CASADE

As Oil Prices Slump, Many African Countries Would Benefit While Nigeria and Sudan Bear The Brunt.

The price of oil halved between June 2014 and March 2015. This was mainly due to increased oil supply – particularly in the US, which last year saw the highest volume increase since records began in 1900. An overall slowdown in global demand has contributed to the price drop as well.

Low oil prices are bad news for Africa’s major oil exporters. But this is not the whole story. In fact, lower prices and lower inflation will be a boon for African oil importers and consumers, improving growth prospects for many African countries. If governments pursue smart policies, they can translate these opportunities into sustained benefits to their economies.

Nigeria and Sudan among oil exporters that would suffer the most

An oil price drop directly hurts exporters. If prices fall by around 30% between 2015 and 2014, as predicted by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank), we estimate that sub-Saharan Africa will lose $63 billion – around 5% of the region’s gross domestic product (GDP). Oil exporters like Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Congo, Gabon and Sudan will bear the brunt.

We are already seeing this starting to happen. The value of African oil exports to the European Union, US, Japan and China fell by $25 billion, or 13%, last year. Exports to the US account for much of that, where fracking has helped reduced its demand for oil imports by 44%, but exports to the EU also declined substantially, by 10%. And the drop in the value of sub-Saharan African oil exports to these countries was most noticeable in the last quarter of 2014, when they fell by 17% year-on-year. Exports from Nigeria fell by 14% ($11 billion, or 2.1% of GDP).

But oil importers and consumers stand to gain

At the same time, the sub-Saharan African countries that rely on importing oil will be the biggest winners. We estimate that the 30% oil price drop would reduce imports by around $15 billion, with the major gainers including South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya and Ethiopia. The value of Tanzania’s oil imports have already dropped by 20% ($800 million, or 2.5% of GDP) over the 12 months to January 2015.

There is a further group that will benefit: consumers. Between June 2014 and February 2015, inflation fell by 2% in Tanzania, South Africa and Kenya. If inflation remains low, real disposable incomes will rise correspondingly, which could increase consumer spending by around $10 billion across sub-Saharan Africa.

And this is good news for growth prospects in these countries. The World Bank’s forecast for growth in Kenya in 2015, for example, was recently revised up from 4.7% to 6%, citing lower oil prices. So even as we face a period of slow global growth, Africa’s oil importers stand to gain. Generally, African countries also gain indirectly when low oil prices boost world growth.

How African economies can mitigate shocks – and sustain the benefits

So how can the oil exporters minimise their exports losses? In the short term, they can put in place macro financial instruments such as introducing less monetary tightening than would have been the case without the oil price decline. They also need to reduce fiscal deficits and lower oil benchmark prices in budgeting processes.

Ultimately however, Nigeria and other oil exporters need to reduce their economies’ dependence on volatile oil prices, by increasing energy efficiency and diversifying trade and production. If the oil price drop can be a catalyst for economic transformation, it could bring sustained benefits.

As for the oil importers, the long-term benefits of falling oil prices are by no means guaranteed. Kenya, South Africa and others need to take advantage of this opportunity to invest in skills, infrastructure and technology for the long-term. There are further measures that all countries can take to enhance the positive effects of oil price declines on lower inflation, for example, ensuring that consumers quickly see the benefits of falling oil prices on cheaper food and other goods. This is also an opportunity for governments to reduce oil price subsidies or increase taxes – an obvious strategy that is not just sound economics but sound environmental policy too.

Finally, this is a moment for all countries to recognise the need to foster cooperation between the winners and losers of the recent oil price changes. Whether at the global, G20 or national level, we need common facilities for managing future oil shocks.

by CASADE

From Strong Men To Strong Institutions: An Assessment Of Africa’s Transition Towards More Political Contestability

Vera Songwe.

As President Obama said during his recent address at the African Union, "There's a lot that I'd like to do to keep America moving. But the law is the law, and no person is above the law, not even the president."
This sentence, uttered during his speech to the African Union last month, summarizes President Obama’s message to Africa when it comes to the need for strong institutions. In his speech he highlighted that the first president of the United States, George Washington (1789-1797), refused to run for a third term in 1798—during the nascent years of the republic—despite popular acclaim and instead stepped down to ensure there was peaceful transition and the principles of democracy upheld. South Africa’s Nelson Mandela did the same thing.
In 1940 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, however, in an unprecedented move in U.S. history—and about a century and a half after George Washington—sought a third and a fourth third term and won. Those were extraordinary times some would say: World War II had begun. However, shortly before the 44th president of United States was born, and before many African countries got independence in 1951 the United States Congress moved to ratify an amendment to the U.S. constitution formerly limiting presidential terms to two. The amendment was passed in 1947 and took four years to ratify. Thus, it took the U.S. from George Washington to Harry Truman, 1797 to 1951, to strengthen and perfect this institution. Thus, even in America building institutions takes time, but, once built, they are respected: No one has since dared to change the 22nd Amendment, even as America continues to strive to build a more perfect union.
Africa's early experience with representation: A timid one
The concept of elected representation (representative government) began on the continent at independence towards the end of the 1950s for some and the 1960s for most. As Figure 1 shows, from the 1950s to the 1980s the number of uncontested (single party) elections increased substantially. The continent went from having less than five uncontested elections in the 1950s to over 37 uncontested elections by the 1980s. One could term this period “the learning years,” as countries were experimenting with the concepts of the ballot box and representative rule. By the end of 1980 almost all countries on the continent had organized elections at least three times, and the moment was ripe for more inclusive and contested representation. Citizens began to demand more representation. But leaders remained reluctant for the most part to opening up. Unrest set in.

From uncontested elections to coups: A tortuous transition
The transition from uncontested elections to contested elections was not a peaceful one, with a multitude of military interventions around the continent. In fact, the decade 1980-1989 saw the most coups in the history of Africa. In this way, the 1980s also saw the most government transitions overall, but mostly in an uncontested setting. By the end of the 1990s many countries had experienced the cost of coup d’états, and there was a growing rejection of military coups and the emergence of opposition parties across the continent. This experience helped Africa transition from uncontested to contested elections.

Multiparty elections become a more common, though not universal, political transition
By the 1990s the transition trend in African countries had resolutely migrated from a dominance of uncontested elections to contested elections. The number of contested elections grew exponentially from less than 20 in the 1980s to a staggering 72 in the 1990s as countries introduced term limits, reduced mandates from seven years to five years or less, and adopted new constitutions. This trend was consolidated at the end of the last decade and the concept of contested elections—multi-party elections—became commonplace.
From contested elections to leadership transitions: Institution building launched
Africa is at a new crossroads in its institutional building process. While the number of uncontested elections and coup d’états has dropped, the number of contested elections leading to leadership transitions is not proportionally increasing. In addition, there are a number of countries that have experienced only one leadership transition since independence, and none of those transitions was competitive. In addition to the intransience of many leaders, another great and growing fear is that of backsliding. Leaders elected through an open and contested process, with clear and transparent constitutions in place, are beginning to question the need for term limits. There is a groundswell of initiatives across the continent of presidents trying to change constitutions not to bring more stability to the system but to regress. In Burkina Faso and Burundi these attempts have led to civil unrest and the loss of lives. These are the groups to whom President Obama was referring to when he now famously said to the African Union, “I think if I ran [again], I could win. But I can’t.” Over the next year, Africa will see elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Gabon, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea—all countries where presidents have met their term limits. How Africa defines this decade will depend on what happens in all these countries and many more with elections before the end of 2020 in which sitting presidents will have met their term limits.
Emerging truisms
First, while many countries have moved from single party to peaceful, contested elections there is still significant dominance of incumbents winning elections. This trend implies that the competitive process is not ripe enough to deliver the results contests are meant to produce.
Second, the countries with the most leadership transitions have been those where the competitive process has been circumvented like in Nigeria, Comoros, Libya, Benin, Ghana, and Somalia. These countries have had the most leadership transitions, but most of these have been as a result of non-competitive processes and most of the time by military takeovers. In fact, the countries with the most transitions are countries that have had the most number of coups. Nigeria leads the pack with over 16 transitions of 6 coups, followed by others like Comoros with 5 coups and over 12 leadership transitions. Importantly, Ghana and Nigeria transitioned from coup d’états into competitive elections and have never gone back but have rather continued to perfect the competitive process. These two countries have even had leaders die in office, but as a testament to their competitive experience and their institutions, the competitive process was orderly restored or maintained. Despite these developments, they are outliers and the process of peaceful contestation resulting in leadership transitions is not yet a consistent and dominant normal.
Third, initial conditions seem to matter: Countries that launched competitive transition processes shortly after independence—like Mauritius, Zambia, and Botswana—have succeeded in keeping the momentum and have not been plagued by coups or other disruptions in leadership. Whereas countries like Liberia that launched mock contestations where the same leader was reelected ended up with coups before settling once again into competitive election processes.
Fourth, looking ahead to the rest of this decade, there are ominous signs that citizens in countries where a truly competitive process has not taken root will be fertile ground for popular uprisings and instability—including, unfortunately, terror. As President Obama recently noted, “If we sacrifice liberty in the name of security we risk losing both.” This truth is all the more relevant in countries with rapidly expanding youth populations, low literacy rates, and rising unemployment.
The continent has clearly leap-frogged into the process of contested elections and representation. What the United States took a century and a half to accomplish, some African countries have accomplished in less than 40 years. The process has been, at times, tortuous; there is still backsliding in some countries and inertia in others. However, clearly emerging is a resolute move towards more contested elections and leadership transitions.
Importantly, over the next five years the role of citizens, the role of African Union, and leadership demonstrated by other countries like the U.S. will be critical in determining how Africa’s leadership transition history evolves. Will the African Union succeed in adopting legislation that makes term limits binding? Will Western countries support civil society in isolating leaders who attempt to circumvent their constitutions? Will President Obama take positive measures to ensure the hopes and dreams of so many of the youth that listened to him come to pass when the sun sets on this decade?
In the meantime, while we celebrate countries like Mauritius, Botswana, Cape Verde, Benin, Zambia, Botswana, Kenya, Ghana, and many others, we cannot lose sight of the fact that there is still a lot more to do to perfect the institutions for representation in these countries and on the continent as a whole. To protect and strengthen these institutions a number of challenges need to be tackled such as dealing with the  cost of contested elections, developing transparent and inclusive electoral codes, clarifying the election process (in many countries election day is not set in the constitution),  perfecting the voting systems, building credible  electoral commissions, and most of all protecting the will of the people—first to exercise their civic duty to participate in the contest and second to accept the results.  Here Africa can learn from itself but also from other countries and could even provide solutions for the world to employ. The African Union, like the U.S. Congress of 1947 can take on these challenges, and with the youth of Africa by her side, an Africa with leaders chosen by the people with dignity and peace underpinned by strong institutions will emerge.

by CASADE

Extortion Fees From Trans-Saharan Migrants through Libya As Source of Funds For Terrorism in Africa

Wend William.

The phenomenon of migrants traversing the hostile terrain of northern Africa to Europe is not new—not the routes or the dangers. A decade ago,experts estimated that about 2,000 migrants drowned each year attempting to cross the Mediterranean and untold numbers perished in the desert. But after the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, the number of people crossing the Mediterranean from Libya (the Central Mediterranean route) has grown exponentially—resulting in a 277 percent increase since 2013.

In fact, 60 percent of all migrants caught illegally entering Europe in 2013 came on boats from Libya. On those boats, nearly half were Syrians (39,651) and Eritreans (33,559) who were granted “protection status,” provided to persons fleeing conflict or persecution or for other humanitarian reasons. As a result, they received residence permits, access to employment, education, and healthcare among other benefits. Sub-Saharan migrants contributed the next largest cohort (26,340) crossing the Mediterranean from Libya. Only a fraction of these received protection status as they were deemed to be “economic migrants”—those merely seeking to improve their standard of living.

Whether fleeing conflict or persecution or seeking to improve one’s standard of living, many African migrants converge on the same Central Mediterranean route (see graphic below). With many Sub-Saharan countries facing an expanding youth bulge, the number of African migrants is likely to rise in the coming years. Indeed, more young migrants than ever (including a growing number of women and minors as young as 14) are embarking on the risky journey toward Libya’s coast.

Transnational criminal and terrorist networks benefit most from the migration flows

As migrants make their way across the desert and eventually the Mediterranean, they increasingly face exploitation and abuse at the hands of transnational criminal rings and extremist groups. Trafficking and torture of Eritrean migrants is well-documented in Sudan and Egypt. As criminal and terrorist groups have found control over these smuggling and trafficking routes to be highly lucrative, their role in this illicit activity can only be expected to grow.

Source: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2015

In response to the rising demand, the migrant smuggling economy has bloomed. On Libya’s coast it is valued at $255-$323 million a year and dwarfs Libya’s other illicit enterprises. The fees migrants pay for safe passage to Libya and beyond do not just go to small-time smugglers. Various groups also charge a “protection” tax for anyone crossing their path. For many migrants coming through West Africa, their money finds its way into the hands of terrorist groups like al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al Mourabitoun (formed by Mokhtar Belmokhtar), Ansar Dine, and Ansar al Sharia who control swaths of territory through Algeria, Libya, Mali, and Niger. Migrants coming from the Middle East, increasingly encounter the Islamic State (IS), which has attacked refugee camps in western Syria to increase the flow of Syrians south toward Egypt through IS-controlled territories for the purpose of raising revenue.

Extortion of migrants is just one way criminal and terrorist networks benefit from gaining a foothold in fragile countries. The lasting damage they do to these societies is another. As organized crime becomes rooted in areas where state security and judicial institutions are weak or corrupt, it becomes far more difficult to eradicate. For many of these areas the illicit economy brings one of the only means of subsistence. Eventually, the communities become more disposed toward the criminal activity at the expense of rule of law.

The entrenchment of organized criminal and terrorist groups in the vacuum provided by weak government control has already been seen in parts of northern Mali and Niger, southern Algeria, and in Libya. This, in turn, diminishes economic investment (and job prospects) as well as the space to build state structures, democracy, and stability.

Priorities for Action

Much of the focus on the Central Mediterranean migration crisis has been on the heightened European efforts at interdiction. Likewise, much of the instability in Libya is viewed through the lens of the growing influence of terrorist groups like the Islamic State. However, the intertwining of the migration crisis and terrorist groups highlights other priorities such as:

Stabilization. Stabilizing Libya is central to stemming the immediate migration crisis. Doing so will also directly affect an important source of revenue going to the Islamic State and other terrorist and criminal groups that are exploiting the crisis for their financial gain.

The migration crisis also shines a light on the desperation of citizens living under repressive African states such as Eritrea. International diplomatic and humanitarian engagement in Eritrea and other authoritarian states in Africa can help address a key segment of the Central Mediterranean migration crisis at its source.

Raising the Costs on Human Smugglers. External efforts must also focus on criminalizing migrant smuggling—not the migrants. Central to these efforts will be the need to raise the cost and risk for smugglers. Reinstating an effective police presence, which used to exist under Gaddafi’s regime, would discourage smugglers who now don’t even feel the need to hide their human cargo. Niger also recently placed legal responsibility on transport “companies” to ensure their travelers have valid documents. Otherwise, these groups are at risk of having their assets confiscated.

Better Information for Source Migrant Communities. For the migrants and the communities through which they pass, more information and direct assistance is necessary. UNHCR, for example, has set up skills training and awareness-raising workshops for Eritrean migrants in Ethiopia to dissuade them from continuing onward to Europe. The EU has plans to set up a presence in Agadez, a hub of West African migration, to tackle the smuggling economy that has infiltrated every aspect of this central Nigerien town.

Further reading:

• Altai Consulting, Mixed Migration: Libya at the Crossroads: Mapping of Migration Routes from Africa to Europe and Drivers of Migration in Post-revolution Libya (UNHCR, 2013).
• Libya: a growing hub for Criminal Economies and Terrorist Financing in the Trans-Sahara, The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (May 2015).
• Mark Shaw and Fiona Mangan, “Illicit Trafficking and Libya’s Transition: Profits and Losses,” Peaceworks 96, US Institute of Peace (2014).
• Organized Crime and Illicit Trafficking in Mali: Past, President and Future, The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (January 2014).
• Tim Midgley, Ivan Briscoe, and Daniel Bertoli, Identifying Approaches and Measuring Impacts of Programmes Focused on Transnational Organised Crime, Saferworld (May 2014).

by CASADE

China In Africa Is Good, But Can Discourage Industrialization In The Continent

Edward Paice and Jonathan Bhalla.
“China: friend or foe?” was the title of a special Q & A session with the BBC’s World Affairs Editor, John Simpson, on Tuesday 30 July. Of course loaded leading questions – cast in binary terms – tend to produce answers that are of little value. “China is neither good nor bad. China is a combination of these things”, says Zhong Jianhua, China’s Special Representative on African Affairs – a far more satisfactory starting point for discussion.
Nowhere is the debate about China’s motives and practices more live than in Africa. China is either the saviour the continent has long awaited, or neocolonialist gargantuan solely intent on sucking up oil and minerals as fast as it can in the murkiest possible fashion. The reality is more complex – and it is evolving far more rapidly than the stilted relations between Africa and the West.
In March 2013, Lamido Sanusi, Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, delivered the boldest assessment to date of China-Africa relations by a senior African policymaker. In an open letter to the Financial Times, he argued that Sino-African trade patterns were “a significant contributor to Africa’s deindustrialisation and underdevelopment” and smacked of “the essence of colonialism”.  He called on Africans to “remove their rose-tinted glasses through which we view China”. The dragon-slayers cheered. The immediate response from China was muted and, when it came, more considered.
Zhong Jianhua is the most senior Chinese government official to have voiced his reaction to Sanusi’s accusations in detail and on the record. In an interview with Africa Research Institute, an independent and non-partisan think-tank in London, Zhong was characteristically urbane. “I would argue that Mr Sanusi made a number of important points that have been overlooked”, he says. A highly respected career diplomat, Zhong knows the form. But his take on the broadside from Nigeria, China’s fourth largest trade partner in Africa, is also illuminating.
For Zhong, the most important feature of Sanusi’s polemic is his insistence that Africa must start to compete with China. “Africa is strong enough to fight economically”, says Zhong, “but this is the first time we are hearing that it is willing to do so. I welcome this kind of attitude”.  He believes that Africa’s dilemma is similar to that confronted by Deng Xiaoping’s China in the late 1970s and early 1980s. China chose to modernise and industrialise by “opening up” [Chinese word] and “going out” [Chinese words] – it chose to compete.
The process was “a hard battle” for China, akin to a “revolution”, according to Zhong. While Africa is “on the point of take-off”, its leaders will need to steer through something similar to achieve sustainable and transformative development. It will require revenues from raw materials “to be managed and invested well”, and investment in skills if the continent is to compete for manufacturing jobs. As it was for China, commercial agricultural development – small and large scale – is an absolute pre-requisite for Africa. Above all, it will require determination, tenacity and visionary leadership.
Is the positive, supportive rhetoric merely the stock-in-trade of China’s top diplomat in Africa? Maybe, but often overlooked in any discussion of China’s engagement with Africa is the vulnerability of China itself. The political project of the Communist Party of China is almost entirely reliant on foreign markets and resources to drive its economy and legitimise the state.  Although it is the world’s second largest economy, China also remains a developing economy confronting immense challenges. Counter-intuitive as it may seem to Africans who lament their lack of bargaining power, China and its partner countries in Africa are mutually dependent.
This is a point and opportunity grasped – unsurprisingly – by Sanusi, but not by all African policymakers. Just as China’s deep pockets, “can do” mentality, and respect provided resource-rich African governments with unfamiliar and welcome room for manoeuvre on the international stage during the 2000s, options for dealing with China in its many guises have now emerged. The canny have learnt fast and are reading the game well – something that Zhong acknowledges China needs to emulate when he asserts “we want – and need – to improve our understanding of Africa”.
Playing hard-ball with China may not be an option for every African government. But understanding that the Chinese government feel morally obliged to give if they are also to take is imperative – as is knowing what to ask for. Sanusi knows what to ask for – he has effectively challenged China to deliver jobs to Nigeria if it wants greater access to oil and other commodities.
Sanusi rejects “a divorce” from China. He is far too pragmatic for that. But he has called time on the honeymoon and has set out his terms – the tough business of making the marriage work has begun. He is likely to find China receptive. “We are happy to move forward together,” says Zhong. “Chinese reform and prosperity have benefitted the whole world – and African development and prosperity will also benefit the whole world”.
Although there will still be much talk, particularly from China, of win-win relationships with Africa – and of Chinese neocolonialist exploitation from Africans – patterns of engagement which emerge in the next decade will be much more complex, even messier, than in the last. This will be confusing for the dragon-slayers and panda-huggers: “China: friend or foe” will prove be a singularly inadequate frame of reference. But it will be fascinating for the rest of us to observe.

by CASADE

Revisiting President Buhari’s Stance On Governance and Ministerial Appointments As Nigerians Impatiently Wait

Muhammadu Buhari, President of Nigeria.

This month, the world moved a step closer to the defeat of Boko Haram, the jihadist group that has terrorized hundreds of thousands in the northern states of Nigeria. In one of my first acts since taking office as president six weeks ago, I have replaced the heads of Nigeria’s army, navy and air force. Our new military leadership has not been chosen because of their familiarity with those in government, as was too often the case in the past, but on their track records and qualifications alone.

These new military leaders will be based in Borno State in northern Nigeria, where the headquarters of the armed services has been relocated. This shift of resources and command directly to the front line, in addition to the replacement of the head of the State Security Service, Nigeria’s intelligence organization, and a new emphasis on working in partnership with our neighbors, has equipped us to take the fight directly to Boko Haram.

Already we are beginning to see a degrading of Boko Haram’s capabilities as a fighting force. In recent weeks, it appears to have shifted away from confronting the military directly to an increase in attacks on civilian areas, as we saw only last week when an elderly woman and 10-year-old girl blew themselves up at a Muslim prayer gathering in northeastern Nigeria. We should not be confused by this change, hateful as it is: It does not mean that Boko Haram is succeeding in its aims — it shows that it is losing.

While we work to defeat the terrorists, I ask the people of Nigeria and the world for resolve and fortitude. The campaign we will wage will not be easy; it may not be swift. We should expect stages of success and also moments when it may appear that our advances have been checked. But no one should have any doubt as to the strength of our collective will or my commitment to rid this nation of terror and bring back peace and normalcy to all affected areas. Similarly, my determination should not be underestimated in other matters. This includes instilling good governance and tackling the scourge of corruption that has held Nigeria back for too long.

 As I meet with President Obama today — the first time a president of the United States will encounter a Nigerian counterpart following the peaceful transfer of power in a contested election in our history — I will be discussing my plans for critical reforms. So, too, will I discuss why the formation of my administration is taking time and, crucially, why it must. Already there are voices saying these changes are taking too long — even though only six weeks have passed since my inauguration. I hear such calls, but this task cannot and should not be rushed.

When cabinet ministers are appointed in September, it will be some months after I took the oath of office. It is worth noting that Obama himself did not have his full Cabinet in place for several months after first taking office; the United States did not cease to function in the interim. In Nigeria’s case, it would neither be prudent nor serve the interests of sound government to have made these appointments immediately on my elevation to the presidency; instead, Nigeria must first put new rules of conduct and good governance in place.

I cannot stress how important it is to ensure that this process is carried out correctly, just as it has been crucial to first install the correct leadership of the military and security services before we fully take the fight to Boko Haram. There are too few examples in the history of Nigeria since independence where it can be said that good management and governance were instituted at a national level. This lack of a governance framework has allowed many of those in charge, devoid of any real checks and balances, to plunder. The fact that I now seek Obama’s assistance in locating and returning $150 billion in funds stolen in the past decade and held in foreign bank accounts on behalf of former, corrupt officials is testament to how badly Nigeria has been run. This way of conducting our affairs cannot continue.

Indeed, the failure of governance, it can be argued, has been as much a factor in Nigeria’s inability thus far to defeat Boko Haram as have been issues with the military campaign itself.

So the path we must take is simple, even if it is not easy: First, instill rules and good governance; second, install officials who are experienced and capable of managing state agencies and ministries; and third, seek to recover funds stolen under previous regimes so that this money can be invested in Nigeria for the benefit of all of our citizens.

We seek the support and partnership of the United States in these tasks. The importance of the fight against terrorism and corruption in Nigeria, Africa’s most powerful economy and largest populace, cannot be underestimated. Our allies can provide much-needed military training and intelligence as our soldiers take the war effort to Boko Haram. Similarly, we look to U.S. businesses as well as the Obama administration to help develop governance initiatives that can ensure that Nigeria’s wealth benefits all its people, not just a few. By taking these steps, we will be positioned to benefit from increased investment — particularly in energy and electricity — from the United States.

I was elected on a platform of change. I know this is what the people of Nigeria desire more than anything else. I know they are impatient for action. I realize the world waits to see evidence that my administration will be different from all those that came before. Yet reforming my country after so many years of abuse cannot be achieved overnight. In our campaigns against both Boko Haram and corruption, we should remain steadfast and remember, as it is said: “Have patience. All things become difficult before they become easy.”

by CASADE