When NGOs and Aid Agencies compensate their staff unequally, the local communities they service take notice
Is it hypocritical for an aid agency to come to a developing country looking to improve local lives, yet economically discriminate against local staff within their organisation? Or is there a line that separates extremely poor citizens targeted as beneficiaries from the average working citizen? Are their needs, such as equal treatment in the workplace, irrelevant?
Perhaps local staff are seen more as tools to implement aid programmes without the expertise to make the big decisions. But local staff have knowledge that cannot be learned at any institution and many are highly educated with years of experience in their field, so why don’t they have the salary to match? A local employee of an NGO provides a compelling narrative:
I am a local aid worker at an international humanitarian NGO in an east African country. Given my foreign qualifications, I negotiated hard for my salary of over $1,500 (£1,000) a month, making me one of the highest paid local staff. On average, a local employee receives a third of that, (if they are lucky) as my organisation reminds me on those times I dare to raise my head above the parapet. On the other hand, expatriate staff receive between $3,000 and $8,000 a month. This is not uncommon in the international NGO (INGO) world. In fact, in a particularly renowned UN programme, the highest paid local employee receives less than the international intern.
In most companies, if two people who did the same role and had the same amount of experience got paid vastly different salaries, there would be uproar. Not so in the NGO world. I recently asked around my aid worker friends for their own stories of inequality in the workplace. One told me how when an expat programme director left their country office, a national staff member was hired. She was paid half his salary despite having both superior academic qualifications and experience. Despite earning salaries that are several times higher than local staff, expats receive even more goodies from INGOs in their benefit packages. A beautiful house in the safest, most privileged part of the city; a smooth 4-wheel drive, fuel for work trips paid for; and some organisations also pay for school fees up to college.
Do I, as a local, not deserve the same standard of living? I pay my own rent, in the cramped, cheaper outskirts of the city. I would love to have a car that allows me to explore my country and visit its famous sights that expat workers enjoy but I only dream about. I wake up extremely early to board the cramped public minibuses to get to work on time, paying with my own money. A personal vehicle would be a great privilege. While the children of expat colleagues go to the country’s top schools, I struggle to pay the fees for my kids attending schools of a standard I can afford. I guess this economic imbalance will perpetuate into the next generation.
Do expat colleagues deserve these privileges more than I do? Must I accept unequal treatment because they are bringing in goods and services that are otherwise unavailable?
I am not advocating that every NGO worker should receive mansions and cars, a pure wastage of funds that should be channelled into the community. Rather, none should get such royal treatment.
Even more double standards can be pointed out regarding per diems, rest and recuperation (R&R), and consultants. When a foreign employee travels here, they are given per diem double what we are given when we travel within the country. This usually results in a separation of groups at mealtimes – with expats fine dining and citizens grabbing something from the local joint. In challenging locations, foreign employees are given high hardship allowances and extra monthly leave days to visit home, travel expenses paid. Usually, local employees do not receive R&R. International consultants live on another planet entirely. Usually the upper limit is $800 a day, but I have encountered short-term consultants being paid up to $3,000 a day. One consultant I know was flown in for 12 days and earned $36,000, six times the average annual salary of a local employee.
The discrepancies in compensation and benefits reflect the difference in value assigned not only to needs, but to the capabilities of local versus expat staff. Foreign “experts” are assumed to know more about how to improve local lives than the locals themselves. This means that the highest positions in INGOs are almost all held by foreigners from the country in which the INGO is headquartered. And so, with foreigners holding the power and the money, the neo-colonialist legacy continues. We locals, who are lucky enough to be employed by INGOs bite our tongues and accept our relative privilege over fellow citizens, not daring to risk questioning the inequality within the workplace lest we lose our jobs.
Reasons why Africa is especially vulnerable to climate change
Coleen Vogel.
When it comes to climate change Africa is in the eye of the storm. This is partly because of human factors - but the continent’s climate also makes it extremely vulnerable.
Africa is faced with a number of interlinked challenges. These include land degradation, poverty and climate change. These are referred to as “wicked problems” since they are complex and caused by a number of factors, many of which have global dimensions.
In the case of climate change, Africa is vulnerable because it is exposed to damaging climate risks including extreme droughts, flooding and storms. The continent also has low adaptive capacity, making it particularly vulnerable and exposed because of high rates of poverty, financial and technological constraints as well as a heavy reliance on rain-fed agriculture.
Solving these challenges can seldom be achieved with a one-size-fits-all approach.
Expect changes
Africa has one thing in common with the rest of the world: the certainty that rising temperatures will exacerbate existing problems and vulnerabilities. The global focus is on getting agreement to halt the rise in the world’s temperature. The outcome of the Paris Climate Summit later this year will be particularly important for Africa because of the changes that may accompany climate change.
An increased number of droughts is possible. Flooding is also a very real threat and we could experience more frequent and severe storms. With climate change and climate variability occurring, the poorest communities are set to suffer the most.
African climate systems
The engine of the global climate system is a linked set of ocean currents and circulating air masses. These are powered by the greater warming of the earth near the Equator than at the poles. As the planet rotates, the air masses curve when they blow north or south.
This forms large swirling air masses. Where the air is descending it is dry and clear. When ascending it produces clouds and rain. For example, the rising air in the Equatorial regions generates huge thunderstorms, whereas subtropical descending air creates the Sahara and Kalahari deserts.
The climates of Africa are a direct result of the spread of the continent across the Equator. The general zonal pattern of climates worldwide is a warm and moist rainforest-covered equatorial belt; savannas and hot, arid lands surrounding the tropics of Cancer and Capricorn; and temperate, cooler lands north and south of about 30 degrees.
This basic pattern is altered in Africa by the influence of the ocean masses on the western and eastern coasts (the Atlantic and Indian Oceans). For instance, in southern Africa, the climate zones are oriented east-west rather than north-south, with the western part much drier than the eastern part.
The climate of the southern portions of the continent is influenced by waves of cold, polar air from the Southern Ocean while the influence of the Mediterranean ocean impacts North Africa. The air streams that flow out of Eurasia - the monsoons - also influence the climate of the continent. An example of this is East Africa’s double rainy season.
Warming world
A warming world results in the strengthening of these atmospheric patterns. Africa, straddled as it is across the equator, is generally hot. The climate in many areas, exhibits a wet-dry seasonality. Current projections indicate that we can possibly expect warmer and drier conditions in the interior of the sub-continent, and an increase in the magnitude and frequency of thunderstorms in Southern African.
Semi-arid areas fringing the deserts are particularly vulnerable. Changes in ocean circulation, often thousands of kilometres away, will possibly see these areas more prone to spells of drought followed by floods over consecutive years.
Some climate model projections also suggest a poleward displacement of the westerly waves, leading to more summer rain and less winter rain in the southwestern Cape.
Efforts are being made to better understand Africa’s climate as a system and possible implications for ecosystems and humans. This will equip us to better meet the challenges posed by climate change. But there is only so much we can do. This is a global threat that needs a global response.
Are the attacks on Tivs in Benue State informed by the militancy in North-Eastern Nigeria?
Father Shagbaor F. Wegh.
I write this piece with a broken heart, bleeding from the wounds of man’s inhumanity to man. Think of the hundreds of innocent school children murdered recently in the North-East of Nigeria by Boko Haram. With that act, Boko Haram’s assault and devastation on Nigerians has reached Nostradamic proportions.
However, I am now writing about another imminent disaster which has been in the making for some years in Benue State. As I write thousands of Tiv people have been driven out of their homes, and have become refugees in their own land. The Tiv in different parts of Tivland have incessantly been attacked with automatic rifles and bombs scores have been killed, houses and property either looted or destroyed. Farms have also been destroyed, and children have been out of school.
The attacks being carried out against the Tiv if not checked now contain all the ingredients needed to metamorphosize into ethnic cleansing and genocide. Trying to make sense of the rubble of rumours and counter-rumours and the trajectories of what is happening is quite a herculean task. Some questions naturally come to mind. Who is actually attacking the Tiv? Who is sponsoring the attacks? What is the motive for the attacks? Regarding the identity of the attackers it is believed that Fulani nomads are responsible.
It has been alleged that some Tiv chiefs either sold land or gave it out on lease to the Fulani to graze their cattle. According to this view the chiefs reengaged on their agreement with Fulani, and this brought about the current conflict. It is not even clear whether its land that was sold or grass in a particular field.
It is important to distinguish between the sale of land, and the sale of grass because among the Tiv land is not normally sold even to neighbours, not to talk of strangers. Even if some chiefs sold land and later refused the Fulani the use of it should the latter take the law into their hands, and attack everyone they see? Are the Fulani like everyone else not expected to go to court to seek redress? That the Fulani chose to wage war rather than go to the law means that the problem arising from the sale of land may have been used only at a ploy to attack the Tiv. The real motive in Fulani attacks is thus to take over Tivland with the look of arms, overrun Tivland, Islamize, Sharialize, and dhiminize Tiv society.
A little history will show why the Fulani target the Tiv. The Tiv and Fulani are not strangers to each other. The two groups encountered each other in the early past of the 19th century. The Tiv are believed to have migrated from the Central African Republic to the east of the Cameroon. It was while dwelling there that they met the Fulani. The two groups may have developed a short-term friendship. Oral tradition says that the Tiv did not like the domineering attitude of the Fulani. The tense relationship between the two was rationalized through a joking disposition they agreed that if a Tiv saw a Fulani wearing a perforated clothing he should claim it, and vice versa. Whether this was actually been practiced or not is another matter. So the two parted wayas after a frosty relationship. Between 1804 and 1808, Usman Danfodio a Fulani waged a jihad.
He conquered several ethnic groups in a West Africa, and established a Hausa/Fulani empire. It was during this time that Danfodio who came to be identified by Tiv as Damkor also moved against the Tiv. The Tiv defeated his mighty army of horsemen and swords men. The defeat of Danfodio halted his ambition to penetrate the South-East from the Middle Belt and Islamize Nigeria. The Fulani have never forgiven the Tiv for the set-back. About a hundred years later they have returned, more determined that ever to continue Danfodio’s jihad.
This is the context in which attacks on the Tiv must be understood. Meanwhile, from the moment of Danfodio’s defeat the Tiv leave have always championed the cause of the minorities. Their sin is to have resisted Hausa-Fulani hegemony, rejected Islam, and a culture alien to their own.
In the 1950s the Tiv joined the Middle Belt congress founded by their son J.S. Tarka in opposition to the Northern People’s Congress which they regarded as autocratic and oppressive. This again angered the Hausa-Fulani, who have never hidden their belief that they are born to rule. The cost of self-assertiveness has been very high.
Hermed in between the North and South, the Tiv are the fourth most populous ethnic group. In colonial times they were regarded as stubborn and the British eagerly recruited them more than any other group in the North to fight both the First and Second World Wars. During the Nigerian Civil War Tiv recruits were more than fifty percent of the total from Northern Nigeria. The Tiv have no doubt contributed immensely to the survival of Nigeria. Yet today they are treated as a political minority. Since independence the Hausa/Fulani have been influencing articles towards the Tiv both in government and among minorities in order to undermine them. They are systematically being denied proportionate employment, recruitment into the army, police, and other paramilitaries. For several decades the Hausa/Fulani fought to exploit Benue Cement.
The Fulani are by no means the neighbours of the Tiv, and yet come all the way from the far north to wage war against the Tiv. This means that what is going on is deliberate and pre-meditated. In fact it is alleged that in Hausa-Fulani circles they are talking of a “Tiv project” meaning the plan to dislodge the Tiv from their ancestral home. To that end Hausa-Fulani people are being levied to purchase arms and ammunitions. Mercenaries are hired from other African countries and beyond, and sent to execute the Tiv project.
The Fulani have struck at an opportune time when the government at the centre is tackling the mounting security challenges in the country. Otherwise how can the government allow external aggression on a peaceful and friendly state to go on? Within the state we have self-serving leaders who seem to care only about how to grab the next political position available. The consequences of the Fulani destabilizing Tivland are grave.
First of all the fall of the Tiv to the Hausa-Fulani control would mean that the minority ethnic groups are left with no one who can defend them and champion their cause. The Hausa-Fulani will only be too happy to overrun the ethnic minorities and force them into Islam and enslave them. Unfortunately, minority groups do not understand this and so allow themselves to be used as a divisive factor.
Secondly, Benue State nay Nigeria will face hunger. Already hunger is creeping into the state as large farms have been destroyed, and thousands of farmers have fled their farmlands. The Tiv account for over 90% of the yams, over 80% of the rice and benniseed, a 100% of soya beans, and 80% of citrus produced in Nigeria. It is these that have made the state the Food Basket of the Nation. Agricultural production will be endangered and probably come to an end. Both the federal and state governments must wake up and tackle the Fulani menace without delay.
Capital drain from developing economies remains problematic to growth
Developing countries are bracing for a major slowdown this year. According to the UN report World Economic Situation and Prospects 2016, their growth will average only 3.8% this year – the lowest since the global financial crisis in 2009 and matched in this century only by the recessionary year of 2001. And what is important to bear in mind is that the slowdown in China and the deep recessions in the Russian Federation and Brazil only explain part of the broad falloff in growth.
True, falling demand for natural resources in China – which accounts for nearly half of global demand for base metals – has had a lot to do with the sharp declines in these prices, which have hit many developing and emerging economies in Latin America and Africa hard. Indeed, the UN report lists 29 economies likely to be badly affected by China’s slowdown. And the collapse of oil prices by more than 60% since July 2014 has undermined the growth prospects of oil exporters.
The real worry, however, is not just falling commodity prices, but also massive capital outflows. During 2009-2014, developing countries collectively received a net capital inflow of $2.2tn (£1.5bn), partly owing to quantitative easing in advanced economies, which pushed interest rates there to near zero.
The search for higher yields drove investors and speculators to developing countries, where the inflows increased leverage, propped up equity prices, and in some cases supported a commodity price boom. Market capitalisation in the Mumbai, Johannesburg, São Paulo, and Shanghai stock exchanges, for example, nearly tripled in the years following the financial crisis. Equity markets in other developing countries also witnessed similar dramatic increases during this period.
But the capital flows are reversing, turning negative for the first time since 2006, with net outflows from developing countries in 2015 exceeding $600bn – more than a quarter of the inflows they received during the previous six years. The largest outflows have been through banking channels, with international banks reducing their gross credit exposures to developing countries by more than $800bn in 2015. Capital outflows of this magnitude are likely to have myriad effects: drying up liquidity, increasing the costs of borrowing and debt service, weakening currencies, depleting reserves, and leading to decreases in equity and other asset prices. There will be large knock-on effects on the real economy, including severe damage to developing countries’ growth prospect
This is not the first time developing countries have faced the challenges of managing pro-cyclical hot capital, but the magnitudes this time are overwhelming. During the Asian financial crisis, net outflows from the east Asian economies were only $12bn in 1997. Of course, the east Asian economies today are better able to withstand such massive outflows, given their accumulation of international reserves since the financial crisis in 1997. Indeed, the global stock of reserves has more than tripled since the Asian financial crisis. China, for example, used nearly $500bn of its reserves in 2015 to fight capital outflows and prevent the renminbi’s sharp depreciation; but it still has more than $3tn in reserves. The stockpile of reserves may partly explain why huge outflows have not triggered a full-blown financial crisis in developing countries. But not all countries are so fortunate to have a large arsenal.
Once again, advocates of free mobility for destabilising short-term capital flows are being proven wrong. Many emerging markets recognised the dangers and tried to reduce capital inflows. South Korea, for example, has been using a series of macro-prudential measures since 2010, aimed at moderating pro-cyclical cross-border banking-sector liabilities. The measures taken were only partially successful, as the data above show. The question is, what should they do now?
Corporate sectors in developing countries, having increased their leverage with capital inflows during the post-2008 period, are particularly vulnerable. Capital outflows will adversely affect their equity prices, push up their debt-to-equity ratios, and increase the likelihood of defaults. The problem is especially severe in commodity-exporting developing economies, where firms borrowed extensively, expecting high commodity prices to persist.
Many developing country governments failed to learn the lesson of earlier crises, which should have prompted regulations and taxes restricting and discouraging foreign currency exposures. Now governments need to take quick action to avoid becoming liable for these exposures. Expedited debtor-friendly bankruptcy procedures could ensure quick restructuring and provide a framework for renegotiating debts.
Developing country governments should also encourage the conversion of such debts to GDP-linked or other types of indexed bonds. Those with high levels of foreign debt but with reserves should also consider buying back their sovereign debt in the international capital market, taking advantage of falling bond prices.
While reserves may provide some cushion for minimising the adverse effects of capital outflows, in most cases they will not be sufficient. Developing countries should resist the temptation of raising interest rates to stem capital outflows. Historically, interest-rate hikes have had little effect. In fact, because they hurt economic growth, further reducing countries’ ability to service external debts, higher interest rates can be counterproductive. Macro-prudential measures can discourage or delay capital outflows, but such measures, too, may be insufficient.
In some cases, it may be necessary to introduce selective, targeted, and time-bound capital controls to stem outflows, especially outflows through banking channels. This would entail, for example, restricting capital transfers between parent banks in developed countries and their subsidiaries or branches in developing countries. Following the successful Malaysian example in 1997, developing countries could also temporarily suspend all capital withdrawals to stabilise capital flows and exchange rates. This is perhaps the only recourse for many developing countries to avoid a catastrophic financial crisis. It is important that they act soon.
**Joseph Stiglitz is university professor at Columbia University, chief economist of the Roosevelt Institute and a former senior vice-president and chief economist of the World Bank. Hashid Ramid is head of global economic monitoring at the UN economic and social affairs department.
al-Qaida, Boko Haram, and ISIS; Is there a real alliance?
Boko Haram’s recent pledge of allegiance to ISIS has generated a wave of speculation about its significance. ISIS’s response was to release an audio-tape purporting to welcome the pledge. In the rest of the world one dominant view is that ISIS and the jihadi front is spreading and becoming more organized, which, in turn, has spurred the US government to consider expanding its military actions to include ISIS affiliates. There are, however, good reasons not to read too much into the Boko Haram pledge. It is probable that it will have little or no real practical significance, beyond the initial public relations bump.
Boko Haram under pressure
The pledge of allegiance (Arabic: bayat) by Boko Haram’s leader Abubakar Shekau on March 7 was made in an audio-message, in which the organization expresses its support for ISIS. The announcement was hardly surprising; Boko Haram had been for some time praising ISIS’s actions. Also, the pledge comes at the time when Boko Haram is under much pressure. The recent coordinated offensive by the Chadian, Cameroonian and Nigerian armies has taken its toll on the organization. The pledge could possibly be seen as an act of desperation. It is, however, doubtful if the pledge will turn any tide, and it is unlikely that the announced cooperation between Boko Haram and ISIS would mean much – in practical terms – to either party.
The Somali organization al-Shabaab made a similar pledge to al-Qaida in 2012 without having any practical implications. It is unlikely that ISIS will provide Boko Haram with fighters and arms. Boko Haram has, in fact, been critical of “Arab” involvement in its activities in Nigeria. Foreign fighters are not flocking to Nigeria as they are to ISIS-held areas. Nor is it likely that Boko Haram will provide soldiers to ISIS. It might mean infusion of funds from ISIS, but also that is uncertain.
Boko Haram and ISIS are rooted in different localities
Keep in mind that both organizations – even if they claim to represent something global – reflect their respective localities. Boko Haram has its specific history and ethnic particularity and is geographically confined to northeast Nigeria. It has been haunted by internal divisions, and there are many questions as to how strong and coherent the current leadership is. Thus it is doubtful that the recent pledge will mean that Boko Haram would submit to the will of ISIS, take orders from Bagdadi, and view itself as a branch of ISIS.
This situation relates to the larger issue of constant fragmentation among militant Islamic groups. The rise of ISIS has created tensions within the jihadi camp, with al-Qaida going against ISIS, and rifts developing between ISIS and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi – the main jihadi ideologist associated with ISIS’s forerunner, al-Qaida in Iraq. Boko Haram is itself a coalition of various factions, and it is unclear how strong this alliance actually is. While affiliating itself with ISIS, Boko Haram has at the same time not distanced itself from al-Qaida.
Everyone wants to be a caliph
A pattern of disintegration seems to be at play: exclusive ideologies coupled with violent struggles are empowering to individuals. When groups under the leadership of strong personalities experience success they create momentum and leadership. Everyone, basically, wants to be a caliph or spiritual leader. Just as al-Shabaab’s pledge to al-Qaida and its push beyond the confines of Somalia produced conflicts within that organization, Boko Haram’s pledge to ISIS may possibly spur further internal tensions. The US and other Western powers should, therefore, be careful not to interpret the pledge as yet another sign of a more solidified front. While there obviously is an urgent need to reduce the human suffering caused by these organizations, there is a similar need to maintain a realistic view of the situation, to avoid exaggerating the threat scenarios, and to apply strategies that reduce the risk of political collateral damage.
It is also important to note the format of the pledge – an audio-message posted online. This is in clear contrast to how such pledges traditionally were done, when individuals or groups declared their allegiance in real time and space. Boko Haram’s pledge obviously has an important symbolic meaning, but there is a noncommittal flavor to it. It says what it says, but that’s not necessarily binding for either party.
In a world with constant flows of messaging, including the posting of online fatwas (legal rulings) and jihadi propaganda videos, let’s not forget the ephemeral nature of such messages. Yesterday’s postings are forgotten and substituted by today’s postings. Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance to ISIS can, therefore, for practical reasons remain what it is: virtual.
In the midst of plenty, poverty is the norm in Africa; here is one of the recent, but old appalling reasons
Robtel Neajai Pailey and Silas Kpanan Ayoung Siakor.
In front of a collection of sticks, torn plastic sheeting, and broken pieces of harvester zinc held together by taut rope and shiny nails, 63-year-old Francis Selee stands stoic like a statue. When Ebola charged through Liberia, leaving behind more than 4000 dead and nearly 10,000 infected as of March 22, 2015, Selee and his family survived unscathed. Yet, they have had to deal with more pressing existential threats to their livelihoods—before the outbreak, now, and undoubtedly after Liberia is officially declared Ebola-free.
From 1970 to 1989, Selee worked for the German-Italian owned Bong Mining Company (BMC), named after the iron-ore rich mountain range in the north-central region of the country. For over 30 years, BMC surface mined iron ore for export and built one of Liberia’s major rail lines to ease shipments of the lucrative mineral. Then war came and operations sputtered to a halt.
China Union took over the mines in 2009, signing a 25-year mineral development agreement with the Liberian government valued at $2.6 billion. What appeared to be an investment boon for the post-war country translated into hardship for local communities directly impacted by the mining operations, including Selee’s family. According to a recent report by the Sustainable Development Institute in Liberia, mining communities were increasingly agitated long before Ebola. As operations intensified and companies began extracting iron ore, the so-called development dividends did not trickle down. Liberian employees of China Union complain of gross labor rights violations—from abuse by Chinese managers, low wages, long workdays without overtime pay, and little to no employee benefits.
In February 2014, China Union exported its first shipment of 50,000 tons of iron ore, valued at $1 million in royalty payments. Under its agreement with the government of Liberia, the company has failed to meet many of the commitments and only partially met others, including, but not limited to: contributing $100,000 to relocate communities directly impacted by mining operations, such as Selee’s family; rehabilitating a major railroad; providing housing, safe drinking water and sanitation, and free medical services to its employees; and hiring 50 percent Liberian senior management.
China Union expatriates rarely interact with their Liberian neighbors in Bong Mines. According to locals, they reside in the mountains in self-imposed seclusion. Although the SDI attempted to share its findings with China Union, the company was unresponsive. Despite the company’s reticence, however, community and worker discontent has been bubbling for some time now. In September 2013, community members and China Union contract laborers staged a weeklong blockade to prevent access to the concession site, with numbers swelling to 400. After government intervention proved unsuccessful, the Emergency Response Unit (ERU)—a paramilitary force—swooped in firing live rounds to disperse the crowd. When representatives of the demonstration, including clan chiefs, were invited to Monrovia, Liberia’s capital, to meet the Minister of Justice, they were summarily arrested, detained and charged with disorderly conduct, rioting and criminal mischief though the case was not formally pursued in court. Riots continued into 2014 without any redress.
Selee’s story is emblematic of a larger struggle pitting foreign multinationals against local communities. His family’s ordeal began when the president of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, visited in 2013 to inform them that China Union was about to scale up their mining operations. According to Selee, she asked the former workers living in what remained of the BMC workers’ estate after the war: “If China Union comes will you turn over the houses?” Excited about the prospects of jobs with the company and the rebuilding of the area, they all said yes. Government agents later arrived and handed out $500 to each former worker as a resettlement package. They protested the paltry amount but were threatened with forced eviction. The ERU was already deployed in the area and on standby for instructions. Along with many others, Selee and his family had 10 days to move out of the estate to make way for China Union’s take-over. Most of those evicted slept in the open for more than two weeks while looking for land to construct shelters. Few found rooms to rent in private homes in the community. Others left the area altogether. “My wife was scared,” said Selee. “She didn’t want disgrace. So we decided to leave before the deadline, which was the end of December [2013].”
Since then, Selee has called home the makeshift house constructed with sticks and tarpaulin. Most of the surrounding households of former Bong Mines employees are made of similar material. Others have clay-like mud walls. Their community has no source of safe drinking water. They rely on a three-meter deep dugout well in the nearby swamp, where the water smells faintly of dirt and clay. Toilet facilities are the nearby bushes. Either there are no banners, they are disabled or none qualified for this location! Selee is bitter about China Union’s conduct, but even more incensed that the Liberian government has failed to protect the interests of its citizens. Like other mining companies, China Union shut down indefinitely in August 2014 citing Ebola as an occupational hazard. During a recent visit to the United States, the Liberian president said that her priorities were strengthening the healthcare system, building infrastructure and attracting foreign investment by instituting waivers on taxes and royalties. While this may entice companies back to Liberia, citizens often wonder when they might see real benefits from their natural resources. When China Union eventually resumes full operation in Bong Mines, Selee and others like him across the country will want more than poverty in the midst of plenty.
Societal stability and peaceful co-existence are under-girded by the essence of a social contract
PAUL OKUMU.
Following ten years of expended time and resources, the United Nations (UN) Peace-building Commission (PBC) is beginning a much-needed makeover. It is, therefore, time to consider not so much how it has done its work, but what has informed this work.
In an increasingly volatile and violent world, the review is long overdue. Ten years ago we were concerned about external actors like al-Qaeda, while internally the World Development Report told us to focus on internally driven conflicts. Today we have external actors several times more powerful than al-Qaeda, with a motive that has shifted from conquering western ideologies to conquering nations. The boundaries of internal conflicts have become blurred, with no clarity whether those in Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Libya and Yemen are internal or driven by multiple actors across several countries. These are issues which are area written about and discussed, but which are largely relegated to footnotes in the PBC's work.
SOCIAL CONTRACT
One of the glaring anomalies in the work of the PBC is its scant reference to the very reason for its existence − people. There is a lot of reference to states and countries, even to conflict and conflict prevention. But these words have no meaning if they do not respond to, or are not informed by the needs of societies. Without their permission, there can be no state, country or government, no matter how much attempts are made to prop up these institutions or boundaries. Increasingly, we are beginning to appreciate that any institution exists for and on behalf of its people.
While it is important to ensure that state and government institutions are strong, this strength is based on a basic assumption that there is legitimacy from the people. And this is the heart of a social contract. It is not about elections, nor is it about effective governance or development. A social contract is about recognizing that a government holds office in trust on behalf of the people.
Citizens, not the government, decide how and in what way they would like to be governed. The PBC has placed great emphasis on credible and effective institutions, but it has failed to translate this into a strong social contract agenda where the leaders do not have greater power than that resting in society, no agenda other than that of the public, and no politics that do not address issues of sharing of resources and obligations to citizens at local and national level.
At the heart of a social contract is a much misused phrase − 'legitimate state'. The PBC spends considerable resources engaging with what they call 'legitimate governments'. But in many cases this legitimacy is not clearly defined by society, and is often linked to one-off processes, key among them being elite bargains, elections, or some internationally defined parameters. This is what happened in Burundi. Elite bargains pitting individuals from one society against another is unsustainable for use in a multi-ethnic society as a social contract ultimately requires that the entire society becomes part of one large bargaining process. The results of elite bargains are well-known, in a best case scenario it buys time for a social contract to emerge out of some spaces.
But, to a large extent, it alienates sections of society and legitimizes violence as a tool to gain a seat at the bargaining table. A state can only be legitimate if the society says so, and the PBC will need to find ways in which every government it engages is firmly rooted in society, not just the majority (or in worst cases, the elite) within that society. South Sudan is an interesting case in this regard. It's surprising how the country was allowed to consider itself legitimate on account of a majority ballot decision, when it is well known that two ethnic groups from that society have the numerical power to win every election over the next hundred years! If the PBC is to move forward it must begin to redefine the parameters for legitimacy, and who sets them. Not even the New Deal Agreement, signed by almost all the members of the PBC, acknowledged that legitimacy derives from and is vested in society. But there is a bigger issue that may need consideration.
How do we define society within the context of peace-building and state-building?
The conflict in CAR has its roots in society. But that society is spread across many territories. From Chad to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to France, societal interests in many PBC countries means that very often the people we send to address conflicts in those societies are themselves part of the conflict. We need to make the bold move and define society in much broader contexts than national boundaries. Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia all have sections of their societies that identify as one, but are considered different by the various governments. West Africa has large sections of society that are primarily one people, from a single ethnic group, but national boundaries seek to separate them into dispersed sections. The regional approach taken by states was a good first step. What is needed now is to extend that to societies.
Ultimately, peace-building begins and ends with a social contract.We can pursue many options, and indeed they can hold the country for a while, but, as we saw during the Ebola crises, where there is no social contract, society quickly turns against the state, however strong or celebrated it may have become.
This is the heart of peace-building.
Currency devaluations and falling oil prices: Another reminder of the folly of mismanaging windfalls from natural resources in sub-Saharan Africa
Gerard Kambou.
Growth picked up in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2014, after moderating in 2013, but remained weaker than during the pre-crisis years. It softened around the turn of the year owing to headwinds from the plunge in the price of oil. Sub-Saharan Africa’s oil exporters, which account for nearly half of the region’s aggregate output, have been hit hard by the sharp decline in the price of oil. From June 2014 to January 2015, oil prices fell by nearly 50 percent, and have remained low despite the recent uptick.
In response, several of the region’s oil-exporters have revised their 2015 budgets by adjusting the oil price assumption and cutting spending, especially capital expenditures. Currency depreciations and falling foreign reserves prompted monetary and exchange rate policy adjustments. The Central Bank of Nigeria raised the policy rate, and discontinued its reserve drawdowns to defend the naira. Between June 2014 and February 2015, the Nigerian naira depreciated by more than 20 percent against the U.S. dollar. The naira rebounded in March and was stable through May, as successful elections helped improve market sentiment, but has remained weak. Inflation accelerated in the first half of 2015, largely on the back of naira weakness. Similarly, in Angola, the central bank hiked its policy rate. In addition, in early June, it devalued the Angolan kwanza. Several of the region’s oil exporters share a common currency, the CFA franc, which is pegged to the euro. With the euro depreciating against the U.S. dollar, the CFA franc has also depreciated against the dollar, helping to smooth adjustment to the oil-price shock for these countries by boosting export earnings in domestic currency.
Public spending cuts, currency weakness, rising inflation, and falling investment point to a weaker outlook for the region’s oil-exporting economies. In Nigeria, the region’s largest economy, growth slowed markedly in the first quarter of 2015, with real growth turning negative in the oil sector and stalling in the non-oil sector.
In contrast to oil exporters, the oil-price plunge helped lower inflation in oil-importing countries. In Kenya and South Africa, inflation rates quickly moved back within their target range, allowing central banks to keep interest rates steady. However, against the broad-based strength of the U.S. dollar, even the currencies of oil-importing countries came under pressure, adding to inflationary pressures that rising prices of food and public utilities generated. In June, to ease the growing pressure on the Kenyan shilling, the central bank of Kenya raised its policy rate. In South Africa, the region’s largest oil-importing economy, growth was stronger than expected in the fourth quarter of 2014, after slowing earlier in the year. This rebound failed to carry into the first quarter of 2015, however. Growth was held back by energy shortages, output contraction in agriculture, weak investor confidence amid policy uncertainty, and the expected gradual tightening of monetary and fiscal policy. Elsewhere, the economies of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the countries most affected by the Ebola outbreak, remained weak as activity in mining, services, and agriculture continued to contract.
The World Bank forecast has the region expanding at a slower pace in 2015, with growth averaging 4.2 percent, a downward revision of 0.4 percentage points relative to the January 2015 forecasts. This revision reflects a re-assessment of prospects in Angola and Nigeria, the region’s largest oil exporters, because of the lower oil prices, and in South Africa because of ongoing electricity problems. However, growth should remain robust in most low-income countries in the region, driven by investment, consumer spending, and agriculture, although continued weaknesses in the prices of their main exports will tend to offset the benefits of the oil-price decline.
Sustaining high economic growth is a policy priority for most countries in the region. The oil-price shock highlights the need for oil exporters to diversify their economies. This will require policies to remove impediments to private sector activity, and to improve the business environment. For policymakers throughout the region, the fall in oil prices reduces the need for fuel subsidies. In most countries, fuel subsidies have been ineffective in benefiting the poor and vulnerable groups. Although Angola and Nigeria are large net oil-exporters, they import most of their fuel due to limited refining capacity. In Angola, the government ended fuel subsidies as part of efforts to alleviate pressure on the budget. In Nigeria, the ongoing fuel shortage crisis has highlighted the need to overhaul the energy sector, including the inefficient fuel subsidy system.
INTERPOL's recent border operations in West Africa as a reminder of Africa's porous borders
Drugs, Guns, Criminals, and Gold: the bloodline of terrorist groups.
An operation to strengthen border controls along the Abidjan-Lagos corridor has resulted in major seizures of drugs, stolen cars, currency, firearms and fake travel documents, in addition to arrests for migrant smuggling.The 10-day (26 January – 4 February) Operation Adwenpa saw more than 100 officers deployed to ten air and land border control points across five countries ‒ Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo – to conduct additional security checks against INTERPOL’s databases.
Two men who were the subject of INTERPOL Red Notices were identified – a Ghanaian national wanted by Brazil for drug trafficking was taken into custody at the Ghana/Cote d’Ivoire border, and a French national wanted for fraud and embezzlement by Benin was arrested at Abidjan’s Félix-Houphouët-Boigny International Airport.
A Ghanaian man attempting to smuggle two migrants into Togo using counterfeit travel documents was arrested, and at the Nigeria/Benin border six child victims aged between 13 and 17 who were suspected of being trafficked for labour exploitation were handed into the care of national authorities. Nearly 900 kg of narcotics were seized including cocaine, cannabis, methamphetamine and khat. Searches against INTERPOL’s database of stolen motor vehicles led to the recovery of seven vehicles which had been stolen in Canada, France, Germany and Italy.
Smuggled bulk cash, gold ingots and jewellery worth more than USD 1million were also seized, as well as nearly 80 kg of trafficked ivory and a number of counterfeit passports.
Director General of Benin National Police Didier Atchou said the operation clearly showed the links between different types of crime and the need for a coordinated transnational response.
“With the increased freedom of movement of goods and people also comes increased opportunities for criminals,” said Director General Atchou. “The results from Operation Adwenpa demonstrate what can be achieved when officers on the ground have the training and access to policing capabilities they need, such as those provided by INTERPOL. “Police in the involved countries have gained new knowledge in combating people smuggling, drug trafficking, terrorism and other transnational crimes which will significantly enhance national and regional security in the future,” concluded the Director General.
Operation Adwenpa marks the final activity of the two-year Capacity Building Programme to Strengthen Border Management in West Africa, supported by the Government of Canada’s Anti-Crime Capacity Building Programme. “What makes Operation Adwenpa especially effective is that local officers involved in the operation took part in an INTERPOL Train-the-Trainer course beforehand,” said Julia Viedma, INTERPOL’s Director of Capacity Building and Training. These officers were given the skillsets and tools to train their own colleagues, meaning police across West Africa will also benefit from this programme in the future. “Operation Adwenpa clearly shows the range of activities in which organized crime is involved, and law enforcement cannot look at different crime types in isolation,” said Michael O’Connell INTERPOL’s Director of Operational Support and Analysis. This exercise also demonstrates the importance of using INTERPOL’s global policing capabilities, to share information and cooperate across borders.
Over the course of the programme, more than 50 officers from National Central Bureaus (NCBs), immigration, customs and other law enforcement units underwent specialized training.
A practical handbook specifically designed for West African border officers, providing tips, guidelines and advice in detecting the most predominant forms of transnational crime affecting the region has also been produced.
Africa's Odious Debts: How Foreign Loans and Capital Flight Bled a Continent
By Leonce Ndikumana and James Boyce.
In Africa's Odious Debts, James Boyce and Léonce Ndikumana reveal the shocking fact that, contrary to the popular perception of Africa being a drain on the financial resources of the West, the continent is actually a net creditor to the rest of the world. The extent of capital flight from sub-Saharan Africa is remarkable: more than $700 billion in the past four decades. But Africa’s foreign assets remain private and hidden, while its foreign debts are public, owed by the people of Africa through their governments.
Léonce Ndikumana and James K. Boyce reveal the intimate links between foreign loans and capital flight. More than half of the money borrowed by African governments in recent decades departed in the same year, with a significant portion of it winding up in private accounts at the very banks that provided the loans in the first place. Meanwhile, debt-service payments continue to drain scarce resources from Africa, cutting into funds available for public health and other needs. Controversially, the authors argue that African governments should repudiate these ‘odious debts’ from which their people derived no benefit, and that the international community should assist in this effort.