cause a dull, low-grade pain through the night.
It is a constellation of forces that has led to this predicament. The most recent challenge comes from the low commodity prices which is causing great hardship on commodity exporters and inflicting adjustment costs on everybody, especially the corporations and firms that had invested in commodities and, in particular, oil.
My own expectation is that, barring major political turmoil in oil-exporting regions, oil prices will remain in the range 40 to 55 dollars per barrel in the near future, for a couple of years. The arrival of Iranian oil and the potential increase in shale oil supply as soon as prices rise sufficiently sets an effective ceiling on oil prices. These forces are unlikely to go away soon.
I expect that the benefits of low commodity prices will eventually kick in and the global economy will turn around and do better. This could begin as early as next year. But there is a period of difficult adjustment ahead.
While there isn’t too much we can do about these natural processes and their attendant problems, there is a global policy problem that we can try to solve. The big policy lesson of our time is that the world of today is too globalized for disparate, inward-looking policies to be effective. We have seen the stresses of uncoordinated economic policy in recent statements on how the US Federal Reserve has had to go slow on rate hikes. This is not because of the US economy but the global situation.
The Fed is right in stressing this. It seems reasonable to argue that with 6 major central banks having gone for negative interest rates, the US Fed cannot alone pull in a different direction. This stresses the need for better policy coordination.
And speaking of negative interest rates, we have to admit, we do not fully understand their implications. As policy, this may work when it is one or two countries using it for a short duration, but when a whole host of nations use it, there is a growing feeling that it does not work. No country gets an exchange rate advantage and they all get the effect of a perverse savings behavior.
Let me explain the latter. It is commonly believed that, as interest rates rise, people save more—they park their money in banks, in bonds, and in savings account. This is another way of saying that, when interest rates drop, they pull their money out from savings and divert it to consumption. What this misses out on is that this is true within a reasonable range of interest rates. When interest rates go sufficiently low, a different logic sets in—a worry about what will happen when they retire. In short, when interest rates go very low, the pressure builds up to shore up savings for old age or simply when one is out of work.
Suppose a poor person saves $6,716 each year. If the interest rate is 4%, she will get to a saving of $200,000 at the time of her retirement 20 years later. That is not a lot of money for the post retirement years. So when interest rate drops, say to minus ½%, instead of thinking it is not worth saving, she will now be worried about her retirement. If she treats 200,000 dollars at retirement as a target, she will have to save more, in fact, $10,483 each year.
In brief, if a person’s income is 20,000 dollars per annum, and he wants to have a saving of $200,000 at the end of 20 years, he has to save 34% of his income if interest is 4%; and 52% if interest is minus ½%.
The supply curve of savings is not everywhere upward-sloping, as we were taught in school, but more like a fishhook, ready to catch economies in a low-growth trap.
With interest rates going as low as they are now, it is likely that this trap is getting set, causing consumption to be cut back in favor of greater savings, and this is what is prolonging the slow growth in Japan, in Europe and many other parts of the world.
In short, we need to re-think the ubiquity of negative interest rates, and we need better policy coordination. For this reason, I support the IMF line that Brexit will be unfortunate. It will disrupt one more link of policy coordination—this one within Europe—and, as such, will be bad for both Europe and more so the UK.
One more challenge that we are all facing comes from the otherwise-welcome rise of technology, both labor saving and labor linking, which makes it possible for workers in emerging economies to work for firms and organizations in faraway nations. This is causing wages to decline and job creation to be anemic especially in advanced economies. Among emerging economies, the ones that are able to maintain a stable business ethos and manage their policies reasonably will grow.
The diverse performance within the BRICS countries talks to this. India is growing above 7%, China just below 7%, South Africa is growing but very slowly, while Russia and Brazil are witnessing the pain of declining GDP. Divergence of this kind has rarely been seen. The crying need in emerging economies and advanced economies is that of innovative policies for creating jobs and boosting the incomes of workers. This requires data, research, determination and above all innovative thinking.
The various dimensions of national security: A commentary
September 11, 2001, stands as a critical pivot point in history, one that put the threat of terrorism in the national spotlight and demanded immediate expertise in national security. Yet, as new as the issue may have seemed to many observers, this demand for legal, political, and technical attention to national security reflected a longer-term set of profound changes. The fall of Communism and the end of the Cold War ushered in a new era of geopolitics, ending a past marked largely by alliances between—and rivalries across—nations and beginning an era of global risks from actors not easily defined by, or constrained within, state borders. The collapse of the Soviet Union left nuclear weapons and materials in unstable countries and unprotected facilities, providing attractive targets for rogue states and terrorist groups. This precarious situation has been exacerbated by the growing ambitions of Iran and North Korea. A revolution in digital and information technologies has produced innovations that not only afford new intelligence capabilities for government authorities but also create new forums for terrorist communication, recruitment, and training. Mass migrations of people due to economic hardship, ethnic and religious conflicts, and climate change increase the likelihood of disputes over basic resources, further adding to the risk of violence. Alongside these emerging threats, many traditional security concerns remain salient, including human rights violations in China, tensions between India and Pakistan, and the menace of international piracy.
Devising responses to threats from each of these sources produces its own set of complications and complexities for any nation and for the international community. The U.S.-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan called into question settled precepts of warfare, including the use of preemptive force, the relevance of the Geneva Conventions, the distinction between enemy combatants and civilians, the role of private military contractors, and the function of the United Nations Security Council. The global war on terror challenges domestic law, practices, and politics inside the United States, especially regarding port and border security; coordination among federal agencies; individual privacy and government secrecy; and collaboration between federal, state and local governments. Assessing and responding to national security threats requires new bridges across the public and private divide, for effective security strategies must bring together government actors, private companies, and nongovernmental organizations in direct or indirect partnerships. New legal questions accompany each of these challenges; such questions cast doubt on once- settled legal doctrines and thus present an opportunity for the forging of new areas of law, which in turn raises an array of legal and policy concerns. Lawyers and legal scholars are discovering that in this new age, national security issues cannot be broken down and analyzed as isolated topics. National security concerns implicate domestic and international dimensions, legal and policy issues, and technological and philosophical problems, and, indeed, call for attention to all of these elements as a whole.