Ikemefuna S. Nwoye.

One major challenge that has confronted most countries with natural resources is the ‘oil curse’ or in its causative form the ‘Dutch disease’. A country is said to have the ‘oil or resource curse,’ when it is experiencing political and socio-economic challenges such as volatility of revenues from its natural resources sector due to exposure to global commodity market swings, government mismanagement of resources combined with weak, unstable or corrupt institutions.2 In the case of ‘Dutch disease’, the country is experiencing an increase in exploitation of natural resources and a decline in the manufacturing sector.3

Since the coining of the term ‘Dutch disease’ in 1977, by the Economist to describe the decline of manufacturing sector in The Netherlands after the discovery of a large natural gas field in 1959, several countries with natural resources have also being affected by the disease, with some well entrenched in the vicious cycle of the ‘resource or oil curse’.4 For instance, the effect of North Sea Oil on manufacturing sectors in Norway and the UK in 1970-1990, Russia oil and natural gas in the 2000s, Canada’s rising dollar because of the Athabasca oil sands becoming increasingly dominant and Nigeria and other post-colonial African States in the 1990s. While most of the countries with this challenge have gone ahead to take actions or steps to avoid the persistence of the oil curse or the Dutch disease;5 Nigeria still evince symptoms of the curse and only recently started attempting to take steps to address this issue. One of the laudable steps taken so far is the creation a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF)6 in 2011.

This paper will give an historical background of the economic evolution of Nigeria, particularly in relation to its overdependence on oil revenue. It will look at the step(s) taken by the Nigerian Government to address the issue i.e. the creation of the Nigeria SWF. Further, it will evaluate the Nigeria SWF – its structure, governance model and how effective the impact of the SWF will be, in solving the macroeconomic challenges confronting the country. Part II of this paper deals with the historical background of the Nigerian economy and its over-dependence on oil revenue. Part III will focus on the Nigeria SWF and evaluate its objectives, fund structure and governance model. Finally, Part IV concludes the paper and makes necessary recommendations.

II.Nigerian Economy and Crude Oil Dependence

With an estimated growing population of 170 million people, Nigeria is the largest country in Africa and accounts for more than 47% of West Africa’s population; this is in addition to being the biggest oil exporter in Africa, with the largest natural gas reserves in the continent.7 The first discovery of commercial quantities of oil in Nigeria was in 1956 with reserves estimated from sixteen to twenty-two billion barrels mostly found in various fields in the coastal region of the Niger Delta.8 Crude oil for the past three to four decades has provided 90 percent of the foreign exchange earnings of Nigeria, financing 80 percent of total government revenue.9

The activities of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) in Nigeria have generally contributed to what may presently appear as Nigeria’s development. Increased oil production throughout the 1970s had revived exports, fortifying Nigeria’s balance of payments. National current account increased substantially from a deficit of US$ 412 million in 1970 to a surplus of US$ 5, 295 million in 1980. According to Ann Genova and Toyin Falola, for almost three decades, the general view about Nigeria’s oil reflected optimism in the context of development and modernization.10 It was touted in certain quarters that Nigeria was expected to industrialize by the year 2000.11 The increase or continuous in-flow of oil revenue led to a geometric increase in public expenditure. As the country accessed the international capital market,12 agriculture, the main non-oil tradable sector declined. Symptoms of ‘Dutch disease’ started emerging during this period.13

In 1982, following the collapse of oil prices, the rise of real interest rates, Nigeria experienced rising inflation and strict rationing of foreign exchange. By this period, the country’s external debt had reached $18Billion, which amounted to 160% of its exports.14 The woes of a declining agricultural sector was further compounded by the pollution and environmental degradation which oil production was causing the environment and this continued unabatedly not necessarily due to the absence of effective laws, but due to the absence of functional institutions capable of monitoring and regulating the exploration activities of some MNCs. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and regional development banks had to step in with ‘rescue packages’ to ensure that Nigeria could at least keep up with its interest payments.15

The Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), which was the product of the intervention, had as its main objectives budget restraint, exchange rate reform, trade liberalization, reduction in subsidies, increased agricultural prices, financial liberalization and a partial privatization. Although the SAP was able to achieve some macroeconomic stabilization, it did not elicit a sustained supply response in productive activities that could alter the structure of the oil-dependent economy. By 1985, Nigeria had borrowed almost US$20billion from a combination of the Paris Club commercial creditors, multilateral and bilateral creditors. Poor or no fiscal discipline led to a build-up in debt arrears and a series of debt restructuring programs.16 Despite these challenges, disbursements to Nigeria continued until the early 1990s and by 2004, the country’s external debt had ballooned up to US$30.4 billion.17 However, it is important to point out that much of the increase of the external debt was due to high and variable interest rate on the ICM loans capitalizing the interest, which could not be paid on the existing debt stock.

The effects of weak and dysfunctional public institutions, which also contributed to these problems, cannot be overemphasized. Much of the government spending during the period of oil boom was on wasteful consumptions, including a few ‘white elephant’ projects. The public and civil services were shrouded in corruption and there were little or no implementation of developmental policies. According to Michael Yamoah, the perception of the windfall years continuing into eternity clouded the ability of those in charge of governance to see into the future and to take responsible measures that could have helped avoid some of the negative effects of the tumbling years.18 In fact, the elite and political class were more concerned with personal enrichment than the future prosperity of the nation as a whole; this is evident by the vast amount of money the political class stole in oil revenue alone.19

In 2005, the Paris Club granted a debt relief to the country for the over US$30 billion owed to it. The country was required to eliminate the debt by making a payment of US$12 billion, with the Paris Club writing off $18billion. A deal which the then President Olusegun Obasanjo has described as one that will free up US$1 billion in annual budget resources, which will be used to finance committed investments that will directly improve the welfare of the population.20 With the conclusion of this deal and given the return to democratic governance, it was thought that the country has commenced its journey on a glorious path to economic growth and development.

Towards the end of 2008, it was reported that about US$ 30 billion sat in Nigeria’s Excess Crude Account, a government fund of extra revenue that exceed what the government has budgeted from the projected price of oil.21 However, from US$30 billion the fund trickled down to about $450 million by mid-2010, by beginning of 2011, the fund had trickled down to about $300 million. Media reports indicated that a vast pile of the cash has been spent so-far on the unfruitful efforts to upgrade Nigeria’s feeble power output, but the rest US$22 billion or more remain largely unaccounted for by the Government. 22

Presently, the balance of payment surplus registered from October 2011 to April 2013 has disappeared; official foreign reserves declined slightly from almost US$ 49 billion at the end of April 2013 to US$46 billion as at September 19, 2013.23 The balance of the fiscal reserve of the country (Excess Crude Account) declined from over US$9 billion in early 2013 to US$5 billion by mid-year. According to the World Bank, despite the increased macroeconomic risks, projections for the second half of the year are cautiously optimistic.24 Most importantly, preliminary indications are that oil production is picking up somewhat in the second half of the year. If oil prices also remain generally strong, this could relieve the short- term pressures described above and strengthen the confidence of investors.

III.The Nigerian Sovereign Wealth Fund

Historically, given the socio-economic antecedent of the country, there is no doubt that there is a dire need for accountable and prudent management of revenue from natural resources and diversification of the Nigerian economy. The fundamental question that needed to be answered was what the country should do with the ample reserves it has accumulated given the rise in the price of crude oil in the global market and also bearing in mind the threat to sustainability of the revenue in-flow from the sale of crude oil, given the drop in crude oil output occasioned by general insecurity in the country. The country was faced with the options of remaining in the vicious cycle of spending the reserves on wasteful consumptions or paying off its external and domestic debts;25 or manage the reserves on the Central Bank balance sheet with a long-term perspective or lastly set up a SWF.

After much hesitations and debates among political actors, in July 2010, the then Central Bank Governor, Mallam Sanusi Lamido Sanusi announced to the public the decision of the three tiers of Government to set up a SWF for Nigeria.26 According to him, the various tiers of Government were still considering the issue of governance as well as the operational structure of the fund and a committee comprising two ministers, six state governors and the Central Bank Governor had been set up to work out the legal framework for the SWF.27 At this point, one would say that the idea of setting up a SWF should generally be considered as a welcomed and long overdue one, given the strides other oil or natural resources endowed countries have achieved with the innovative creation of a SWF. Further, taking into cognizance the fact that the SWF if properly governed could improve the economy. Instead of putting the money in a fiscal account, the country would be actually taking that money and hopefully creating some sort of strong governance board and management to supervise- invest and grow the fund for days of shortfall in oil revenue.

In May 2011, the Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority Act, (the NSIA Act) 2011 was passed into law. The law established the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority (the NSIA) with the objects of building a saving base for the Nigerian people, enhancing the development of Nigeria infrastructure and providing stabilization support in times of economic stress.28 The initial take off funds of the NSIA was the Naira equivalent of the sum of US$ 1 Billion. The Federal, State, Federal Capital Territory, Local Governments and Area Councils of the Federation are shareholders of the fund, with contributions based on the percentage of each Government’s share of federation revenue in accordance with the formula stated in the Allocation of Revenue (Federal Account, etc) Act.29 One cannot help but question the adequacy of the initial take off capital of the SWF, given the enormous oil revenue available to the country at the time of the creation of the NSIA. These worries become more obvious when the start-up capital is compared with those of other Countries, more specifically, other African countries with similar SWF.30 Further, given the fact that a vast amount of revenue in the Excess Crude Account have been previously sent on wasteful consumption or largely unaccounted for; the various tiers of government should have seized this opportunity to commit more funds to the SWF.31

III.A. A Three-Tranches Fund

The NSIA Act creates three investment funds namely the Future Generation Fund, the Nigeria Infrastructure Fund and the Stabilization Fund.32 The NSIA is given the statutory function of managing these funds directly or indirectly through such affiliate or subsidiary companies that it creates. It is also given the power to invest, purchase, maintain and divest from assets and investment of any kind.33 In addition, the NSIA is authorized to issue bonds or other debt instruments, borrow or raise money in a currency other than the Naira. Further, the body is authorized to establish a ring fenced diversified portfolio of appropriate growth investment for each of the funds.

In relation to the Future Generations Fund (FGF), the Investment Policy Statement (IPS) issued by the Board of directors of the NSIA provides that the purpose of the FGF is to preserve and grow the value of assets transferred to it, thereby enabling future generations to benefit from the country’s finite oil reserves.34 Further, the IPS provides that the fund shall be invested on a long-term basis i.e. an investment horizon of more than 20 years and multiple economic and market cycles with the base currency being the US dollar. In addition, the FGF shall target an excess return over inflation consistent with reasonable expectations for a diversified portfolio of risk asset and this was defined as United States’ inflation plus 4.0%.35

The IPS for the Stabilization Fund (SF) issued by the NSIA indicates that, the SF is intended to help increase the credibility of the Federal Republic of Nigeria’s macro-economic framework and to act as a buffer against short-term macroeconomic instability.36 In addition, there is the requirement of a conservative approach to investment of the fund, given the need to strike a balance between generating a modest positive return and preserving capital in nominal terms and the unpredictable and short-term nature of the Fund’s potential liabilities and the need for immediate liquidity.37 Considering the purpose of the SF, the time horizon is short and investment is restricted to grade sovereign and corporate fixed income assets with a maturity of up to three years. The base currency of the SF is the US Dollar and the SF’s performance is judged against strategic benchmark, which is a composite of fixed income component. Investment by the SF is restricted to US Treasury Bills, US Treasury Bonds with a maturity of less than 3 years, Investment grade debt from corporate issuers with a maturity of less than three years. If a ‘buy and hold’ strategy is implemented, the maturity of such securities can only be extended to maximum of 5 years.

In relation to the Nigeria Infrastructural Fund (NIF), the aim is to invest in infrastructural projects in Nigeria that meets NSIA’s targeted financial returns and contribute to the development of essential infrastructure in Nigeria.38 Basically, the potential areas for investment include transportation, energy and power, water resources, agriculture etc. The main aim of the NIF is to stimulate growth and diversification of the Nigerian economy, attract foreign investment and create jobs for Nigerians.

An evaluation of the investment policies of the three funds shows that the Nigeria SWF can be said to be a combination of three categories of SWF models namely (i) fiscal savings fund, (ii) fiscal stabilization funds and (iii) development funds.39 With the focus being mainly on the SWF serving the purpose of a fiscal saving fund (i.e. the FGF) and a fiscal stabilization fund (i.e. the SF). This is evident from the time horizon of 20 years and 3 – 5 years specified for the FGF and the SF respectively.40 While the assets in the FGF are invested in a more dynamic way, including investments in equities, the funds or assets in the SF are to be invested in highly liquid and short term U.S dollar – denominated fixed income securities.

However, looking at the fund tranches of the Nigeria SWF, one is of the view that the inclusion of a third tranche – the NIF, is unjustifiable and capable of having a diversionary or overlapping effect. This is because there are annual budgetary allocations by the Federal, State and even Local Governments for infrastructural development. A strong concern is under what arrangement the NIF will be used in its already enumerated focus areas to avoid potential overlap of with other governmental Ministries-Departments-Agencies (MDAs) that has those areas as their primary focus. However, in the event the NIF is given any form of priority by the NSIA, it is suggested that the choice of infrastructural project should be private sector driven (Public Private Partnership (PPP) model) and based on the sound commercial viability or bankability of the project(s). Ideally, one would have thought that in defining and delimiting the functions vis-a-vis the fund of the NSIA, the lawmakers or policymakers should have limited it to fiscal savings and stabilization functions, while leaving the task of creating an enabling infrastructural platform that will sustain economic development to the tiers of government.

The above point is further buttressed by a comparison of the Nigeria SWF and the Pula Fund of Botswana, a more successful SWF that has been in existence since 1996. In the case of the Pula Fund, it has two functions and these are serving as saving fund and a stabilization fund.41 It is important to point that asides its annual budget, Botswana’s International reserves are split into two portfolios: the liquidity portfolio – to provide the foreign exchange needed for normal day-to-day international transactions and the Pula Fund– that is used to finance investments in long-term assets to achieve higher return.42 Given the structure of the Pula Fund, it will not be out of place, if one draws the conclusion that that the Pula Fund is more focused in terms of the objectives that it seeks to achieve, than the Nigeria SWF.

III.B Governance of the Nigeria SWF

According to Udaibir S. Das et al, SWFs could be set up as separate legal entities, a unit within the Central Bank or within the Ministry of Finance.43 When the SWF is established as separate legal entities, it usually have governance structure that differentiates its owner, governing body and operational management; where the SWF is a unit within a central bank, the operational independence could be embedded in a clear legal foundation and internal governance structure, where the decision making framework and oversight functions are clear and relationship between the owner and its agent is well established.44 It was further suggested that in the case of a SWF established within a ministry of finance, it often could have less operational independence and such a set up would only be appropriate for very specific investment mandates such as some stabilization funds that invest in moderate duration bond portfolios.

In the case of the Nigeria SWF, the model of creating a separate legal entity was adopted. The NSIA Act provides that ‘[t]here shall be established the Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority; and it shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal, and may sue and be sued in its corporate name’.45 The NSIA is also provided with a Governing Council comprising of the President, Governors of the 36 States, the Attorney-General of the Federation; the Minister in charge of National Planning Commission, the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, the Economic Adviser to the President; the Chairman of the Revenue Mobilisation, Allocation and Fiscal Commission, four reputable individuals representing the private sector, two representative of civil society, two representatives of Nigerian youth and four eminent academics.46 In terms of management, there is provision for a Board of Directors comprising of a non-executive Chairman, the Managing Director, 2 other Executive Directors, one non- Executive Director who is a distinguished legal practitioner with at least ten years post qualification experience and 4 other non-Executive Directors.47

It was also provided that the NSIA shall be independent in the discharge of its function and shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority.48 Specifically, it is provided that Board of Directors is to be independent in the exercise of its responsibilities and the Council may not by resolution or otherwise require the directors to take or refrain from taking any specified action.49 In addition, there is the provision which specifies the circumstance under which a member of the board can be removed and this is limited to the grounds of bankruptcy, imprisonment, disqualification for practice of profession, disqualification from being a director of any corporate institute under any law and disqualification by the President upon a resolution by the Board that the person has committed a material breach of duties.50 Taking a cursory look at these provisions, it can be said without any doubts that the NSIA Act seeks to guarantee the operational independence of the Authority and the Board, by embedding the rules for appointment and removal and this has the potentials of encouraging sound and prudent investment and management decision making, without the fear of any form of undue interference.51

From the foregoing, it is clear that by the structuring of its governance the NSIA is arranged in such a way that a distinction is created between its owners and the governing body. In relationship to the ownership, the NSIA Act provides that ownership of the fund be vested in the Federal Government, the State Governments, the Federal Capital Territory and the Local Government, who shall hold it in trust for the people of Nigeria.52 However, it is surprising that while two tiers of Government (federal and states) are adequately represented,53 the Local Government and Area Councils have no representation or right of representation on the Governing Council of the NSIA. One is of the opinion that this does not only infringe on the principle of corporate governance, it causes or creates serious accountability issues for the Local Government and Area Councils, given that funds constitutionally allocated to them that have been contributed to the SWF, are being managed on their behalf without any supervision or input from them.

Upon a closer look at the governance model of creating a separate legal entity to manage the Nigeria SWF, one is also critical of the cost implication that this arrangement may have for the Nigeria SWF. Though it can be argued that the enabling law provides that members of the Governing Council are not to be remunerated, but should only be entitled to benefits such as their sitting allowances, their individual travel expenses and such other appropriate entitlements. The author is of the opinion, that any force in the above argument is diminished by the fact that majority of the members of the Governing Council are high placed individuals in the public service who are already well remunerated and have no business collecting any further allowance for the performance of their constitutional or statutory duties.

It is suggested that for purposes of the efficiency of its operating costs, the Nigeria SWF should have been set up as a unit in the Central Bank of Nigeria, given that the country’s foreign reserves is managed by the CBN, whose independence or competent could not have been in issue.54 This would have effectively given room for the use of existing resources and structure of the Central Bank. This approach could have been more cost effective when considered in the light of the initial start-off capital of the Nigeria SWF and the purposes it is meant to serve. For instance, the Botswana Pula Fund as established under the new Bank of Botswana Act 199655 is managed by the Bank of Botswana (BoB). This is despite the fact that it has a capital base of US$7billion. Based on the foregoing, it is safe to conclude that this governance model adopted by the Pula Fund appears to support a more cost-efficient governance structure than that of the NSIA.

IV.Conclusion and Recommendation

Despite the challenges and pitfalls that can be identified from the set up and governance of the Nigeria SWF, it is admitted that the aims behind the setting up of the SWF are genuine and they are aimed at exiting the country from the vicious cycle of oil curse and the concomitant Dutch disease syndrome. However, in achieving concrete developmental strides, intentions are not good enough. Policy formulation must be marched with proper implementation, it should be modified or review when need be. It is suggested that pending the time the lawmakers carry out a review of the enabling law (NSIA Act), one which needs to be urgently done so as to allow the efficiency and effectiveness of the NSIA, the Nigeria SWF as presently constituted can still serve as the roadmap that will lead the country to an efficient management of the revenue from the sale of its natural resources (crude oil).

There is a need for a transparent and prudential approach to fiscal and investment matters as they relate to the Nigeria SWF. The NSIA should understand that the success of the SWF is largely dependent on good and effective governance.56 There is also a strong need for the NSIA to be more focus on pursuing and implementing efficient investment policies, while the government should see to the regulation of broad fiscal and economic issues and the creation of an enabling infrastructural environment that will stimulate the diversification of the economy.


* Ikemefuna Stephen Nwoye is a Consultant in the Office of Ethics and Business Conduct, World Bank Group. Prior to that position, he worked as an NYU International Finance and Development (IFD) Fellow in the World Bank Legal Vice Presidency, Operations Policy Group. He studied for his LL.M (IBRLA) degree as a Dean’s Graduate Scholar at New York University School of Law, 2014. During his time at NYU School of Law, he served on the Editorial Board of the NYU Journal of Law and Business as a Graduate Editor. My deepest appreciation goes to Adjunct Professor Ana Demel and Professor Kevin Davis of NYU School of Law for stimulating my independent thoughts on issues relating to the finance of development and the law as an instrument of development. An earlier version of this paper was presented as seminar paper in the financing development seminar course taught by Professor Ana Demel at NYU School of Law in December 2013. The views expressed in this paper are the personal views of the author, they do not represent the view of any person, entity or organization that the author might have been or is affiliated with.


  • See Richard Auty (1993) Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis. London Routledge.
  • See Christine Ebrahim-zadeh,(2003) “Back to Basics – Dutch Disease: Too much wealth managed unwisely”. Finance and Development, A quarterly magazine of the IMF 40 (1).
  • The Economist of November 26, 1977 “The Dutch Disease” 82-83.
  • Norway, Russia, Canada even African States like Botswana and Equatorial Guinea have

established Sovereign Wealth Funds by which they sterilized the effect of balance of payment inflows on domestic inflation, stabilized their fiscal revenues and managed inter-governmental savings. See Joshua Aizenman and Rueven Glick, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Stylized Facts about their Determinants and Governance  available           at

<http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/papers/2008/wp08-33bk.pdf>          [accessed 11.21.2013]

  • A SWF have been defined as a special purpose investment fund or arrangement, owned by the government and created for macroeconomic It hold, manage or administer financial assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies which include investing in foreign financial assets. See Udaibir S. Das, Yinqiu Lu, Christian Mulder and

Amadou Sy, Setting up a Sovereign Wealth Fund: Some Policy and Operational Considerations (IMF Working Paper) at 5; See http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCkQFjAA&url=ht tp%3A%2F%2Fwww.researchgate.net%2Fpublication%2F46433449_Setting_up_a_Sovereign_ Wealth_Fund_Some_Policy_and_Operational_Considerations%2Ffile%2Fe0b49519515626663 a.pdf&ei=NCuvUvqtGJTLsQSfhYLoDg&usg=AFQjCNFzCLnd4IZZJ1gPLaQC5E_Sl_MwKA&sig 2=NinnLcQcukIusEwYxfwD2g [accessed 11.21.2013]

[accessed 12.14.2014]

  • Chris Hajzler, Nigerian   Oil   Economy: Development   or   Dependence – available at

<http://www.arts.usask.ca/economics/skjournal> [accessed 11.21.2013]

  • See Toyin Folola and Ann Genova, The politics of the global oil industry, an introduction (Praeger Publisher, 2005) 134 referenced in Michael Yamoah, How can Ghana Avoid an Oil Curse? Lessons from Nigeria (Thesis submitted to the Carroll College for the fulfilment of the requirement for   the   degree   of   Bachelor   of   Art   with   Honors)available   at

<http://www.academia.edu/3457899/How_Can_Ghana_Avoid_An_Oil_Curse_Lessons_From_N igeria> [accessed 11.22.2013]

  • Olu Omopariola, “Nigeria’s Financial Management Nightmare” Obafemi Awolowo University Ile-ife (2002) 3 referring to a certain report published in 1979 by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)available at http://www.nuc.edu.ng/nucsite/File/ILS%202002/ILS-64.pdf [accessed 22.2013]
  • Misan Rewane in her paper – Overrated? The Impact of Oil Revenue on Nigeria’s Creditworthiness, Debt Profile & Sustainability, 1973 – 2004 had pointed out that the first major borrowing took place in 1978 with the country taking the sum of US$1 billion which was then described as a ‘jumbo loan’ from the International Capital Market which increased the total external       debt     of       the country  to US2.2 billion. Available at

<http://economics.stanford.edu/files/Theses/Theses_2007/Rewane2007.pdf>          [accessed 11.21.2013]

  • Micheal Yamoah, supra note 10 at
  • at 39.
  • Misan Rewane supra note 12 at
  • at 34.
  • Michael Yamoah,supra note 10 at
  • It is reported that over US$ 400 billion have been looted from the public treasuries since the discovery of oil in 1956 –available at <allafrica.com/stories/201310110669.html> [accessed 11.21.2013]
  • Lex Rieffel, Resolving Nigeria’s Paris Club Debt Problem; A case of Non Performing Creditors at 22 available at

<http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2005/8/01globaleconomics%20rieffel/ 20050801rieffel.pdf> [accessed 11. 22. 2013]

  • Riches Flow Into Nigeria, but are Lost after Arrival –   The New York Times –


[accessed 11.22.2013]

  • See supra note 7.
  • As at 2011, the country’s total debt stock was at US$47.9 billion domestic debt stock had grown substantially to US$42.23 billion, while external debt was at US$5.67 billion available at

<http://en.starafrica.com/news/nigerias-debt-profile-mounts-despite-govts-no-cause-for-alarm- assurance.html> [accessed on 11.22.2013]

  • See The daily Independent – Nigeria: On the Proposed Sovereign Wealth Fund available at

<http://allafrica.com/stories/201007210334.html>[accessed 11.22.2013]

  • See Section 1 and 2 of the Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority Act (NSIA Act).
  • See Section 29 of the NSIA See also Section 30 of the NSIA Act that allows for subsequent funding of the Nigeria SWF from residual funds above the budgetary smoothing amount from the Federal Account. The current sharing formula under the Allocation of Revenue (Federation Account etc) Act is that the Federal Government gets 52.68 percent, while states and local governments receive 26.72 percent and 20.60 percent respectively.
  • For instance, Angola the largest crude oil producer in Africa after Nigeria created a $5 billion SWF, also Botswana and Libya boast of a SWF of $7 billion and $65 billion respectively. See Bloomberg, Angola Names Deloitte to Audit $5 Billion Sovereign Wealth Fund available at:<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-11/angola-names-deloitte-to-audit-5-billion- sovereign-wealth-fund.html>[accessed 11.21.2013]; see also Sven Behrendt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Santiago Principles. Where Do They Stand? P.g 3 Carnegie Papers available at:<http://carnegieendowment.org/files/santiago_prnciples.pdf> [accessed 11.21.2013]
  • The country had Excess crude oil revenue of $30 billion as at 2008 and dropped to $9 billion

in 2013- see pages 4 and 5 supra.

32See Sections 4, 39, 40 and 41 of the NSIA Act.

  • Section 5(1) (b) of the NSIA Act; It is important to note that the use of ‘asset or investment of any kind’ does not necessarily authorise to NSIA to carry out activities that will be contrary to public policy of the country.
  • See   the Future   Generations   Fund   –   Investment   Policy   Statement   available at:<http://nsia.com.ng/about-nsia/policy-statements/> [accessed 11.21.2013]
  • See page 9 41 Section 35 of the Bank of Botswana Act 1996 42 See Paula Ximena Meijia & Vincent castel, Could Oil Shine like Diamonds? How Botswana Avoided the Resource Curse and its implication for a New Libya at 10 – The AFDB Chief Economist Complex available at:

<http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Could%20Oil%20Shine%20like%20Diamonds%20-%20How%20Botswana%20Avoided%20the%20Resource%20Curse%20and%20its%20Implicaions%20for%20a%20New%20Libya.pdf> [accessed 11.21.2013]


  • See supra note 39 at
  • Section 1(1) and (2).
  • Section 8
  • Section 16
  • Section 1(3)
  • Section 25
  • Section 18 and 19
  • Contrast this with the case of Libya where the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) is legally structured to ultimately answers to the Prime Minster- See Paula Ximena Meijia et al supra note 42 at 11.
  • Section 32
  • All the Governors of the 36 States of Nigeria are members of the Governing council of the NSIA
  • Section 11 of Central Bank Act 2007 grants amble protection to the Central Bank Governor and Deputy Governor who can only be removed upon office only upon grounds of assumption of elective legislative position, directorship of any indigenous bank, insanity, convicted of a crime and upon serious misconduct in relation to their duties. Even in the event, where there are concerns about the suitability of the governance structure of the CBN. The enabling statute could have been amended to reflect the new realities.
  • See Section 30 – 35 of the Bank of Botswana Act
  • The NSIA should have the Santiago Principle as a guide in its governance The Santiago Principles as formulated by the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds is a voluntary code of principles documenting SWFs’ investment decision to be solely driven by financial and economic consideration.