The US set to supply more military hardware to degrade Boko Haram
Helene Cooper and Dionne Searcy.
Less than two years after it blocked a sale of American-made attack helicopters to Nigeria from Israel because of human rights concerns, the Obama administration says it is poised to sell up to 12 light attack aircraft to Nigeria as part of an effort to support the country’s fight against the Boko Haram militant group. But the pending sale of the Super Tucano attack warplanes — which would require congressional approval — is already coming under criticism from human rights organizations that say President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria has not yet done enough to stop the abuses and corruption that flourished in the military under his predecessor, Goodluck Jonathan.
Officials at the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon have been bracing for a fight with congressional Democrats, in particular Senator Patrick J. Leahy of Vermont, over the sale of the planes.
The proposed sale reflects the warming of the relationship between the Nigerian and American militaries, which had frayed under Mr. Jonathan. The Pentagon often bypassed Nigeria in the fight against Boko Haram, choosing to work directly with neighboring Cameroon, Chad and Niger.
In addition to citing corruption and sweeping human rights abuses by Nigerian soldiers, American officials were hesitant to share intelligence with the Nigerian military, saying Boko Haram had infiltrated it. That accusation prompted indignation from Nigeria.
But that was before Mr. Buhari, a former Nigerian Army major general, defeated Mr. Jonathan in an election last year.
Since coming into power, Mr. Buhari has devoted himself to rooting out graft in Africa’s largest economy.
He has fired a number of Nigerian military officers accused of corruption, and American military officials say they are now working closely with some of their counterparts in Nigeria. The Obama administration is also considering sending dozens of Special Operations advisers to the front lines of Nigeria’s fight against Boko Haram, an insurgency that has killed thousands of civilians in the country’s northeast as well as in Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Mr. Buhari has also pledged to investigate allegations of human rights abuses and has said he will not tolerate them.
A move to sell the Super Tucano attack aircraft to Nigeria, first reported by Reuters, would continue the détente between the two militaries, administration officials said. The Super Tucano, a turboprop aircraft, is designed for light attack, counterinsurgency, close air support and reconnaissance missions. It could prove useful as the Nigerian military tries to clear Boko Haram out of the Sambisa Forest, which is believed to hold large numbers of the militants, as well as kidnapped girls and women.
The administration has not made a formal decision to send a notification to Congress, but a senior administration official said he expected one soon. President Obama is considering a trip to Nigeria in July.
But already aides to Mr. Leahy, a sponsor of a human rights law that prohibits the State Department and Pentagon from providing military assistance to foreign militaries with poor human rights records, have expressed concern.
“We don’t have confidence in the Nigerians’ ability to use them in a manner that complies with the laws of war and doesn’t end up disproportionately harming civilians, nor in the capability of the U.S. government to monitor their use,” said Tim Rieser, a top Leahy aide. “The United States is committed to working with Nigeria and its neighbors against Boko Haram,” said David McKeeby, a spokesman for the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. “The Nigerian security forces and regional forces from Cameroon, Chad and Niger have made important progress in pushing Boko Haram out of many towns and villages of northeast Nigeria and the broader Lake Chad basin region.”
Gen. Mark A. Milley, the Army chief of staff, is attending a meeting of top African military officials, including from Nigeria, here in Arusha this week. Aboard his flight on Saturday, General Milley declined to comment on whether Nigeria’s human rights record had improved enough to warrant the sale, but said one of the reasons he was attending the meeting was to learn more about the African militaries with which the Pentagon is working.
Consideration of selling the attack aircraft to Nigeria is a sharp turnabout from two years ago, when the United States blocked the sale of American-made Cobra attack helicopters to Nigeria from Israel, amid concerns about Nigeria’s protection of civilians when conducting military operations. That infuriated the Nigerian government, and Nigeria’s ambassador to the United States responded sharply, accusing Washington of hampering the effort against Boko Haram. “Let’s say we give certain kinds of equipment to the Nigerian military that is then used in a way that affects the human situation,” James F. Entwistle, the American ambassador to Nigeria, told reporters in October in explaining the decision to block the helicopter sale. “If I approve that, I’m responsible for that. We take that responsibility very seriously.”
Under Mr. Jonathan, the former president, the Nigerian military was accused by human rights groups of detaining and killing thousands of innocent civilians in sweeps of the militant group, a practice that Amnesty International said was continuing. This year the military rounded up several hundred men and boys in arrests that Amnesty, in a report it released last week, called “arbitrary, the hazardous profiling based on sex and age of the individual rather than on evidence of crime.” The report said 149 people had died this year in detention in the Nigerian military’s Giwa barracks in Maiduguri, a city that has been a staging ground for the fight against Boko Haram. Among the victims were 11 children under age 6, including four infants, Amnesty said. The prisoners most likely died of disease, starvation, dehydration or gunshot wounds, the report said.
In a news release, the Nigerian military called the report “completely baseless, unfounded and source-less with the intent of denting the image of the Nigerian Armed Forces.” Sarah Margon, the Washington director at Human Rights Watch, disagreed. “Indications that the U.S. is going to sell attack aircrafts to Nigeria is concerning given the absence of meaningful reform within Nigeria’s security sector,” Ms. Margon said. “The U.S. must make clear that if the sale is to occur, critical steps, not just rhetorical commitments, on core human rights concerns must be an integral component for approving the sale.”
The benefits and short-comings of using social and economic development as counter-terrorism tools.
Three countries—Israel, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom (U.K.)—have enacted social and economic development policies to inhibit a resurgence of terrorism within their jurisdictions. The efforts of these countries demonstrate the potential benefits and short- comings of using social and economic development as a counterterrorism tool.
In each case, social and economic development initiatives were considered integral parts of wider peace processes:
In Israel, the Paris Protocol of Economic Relations, which provided Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) with various economic and trade incentives, accompanied the 1993 Oslo Accords for establishing the Palestinian Authority (PA).
In the Philippines, the 1996 Davao Consensus, which created a limited Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), was underpinned by a wider Special Zone for Peace and Development (SZOPAD) dedicated to the enactment of social and economic programs.
In the United Kingdom, the 1998 Good Friday Accords for establishing home rule in Northern Ireland included a social and economic commitment from the British government as well as special arrangements for communal “peace money” from the European Union (EU).
Each case offers its own unique lessons that led us to the following six overall conclusions about the role of social and economic development in countering a resurgence of terrorism:
1. Social and Economic Development Policies Can Weaken Local Support for Terrorist Activities.
Social and economic development policies can contribute to the expansion of a new middle class in communities that have traditionally lent support to terrorist groups. In many cases, this section of the population has recognized the economic benefits of peace and, as a result, has worked to inhibit local support for terrorist activities.
In Northern Ireland, for example, a new middle class (and business elite) has emerged that has directly benefited from the development programs. Members of this particular demographic sector have formed important mediation networks to reduce violence between supporters of militant Protestant groups and those sympathetic to the cause of the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA). Commercial interest groups have also acted as a brake on Republican and Loyalist violence, discouraging the retaliatory riots and attacks that traditionally occur during Northern Ireland’s tense marching season.
2. Social and Economic Development Can Discourage Terrorist Recruits.
Many terrorist organizations attract new members from communities in which terrorism is generally considered a viable response to perceived grievances. Some terrorist groups also offer recruits financial incentives and additional family support. Social and economic development policies can help to reduce the pools of potential recruits by reducing their perceived grievances and providing the members of these communities with viable alternatives to terrorism. For example, two development projects in the southern Philip- pines—asparagus and banana production—have been particularly effective in providing economic alternatives to communities that have traditionally lent a high degree of support to local terrorist groups. In the latter case, private investment has resulted in almost 100 percent employment and transformed an area previously known as “the killing fields of Mindanao” into a largely peaceful community.
Of course, not all terrorist recruits come from poorer communities. Depending on the region and the nature of the conflict, terrorists can just as easily come from the middle or upper classes as from the poorer sections of society. In the countries we examined, extremist groups recruited across the class spectrum, with general support from local communities. In several instances, however, among other motivating factors, inductees were attracted to the financial opportunities that were provided by terrorist organizations.
3. Inadequately Funded Social and Economic Policies Are Likely to Inflate Expectations and Renew Support for Terrorism.
For social and economic policies to be effective, they need to be funded according to the relative size, geography, and needs of targeted communities. If development initiatives lack sufficient financial support, they are likely to act as a double-edged sword, erroneously inflating the hopes and aspirations of local communities. When these expectations are not met, there is a high chance that social and economic policies will backfire, triggering resentment and renewed support for terrorist violence.
Consider the positive example of Northern Ireland, where consider- able public expenditures have been set aside to target social needs. Since 1997, the United Kingdom has spent an average of US$869 mil- lion annually on these efforts. The EU has added another US$48 mil- lion annually, generating a total aid package that has amounted to roughly US$543 per person per year. The main focus for much of this investment has been large-scale projects dealing with education, health, housing, infrastructure, and urban redevelopment. Many of these initiatives have borne significant dividends. For example, there is now virtually no difference between Catholics and Protestants in terms of access to schools, hospitals, and suitable domiciles. Inner cities in Belfast and London- derry have been transformed on the heels of sustained regeneration schemes.
A negative example is the southern Philippines, where social and economic aid totaled only US$6 per person per year over a period of five years (see Table S.1). This meager sum helps to explain the dismal failure of most of the development policies instituted in Mindanao to inhibit support for terrorism. Compounding the situation, most of the money was channeled to Christian-populated areas, merely exacerbating already existing wealth differentials between Christian and Muslim communities. The combined effect has been to nurture and, in certain cases, intensify support for local terrorist and extremist groups.
4. The Ability of Development Policies to Inhibit Terrorism Depends on Their Implementation.
The most successful social and economic development policies are those that are (1) developed in consultation with community leaders, (2) based on needs assessments that address the specific requirements of targeted communities, and (3) accompanied by disbursement mechanisms that ensure proper fiscal management and non- partisanship. For example, the EU has administered its programs in Northern Ire- land in a way that avoids inadvertently reinforcing inter-communal hatred. This has been achieved by involving local residents in the design of specific projects and by including a transparent distribution and oversight system. Many schemes also hold local Catholic and Protestant representatives accountable for implementing the projects jointly with members of the opposing community. As a result, funding and implementation of particular programs are generally not perceived as underhanded or manipulative.
By contrast, most development policies in the Philippines and in Palestinian areas have failed to meet the needs of local communities, have been plagued by poor project choices, or been marred by corruption.
In Mindanao, most of the large-scale development schemes funded by Manila were determined without comprehensive, community- based needs assessments. Programs tended to focus on high-profile initiatives that offered a quick return on investment—not projects that the communities needed most. The central government also failed to establish adequate mechanisms to ensure accountability for the development aid that was transferred to Mindanao, much of which was misappropriated as a result of bribery and kickbacks.
In the WBGS, development money paid for such large-scale infrastructure projects as the Gaza port and airport, as well as for a high-profile housing complex known as the Karameh Towers, which offered 192 apartments for sale in Gaza for US$30,000 each. That price is far above what an average family in Gaza can pay for a home; the average annual income in Gaza fluctuates between US$1,200 and US$600. Thus, these development schemes had little, if any, relevance to the everyday needs of ordinary Palestinians. While other quality-of-life projects were also instituted, most suffered as a result of mismanagement and corruption.
5. Social and Economic Development Policies Can Be Used as a “Stick” to Discourage Terrorism.
Development assistance can be made conditional on the absence of violence, creating a useful “stick” to discourage support for terrorists. For example, Israeli authorities have frequently closed off Israel to Palestinian commuters in response to surges of violence from militant groups. Similarly, as a punitive measure for increases in terror- ism, the Israeli government has withheld tax revenue due to the PA. To a certain extent, these policies have been instrumental in trigger- ing communal pressure against such groups as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas to limit their attacks.
Overuse of this tool, however, carries the risk of negating the overall positive effect of development policies. Indeed, Israeli authorities have used the closure tool so often that it has cost the Palestinian economy more than twice the amount of development aid channeled to the area since 1993. This outcome has caused many Palestinians to view the peace process as detrimental, rather than beneficial, to their interests, welfare, and security.
6. Social and Economic Development Policies Do Not Eliminate Terrorism.
Although social and economic development—when properly supported and implemented—can inhibit terrorism, development alone cannot eliminate it. Development is most effective when it is incorporated into a multi-pronged approach that includes wider political, military, and community-relations dimensions. These qualifications aside, there is a noteworthy potential for development policies to reduce the threat of terrorism.
These conclusions have particular relevance to the United States as it embarks on its continuing war on global terrorism. In several regions (e.g., the Philippines, Pakistan, Indonesia, and central Asia), the judicious use of foreign assistance could reduce local support for terrorist groups, including organizations that have been tied to wider transnational Islamic extremism. The lessons derived from Northern Ireland, the Philippines, and the WBGS strongly suggest that development assistance should be framed within a strategic political and military framework that goes beyond simply distributing aid and re- mains acutely sensitive to the risks associated with poor implementation and support.
An effective war against terror must be mindful of the dynamics of international human rights law: A law that requires States to protect the right to life, and prevent terrorism.
Human rights law requires the State to take steps to protect the right to life – which includes measures to prevent terrorism. However, any measures taken to counter terrorism must be proportionate and not undermine our democratic values. In particular, laws designed to protect people from the threat of terrorism, and the enforcement of these laws, must be compatible with people’s rights and freedoms.
Yet, all too often, the risk of terrorism has been used as the basis for eroding our human rights and civil liberties in Britain:
• From 1969 to 2000 Parliament passed a number of temporary Prevention of Terrorism Acts, which included powers of internment and the removal of the right to trial by jury in Northern Ireland;
• After the tragic events of 11 September, 2001, emergency laws were passed which allowed for the indefinite detention of foreign nationals, who were suspected of being terrorists. Under this law, individuals could be detained for an unlimited period at a maximum security prison despite never being charged, let alone convicted, of any offence;
• After a 2004 court ruling, that indefinite detention breached human rights law, detention was quickly replaced by the control order regime in 2005. Following the 2010 Home Office counter-terrorism review, control orders were scrapped in January 2012; but they were replaced with something almost identical, replicating the regime’s worst aspects - Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs). Like control orders, TPIMs allow for indefinite house arrest, and other sweeping restrictions on individual freedoms, on the basis of largely secret intelligence and suspicion;
• The maximum period of detention without charge for most criminal suspects is 24 to 96 hours. But, between 2006 and 2011, terrorism suspects could be detained for up to 28 days without charge. Despite this period being far longer than the period of pre-charge detention in any comparable democracy, Parliament also considered (and, welcomingly, defeated) proposals first for 90 days, and then for 42 days, pre-charge detention;
• Before it was repealed, section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 allowed people to be stopped and searched without suspicion. This overly broad power was used against peaceful protesters and disproportionately against ethnic minority groups;
• Broad new speech offences impact on free speech rights, and non-violent groups have been outlawed;
• Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 is a breathtakingly broad and intrusive power to stop, search and hold individuals at ports, airports and international rail stations. It can be exercised without the need for any grounds of suspecting the person has any involvement in terrorism - or any other criminal activity. This means it can be used against anyone a police, immigration or customs officer chooses. Powers like this are ripe for overuse and abuse. They are invariably used in discriminatory fashion, with stops based on stereotype rather than genuine suspicion.
• Most recently, the Government has passed the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, which again contains a raft of proposals as unsafe as they are unfair - including passport seizure and retention powers, ripe for discrimination; a regime of exclusion orders, which risks exposing British citizens to torture; statutory 'terrorism prevention' duties for a whole range of public bodies, including universities and schools; new data retention powers, mirroring those rejected as unlawful by the Court of Justice of the EU; and provisions which seek to breathe new life into the widely-discredited TPIMs regime.
We believe that terrorism can, and must be fought within the rule of law and human rights framework. Repression and injustice, and the criminalisation of non-violent speech and protest, make us less safe; not more. These measures act as a recruiting sergeant to the extremist fringe, and marginalise those whose support is vital to effectively fight the terrorist threat. They also undermine the values that separate us from the terrorist - the very values we should be fighting to protect.
Boko Hara: A special report on the jihadist group and the military campaign to defeat it
If President Muhammadu Buhari is recently proud of the outcome of the war against terrorism in north-eastern Nigeria, he has good reasons to be, for under his watch the Nigerian military has regrouped, and neighbours in the Lake Chad Basin are collaborating more meaningfully with Nigerian forces in implementing a more effective military response to Boko Haram’s threat in the rural areas where the jihadist group remains potent. Other international partners are also supporting the effort against the insurrection that has since 2009 cost tens of thousands of lives, uprooted millions, and destabilized other Lake Chad Basin states by damaging local economies and cross-border trade. With renewed vigor and better armament, the coalition forces have clearly deflated Boko Haram, and degraded its ability to project terror. But the jihadist group remains dangerous and a major source of concern, albeit dispersed over a vast area with no evident chain of command structure (Borno state alone is 92,000sqkm). Trained both within Nigeria and without, the group’s resiliency under continuous pressure is indicative of a strong idealogical attachment that would make it unlikely that it would be completely eliminated through conventional warfare. The Lake Chad basin states and their international partners, would meet on May 14, 2016 for their second regional summit; this meeting presents an excellent opportunity for engineering a robust and holistic collaboration that goes beyond military cooperation to include means for continuous dialogue and policy responses that address the needs of inhabitants in the region of conflict. This is more likely to conduce to long-lasting stability in the region, while keeping at bay groups like Boko Haram, and their destabilizing influence.
In response to the regional campaign, Boko Haram is adapting to the new condi- tions, including making greater use of women and children as suicide bombers to attack softer targets, though it can sometimes still launch large raids. It remains challenging to develop a clear picture of how the group has evolved over the past seven years and what motivates its leaders and rank-and-file. Many reports, as well as books on the jihadist group, are available, but most build on few first-hand sources beyond statements and sermons by the movement’s leaders. Nigeria and its allies should more effectively collate and use information gathered from captured fighters, supporters and civilians in occupied areas. New accounts beginning to emerge from former abductees, jailed militants and defectors should help to produce an assessment of the continued threat, the best strategy for curbing the insurgency and, more generally, shape new thinking and measured policy options for responding to terrorist attacks from other extremist groups.
The Abuja summit is a major opportunity for Nigeria, its Lake Chad Basin neigh- bours – Cameroon, Chad and Niger – and wider international partners, namely the European Union (EU), U.S., France and the UK, to address vital policy issues, including:
1. the bleak humanitarian situation, especially how to better support the region’s 2.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, including how to limit or mitigate the short- and medium-term impact on local communities of military embargoes on trade believed to sustain Boko Haram;
2. ensuring return of the rule of law and ending state-ordered or state-sponsored counter-insurgency tactics that exacerbate local grievances and push youths to join armed groups and further alienate communities whose support is essential to combatting militancy;
3. releasing some of those detained on suspicion of supporting Boko Haram and retrying individuals sentenced without adequate legal representation;
4. preparingavenuesfortherehabilitationofthemovement’srank-and-file,whojoin for diverse and often non-ideological reasons, while remaining open to engage- ment, public or discreet, with those Boko Haram leaders who may be looking for a compromise;
5. rolling back the use of vigilante groups to fight the insurgents, which if not properly managed, could pose a longer-term threat; and
6. returning government administration to marginalised peripheries, so as to provide crucial basic services – security, rule of law, education and health – and address factors that push individuals to join movements like Boko Haram.
This briefing builds on past work on violent Islamist radicalism in Nigeria, current field research there and in Cameroon, Chad and Niger, and the March 2016 special report, Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. It sets the stage for a series of publications analysing Boko Haram’s evolution from a small protest movement in north-eastern Nigeria into a regional menace and the responses of the Lake Chad Basin states and their allies.
II. Boko Haram, “Technically” Defeated?
On 24 December 2015, President Buhari declared that “technically” Nigeria has “won the war” against Boko Haram.1 It is true that for several months, the group has carried out fewer attacks on softer targets and with reduced success. As recently as December 2013, hundreds of Boko Haram fighters overran the air force base in Maiduguri, the Borno state capital.2 Today, the group seems to deploy fewer fighters, who mostly attack remote villages and refugee camps, and has relied increasingly onsuicide bombings. Its four-wheel drive fleet is depleted, and just as well, many of the armoured vehicles it seized from Nigerian forces
are destroyed or recaptured.3 Its last terror attack in Nigeria’s capital, Abuja, was in October 2015. On 27 March that year, it lost its own “capital”, Gwoza, in south-east Borno state.4
While from 2011 insurgents were very active in other north-eastern states of Adamawa, Yobe and Gombe, they now seem largely limited to Borno’s north-eastern quadrant. In February 2016, a Borno senator claimed controversially that Boko Haram still could operate in half the state and had full control of three of its 27 local government areas (LGAs).5 What seems clear is that it retains presence and capacity in some rural areas, including several permanent bases, particularly in the Sambisa forest, along the borders with Cameroon and Niger and on Lake Chad islets, from where it can launch raids into neighbouring states.6
Boko Haram’s reach into Chad, Cameroon and Niger appears to have peaked in 2014-2015. Attacks in Chad and Niger seemed to diminish at the start of 2016, and it has turned to suicide bombings against Cameroonian towns and garrisons.7 Equally notable, Boko Haram has produced many fewer statements and videos since the end of 2015. There has been no credible proof of life from its leader, Abubakar Shekau, in at least a year.8 A video released on 24 March that shows him was doctored, according to several experts; one on 1 April only featured supporters insisting he was still the leader, though it also depicted well-equipped fighters and four-wheel drive trucks with heavy weapons, including a heavy artillery piece.9
At the least, Boko Haram has demonstrated that it remains a potent asymmet- rical threat. While ostensibly on the back foot, it is not yet defeated. In mid-April, it launched a large attack against Nigeria’s 113th battalion in Kareto, northern Borno state. The nature of its tactics and geographical reach will make the group’s comprehensive defeat difficult. Current attacks seem to be less about military strategy than extracting resources and sending a violent message that it is surviving. Increasingly they are on targets that offer easy plunder, including young captives, many of whom are turned into “wives” and child soldiers.
In its desperate and violent search for resources through plunder, Boko Haram shares some characteristics with late nineteenth century warfare in the Lake Chad area, in which states sustained themselves through raids for goods and people be-came a tool to sustain (temporarily) the state.10 It seems even more strikingly similar to the current Ugandan-born Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a force also originally formed around a radical, religion-based rejection of society that has deteriorated into a roaming gang, surviving by plundering goods and people.11 But because of its connection to the global jihad, it has, unlike the LRA, an understanding of the special power of terror attacks. Much like other jihadist groups, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), it may become less a guerrilla force attached to a specific territory and more a terror group with a longer reach.12
Initially, Boko Haram members attacked “strategic” individuals (local officials, civil servants, chiefs, imams, traders who refused to cooperate). They moved on to greater violence against specific communities, including those that formed vigilante groups to resist them, such as the Civilian Joint Task Forces (CJTF). They now appear to be motivated by a broader anger against all who do not support them, including communities over which they have lost control. In so acting, they may be destroying what little appeal they once had among segments of the local population.13
The insurgency has badly damaged the Lake Chad Basin economy, destroyed or driven away the little services (and cash infusion) the state provided and forced some traders to flee. But in an effort to break its financial base, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria have deliberately targeted economic activities they believe have been benefiting Boko Haram, through tribute, a criminal racket or direct militant participation in certain businesses. States have ordered a variety of bans, such as on motorbike taxi services in the countryside, rural markets, the sale of fuel and trade in fish, pepper, cattle and dried meat. Some trade prohibitions have been lifted after
civil society groups raised concerns, but there is little doubt that the local economies are suffering.14
Under pressure from the region’s armies, Boko Haram faces growing challenges to exact tribute from trade flows that have largely vanished and has difficulties finding suppliers willing to engage in risky illicit commerce.15 The money from bank robberies and ransoms has either run out or become more difficult to spend.16 Raids have replaced the tribute once exacted from villages, another indication that its revenue base is being stifled, though the group may still have control of markets in some areas. There is one recent report, quoting security sources, that militants were surrendering out of starvation.17 Pictures released by the Nigerian military of alleged militants killed or captured in combat show emaciated bodies. Nevertheless, that Boko Haram is losing resources and fighters does not mean the governments have regained complete control of affected areas.
As Lake Chad Basin states push further to dislodge Boko Haram and regain access, further research may shed light on the movement. Since the killing of Mohamed Yusuf, its founder, in police custody in 2009, the evasive Abubakar Shekau, once a Yusuf deputy, is their best-known figure. A known sub-group (or faction), Ansaru, publicly confirmed its existence in 2012. It formed around Nigerian radicals associated with AQIM and had links to, but sought to distinguish itself from Boko Haram. It is not clear whether it was completely dispersed by the security forces, was absorbed into Boko Haram or transformed and survived as something distinct. It is not clear either how deep doctrinal differences run within the organisation, notably over the affiliation to the Islamic State (IS).18 Organisational charts in literature on Boko Haram are hypothetical, with many empty boxes and question marks. Likely the assaults have weakened the centre of the movement’s network, making it less capable of securing obedience and coordination, and fragmenting it into smaller, more local units, tied to specific areas and resource bases.
In its areas of influence, Boko Haram tried to set up a quasi-administrative struc- ture, linking the “imam” (Shekau) and its Shura council to designated emirs (locals or outsiders) charged with organising levies in recruits and kind from local communities. In some areas where its control was most intense and durable, it tried to implement its version of Sharia (Islamic law), controlling male and female dress, limiting female mobility and forcing attendance at Quran classes and prayers.19 However, some consider the notion of Boko Haram as a structured organisation a state-centric misunderstanding of a group that should be viewed as a network of networks.20 Boko Haram, as it deployed in the rural areas and along the border apparently integrated smaller, pre-existing networks – some of which did not have a religious agenda – such as of illicit traffickers or bandits. Some of these are returning to their previous lives but may still be using Boko Haram’s name and notoriety. It would be wrong, however, to consider the movement a spent force. Since the beginning of 2016, its network along Cameroon’s border has been able to attempt 35 suicide attacks.21
III. The Regional Fightback
Boko Haram has been weakened by a stronger, coordinated military response that began in 2015. A combination of regional and wider international support that increased notably with Buhari’s election has put it on the defensive. After years of inaction and a series of spectacular setbacks in 2013-2014, Buhari’s predecessor, Goodluck Jonathan, tried to fight back as the 2015 elections approached. Reaching out to Russia and China, among others,22 he secured training and weapons and arranged for a South African private military company to train and operate a small force in Borno state from December 2014 to March 2015. Most significantly, forces from Chad and Niger were allowed to intervene on Nigerian territory around Lake Chad in February-March. Boko Haram was pushed out of some areas, sometimes for good (Gwoza and Dikwa), but sometimes not, for failure to maintain a permanent deployment (Gambaru and Abadam, which are further north, along the Cameroon and Niger borders respectively). Nigeria’s own army is not large enough to secure the entire north east and cannot depend on the deeply troubled federal police to help secure urban areas.
The armed response strengthened further after Buhari assumed the presidency in May 2015, although given the military’s history, there remains scepticism about the coherence of the fight against Boko Haram. A retired northern general with strong anti-corruption credentials and military governor experience in the north east (1975- 1976), boosted the morale and capacity of Nigeria’s armed forces, which had been compromised by years of mismanagement and wide-scale graft and fraud. Several of his acts have improved the military response: a thorough command change, transfer of the operations base from Abuja to Maiduguri, moving tactical formations’ head-quarters forward and quick improvements in logistics, wage-payment, air support, rotation of troops and equipment procurement.23 To reflect the more aggressive disposition, Nigeria’s counter-insurgency operation changed names from Operation Zaman Lafiya (We will live in peace) to Operation Lafiya Dole (Peace by All Means).
The armed forces have sustained an offensive posture, catching off balance insur- gents who were used to facing a demoralised army largely confined to fixed locations.24 To boost morale and improve capacity, the president also ordered investigations of more than 300 companies and prominent citizens, including senior serving and retired officers, believed involved in security budget mismanagement. Some have been detained.25 Another important change has been the growth and spread of vigilante CJTF groups. Born and nurtured in Maiduguri by local authorities in 2013, they played an important role in pushing the insurgency out of that city, and they eventually formed in Borno’s rural areas and in neighbouring states; the Cameroon and Chad equivalents are known as comités de vigilance.26 They are alleged to have been involved in serious abuses, including extrajudicial executions and rapes, sometimes in association with security forces.27 But in rural areas, they have provided essential local knowledge and intelligence to the security forces and, more importantly, given people a chance to reconnect with the state who otherwise may have looked to Boko Haram for protection.
Nigeria’s more cogent response and the insurgency’s growing cross-border foot- print have done much to mobilise Cameroon, Chad and Niger, as well as Western partners. As early as 2012, in the framework of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), there were attempts to revive the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), an unsuccessful regional anti-banditry operation established in 1998, at a time when bad memories and suspicions between Nigeria and its neighbours, particularly Cameroon, were high.28 However, Chad and Niger pulled out in 2013 and 2014 respectively, and Boko Haram overran the MNJTF headquarters near the Nigerian town of Baga, on the shores of Lake Chad, in January 2015.29
Baga’s fall was a wake-up call. Seeing its trade routes to the sea under threat, Chad sent two large columns, one through Cameroon, one through Niger, and supported by a Niger contingent, to fight the insurgents in Nigeria.30 Faced with mounting criticism for collateral damage, the intervention’s heavy human and financial toll and what it considered insufficient regional and wider international support, as well as an increase in Boko Haram activity on its territory, however, Chad quickly pulled out of Nigeria, somewhat frustrated. It has since focused most of its operations on its Lake Chad’s islands and shore.
Buhari revived regional cooperation that had seemed dead at mid-2015 by paying special attention to neighbours. The MNJTF settled into an expanded N’Djamena headquarters, led by a Nigerian general officially in command of all Lake Chad Basin operations. In reality, there has been no force integration: the MNJTF is about coordination, and national contingents re-hatted as MNJTF operate primarily in their own country and report to their own capital.31 But the task force allows a level of cross- border operational coordination, while assuaging sovereignty concerns and helping to “erase the borders a bit”.32
Not without difficulties, it also coordinates intelligence and does some joint plan- ning.33 It likewise performs a function common to many African regional organi- sations, that of a recipient and coordination point for international technical and financial aid. Several bi-lateral and multilateral partners provide funds and seconded officers directly to the intelligence cell (Cellule de Coopération et de Liaison, CCL), support which may not have been available purely bilaterally.34
Western aid, particularly from France and the U.S., but also the UK and other allies, had already begun accruing to Nigeria’s three neighbours in the form of training, equipment and intelligence, including from U.S. drones operated out of northern Cameroon. Buhari’s reformist agenda has allowed the West, notably the U.S., to commit or pledge more support to Nigeria as well.35
IV. Understanding Boko Haram’s Staying Power
Even if it may be on its back foot, Boko Haram is likely to be difficult to eradicate, because it originates from Nigeria’s deep structural challenges. Key factors include: demoralisation resulting from massive, oil-fed corruption; chronic mismanagement; growing inequalities between regions, with high birth rates, poverty and low levels of formal education particularly acute in the north east; instrumentalisation of Sharia by northern elites in a context of sudden democratisation; and dysfunctional federalism.36 Climate change has probably also had a part, though contrary to received wisdom, Lake Chad has not retreated in recent years.37 The insurgency’s specific home in the north east owes something to Yusuf’s appeal in his region of origin and ethnic community, the Kanuri. That region has also been propitious for the insurgency; the long international borders have allowed it to seek refuge, develop support networks and procure weapons in the Lake Chad basin, an area both of porous frontiers and of regions that are marginal peripheries in their own states.
But another local factor mattered for the insurgency’s origin and continuation: the history of violence in Nigeria, and particularly in the north east. Globally, jihadist groups have tended to emerge or gather strength during conflict at least as much as initiate it.38 When Boko Haram took root and grew, north-east Nigeria and the broader area of the Lake Chad Basin were not home to an open, large armed conflict, but there was diffuse, daily, structural violence. Cattle-rustling, banditry, vigilantism, the protection needed for a lively illicit economy and abuse by state officials have all been pervasive and inter-connected.39 It is a region where trade and the requisite mobile protection have been more important than production, and the 1990s’ economic liberalisation did not change this. Untying the nexus of wealth and violence is the region’s key structural challenge. A new study of ex-Boko Haram fighters’ attitudes tellingly notes that “[a]bout half of former members said their communities at some time supported Boko Haram, believing it would help bring about a change in government”. State legitimacy is the core problem.40
The challenge has been heightened by a violent counter-insurgency campaign to which little thought has been given about how it could further fuel insurgency. The brutal summer 2009 military crackdown in Maiduguri, Yusuf’s extrajudicial execution in police custody and heavy-handed attempts to crush the movement made things worse. Repeated pledges by the states involved to comply with the laws of war have had minimal follow-through; there are still too many troubling reports by human rights NGOs.41 A human rights expert contended that, throughout the region, security forces were probably more deadly for civilians than Boko Haram.42 Even accounts from the security forces are dispiriting reads. This context explains some of Boko Haram’s success in penetrating rural areas, an essential but little analysed issue. It put rural civilians before a false choice. On one side was a state that has often made itself felt through unfulfilled promises of development and the taxations, seizures and predations of its agents, many of whom do not speak local languages, and their local allies – the chiefs and government officials. On the other was the presence of armed militants with sticks, but also some carrots – access to a gun, money, a motorbike, protection for trade (or the loss thereof), promises of plunder or a bride, chance for revenge against state abuse and moral justification couched in an understandable religious discourse. Boko Haram has also provided opportunities for communities, not only individuals. Along Lake Chad, for instance, significant segments of Buduma fishing communities have rallied under its flag to counter the economic dominance of Hausa traders.44
It is probable, too, that Boko Haram was a chance for some rural youths to gain leverage in a sclerotic patriarchal social system that gave them little, while delaying access to marriage and formal adulthood. The movement has abducted many women. There have been reports of rapes, particularly against Christian women. It seems many of the captives have been forced into marriages, which has led to marital rape.45 Reportedly, fighters spent much of their off-duty time talking about marriage prospects.46 The easy access to brides, via coercion or otherwise, Boko Haram gives young militants, an aspect observed in some other Muslim reform movements across West Africa, has probably been a major pull factor for the insurgency.47
Analysis of women’s experience with Boko Haram has often been centred, under- standably, on the plight of the female captives and girls used as suicide-bombers. It should not be ruled out, however, that some women may have seized on Boko Haram as an opportunity for a kind of emancipation observed in other mobilisations drawing on radical Islam. A recent study notes that for some women, particularly young ones, the group offered “unique opportunities”, notably access to Islamic education and a form of social power.48 Overall, the relationship of many civilians to the movement has certainly been more varied than usually thought, combining fear and opportunity in complex ways, with each person joining for diverse reasons. That complexity must be understood and dealt with if Boko Haram is to be degraded.
V. Uncertainties Remain
The military balance is currently tipped in favour of the Lake Chad states, and Boko Haram is not likely to create a large territorial enclave as IS has done in Iraq and Syria. There are, however, substantial long- and short-term uncertainties that still threaten Nigeria’s far north and neighbouring countries and must be carefully monitored.
First, Boko Haram is trying to adapt to military defeats. Its networked nature may mean it is unlikely to collapse from the top and is well-suited to surviving as a loosely-coordinated structure. Some bastions, such as the Lake Chad islets or the Mandara hills, may offer long-lasting cover for guerrilla operations. Other militants could drop the attempt to maintain a guerrilla force, complete with families, in favour of a slimmer structure with a longer reach and a focus on terror acts. Some may move to new areas. While Boko Haram has a primary audience among the Kanuri, the dom- inant ethnic group in Borno state and surrounding areas (and Yusuf’s and Shekau’s community), it has been able to reach further.49 The daily violence of banditry and cattle-rustling prevalent throughout northern Nigeria and the region could open up new areas of operation.50
Another uncertainty is the potential to reach out to other jihadist movements. There has long been evidence of some links, notably with AQIM or ex-Ansaru mil- itants.51 Several sources noted the presence of a few Maghreb Arabs among Boko Haram ranks, and Shekau pledged allegiance in March 2015 to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. U.S. officials have recently claimed links between IS and Boko Haram are tightening, but evidence so far is slim.52 Nigeria articles in IS’s magazine, Dabiq, are of poor quality, unlike its coverage of the fronts where IS is clearly present. With the exception of the 27 November 2015 attack on a Shia gathering near Kano, Boko Haram’s targeting seems to have been less global recently.
Nigeria’s ability to capitalise on Boko Haram’s current weakness and curb it is another uncertainty, particularly with oil prices low and the naira falling. The neigh- bours’ strengths are also unknown. Each in its way is fragile. Cameroon confronts a delicate presidential succession in 2018, a security apparatus with internal tensions and a north with a large (not exclusively) Muslim population that feels marginalised. Niger is tense, fresh from controversial presidential elections, with budget problems, a partial criminalisation of the state due to illicit trafficking and a military used to meddling in politics.53 Chad is also fragile, with a long history of armed rebellions, essentially controlled by a tribal army awash with aspiring men-at-arms, reeling from the oil-price collapse and just past the controversial election in which President Idriss Déby, in power since 1990, won a fifth term.54 Such frailties could, in various ways, offer ground for an extension or more indigenous mutation of Boko Haram, as well as the emergence of other violent actors, jihadist or not.
VI. A Mounting Humanitarian Toll
The humanitarian impact has been huge. There is no solid body count, an indication of state weakness and dearth of local civil society, made worse by security concerns. The Council on Foreign Relations (U.S.) assesses that Boko Haram and state actors together have killed 28,000 since 2011 in Nigeria alone, but the toll may be higher.55 There are now 2.8 million displaced persons in the Lake Chad basin, about 200,000 of them refugees. With limited resources made worse by weak capacity, the states and aid community have struggled to handle the crisis.
Regional governments’ policies have not always helped the displaced. Authorities have seemed keen for civilians to leave and stay away from Boko Haram-held terri- tory (where they could be a potential source of voluntary or coerced support for the insurgents) but are at the same time embarrassed by the massive IDP camps, fearing they may turn into hotbeds of discontent.56 Also, such camps have reportedly attracted human trafficking and sexual abuse. President Buhari’s initial plans to push IDPs back to their home areas have ap- parently been dropped, and Nigeria seems to be preparing for massive long-term displacement.58 Cameroon is not keen on retaining Nigerian refugees and is pushing for swift repatriation, at the risk of returning them to areas still plagued by insurgency and possibly to starve. Niger and Chad have pushed Nigerian refugees and nationals – not always an easy distinction – away from the insurgent-infested Lake Chad islands, sometimes forcibly, and are trying to prevent returns. The future of IDPs, stuck in camps often removed from their resource bases, is sombre.
Displaced or not, 9.2 million of the 20 million living in the affected areas require humanitarian help. Nearly half face severe food insecurity, and in Borno state some 50,000 are starving.59 Agriculture is at a standstill, with labour drained from rural areas, movement of goods and people complicated and poor rains. While many civil- ians have fled to urban centres, there still seem to be many in the bush, with little to no mobility, and the lean season has not even begun.60 Hasty return to rural areas without sufficient seeds, tools or fertilisers will not help. At this stage, if rural populations are not supported adequately by government, they may be vulnerable to Boko Haram offering similar supplies.
With the size of the impacted areas, security concerns, intermittent international attention and Nigeria’s perceived sensitivity to external involvement, aid organisa- tions are struggling to increase their activity.61 Humanitarian aid is nevertheless indispensable, as bans on economic activities, which seem to have proven militarily effective, will likely continue. Even if states were willing to reverse them, it is far from certain that would produce a rapid improvement in local livelihoods, since many IDPs and refugees are cautious about returning, and traders are reluctant to re-enter the markets. Whether pushed back to unsafe areas or stuck in insufficiently supplied and protected camps, the displaced would be easy targets for voluntary or coerced Boko Haram recruitment.62
VII. Conclusion
Though the military response to Boko Haram has become more cogent, the Lake Chad states should not too quickly proclaim “mission accomplished”. Even if they are made to abandon all territorial pretensions in Nigeria’s north east and the Lake Chad area, or are forced to abandon their guerrilla war, some Boko Haram militants at least are likely to seek to continue their insurgency in some form, probably through terror attacks. For Nigeria and its neighbours, the job will only become more complicated. Beyond military action, more complex governance and development challenges need to be addressed. In the coming year, Crisis Group will look at Boko Haram’s region- alisation and transformation, its social impact, patterns of recruitment and radicali- sation, female experiences, MNJTF effectiveness and regional cooperation.
The 14 May regional security summit, two years after the first was held in Paris, is an opportunity to consolidate regional and wider international cooperation and, crucially, to review the current policies of Nigeria and its partners. The summit’s concept note indicates that the Lake Chad states and their international partners recognise the numerous steps and initiatives needed to curb Boko Haram, including restoring security to long-neglected peripheries and borders while respecting rule- of-law, protecting victims and beginning infrastructure development in insurgency- affected areas so IDPs and refugees can go home.63 These are all important to help restrict the rebellion, but preventing future insurgencies must also be part of the summit’s focus. Policies and initiatives should aim at developing strategies and tac- tics that invest in the longer-term goal of conflict prevention and focus on:
Attention to the conflict’s humanitarian consequences. Response to the human consequences has been dramatically underfunded and insufficient. More aid, both humanitarian and developmental, is urgently needed, with priority on the swift return of IDPs and refugees to rebuild local economies, though constrained by reasonable security concerns. Promises of assistance should be implemented speedily, without gaps between people returning and the arrival of support. Special support for agricultural production should be provided. Attention must also be paid, in both humanitarian interventions and development programs, to managing land rights and, particularly, relations between affected communi- ties. Boko Haram has, in some places, driven wider wedges between communities that were already rivals for scarce resources.
It is not just about making sure victims are taken care of and protected. The han- dling of populations that lived under Boko Haram, whether willingly or as captives, needs to be carefully thought through, including with regard to rehabilitation; many are psychologically, socially and culturally vulnerable. Humanitarian sup- port must make special provision for women and children.
Reform state and state-sponsored counter-insurgency strategy.Nigeria and its neighbours have relied on massive, often indiscriminate violence to combat Boko Haram. Security forces and their proxies have been allowed to operate with near total impunity. This may have achieved military gains, but it is likely to prove counterproductive over time. With Boko Haram apparently on the back foot, authorities must establish a calendar to end the state of emergency and re- turn to the rule of law, especially by encouraging security forces to use force more judiciously.
Manage captured and ex-fighters wisely. As regional governments close in further on Boko Haram areas, they should consider how to treat captured and ex-insurgents to prevent further violence and mitigate future recruitment. If they are handled appropriately, it should be possible to obtain crucial information sys- tematically on the insurgency, its recruitment process, including profiles and rea- sons for joining, and the patterns and intensity of radicalisation. It is essential to avoid casting all Boko Haram recruits as hardline, which could provoke further tensions. Governments should also be prepared to engage, openly or discreetly, with Boko Haram leaders who may be looking for a compromise.
How governments treat and distinguish Boko Haram ideologues from those who joined from other motives will be vital. Dealing appropriately with ex-members is the first step to lessen recruitment. This includes developing adequate confine- ment conditions, de-radicalisation programs and well-designed assistance for community reintegration. Though even more of a challenge in areas devastated by insurgency, a more transparent justice process is critical for restoring rule of law and the state’s credibility. While not neglecting accountability for serious crimes and respecting international commitments, the governments should not rule out engaging with leaders willing to negotiate and should provide avenues for reconciliation.
Rolling back the use of vigilantes. The CJTF and other regional vigilante or irregular forces have been important in the fight against Boko Haram, and govern- ment support of them as an immediate measure was understandable. It is now time to think carefully about further reliance on them, however, and about their demobilisation, lest longer-term problems result, including increased risk of lo- cal, communal violence. Many could become tools for local politicians to misuse.
Bringing back the state. Planning is required for returning more trusted, transparent authorities, including professional security forces, to regions that over time have come to distrust central government. This is critical to curbing the in- surgency, particularly in rural areas, where anger against states seen as more predatory than protective has been a push factor for Boko Haram. While diverse factors drove the insurgency, structural insecurity is dominant in the Lake Chad area. Governments must move more urgently to curb impunity, particularly of security forces, and restore social services. The link between underdevelopment and radicalisation is complex, and it rarely makes sense to explicitly label recon- struction or development activities as “de-radicalisation” or “preventing violence extremism”.64 That said, improved service provision is essential to rebuilding the state legitimacy that can sap support for movements like Boko Haram. There is little doubt service provision, which goes beyond rebuilding infrastructure, can help states recover legitimacy.
The states around Lake Chad have been challenged by Boko Haram to find ways of cooperating. At some levels this has been successful, but the success is principally military and tactical and has not been without frustrations and suspicions. The posi- tive elements should now be extended to include issues such as prisoner handling, refugee returns, cross-border recruitment and criminality. The bigger challenge may well be to turn this regional cooperation toward transforming the economies – and political economies – in all four Lake Chad countries.
Notes:
1 “Nigeria Boko Haram: Militants ‘technically defeated’ – Buhari”, BBC, 24 December 2015. Sup- porters tend not to use the term “Boko Haram” which they see as a derogatory designation probably popularised by militants of Izala, a non-violent Salafi movement eager to distinguish themselves from and mock the more radical groups, including Boko Haram, born among them. Boko Haram went through several internal designations, replacing its formal Arabic name, Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad) with the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), after its affiliation with the Islamic State (IS) in 2015. There are reports that some groups involved in the insurgency oppose the IS affilia- tion, so may not accept that name. On divisions with the insurgency, see below. For clarity, and giv- en its wide recognition, “Boko Haram” is used in this briefing.
2 For background on Boko Haram, see Crisis Group Africa Reports N°s 213, Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency, 3 April 2014; and 168, Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict, 20 December 2010.
3 It had more than 150 four-wheel drive trucks with mounted weaponry in Gwoza at the beginning of 2015. Crisis Group electronic communication with military expert, 10 March 2016.
4 On 7 March 2015, Shekau pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS) leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The area Boko Haram controlled was called the Wilayat Gharb Afriqiya (West Africa province) of the IS caliphate.
5 “Boko Haram controls half of Borno, says Senator Garbai”, Punch, 7 February 2016. The three LGAs were Abadam, Mobbar and Kala Balge, all bordering either Niger or Cameroon. The army said it captured Kala Balge on 23 March 2016.
6 “Boko Haram militants attack village in Adamawa”, Naij.com, 17 February 2016; “Boko Haram raids Yobe state on horseback”, Naij.com, 20 April 2016. Since 2011, Boko Haram has had logistical networks in Cameroon’s far north, notably Kousseri. Crisis Group interviews, security forces, ad- ministrative authorities, lawyers and traders, Kousseri, March 2016.
7 The first incidents in Niger occurred in December 2014. According to one count, attacks peaked with 24 in February 2015; there were nine in November and only three in February 2016. “Niger- Diffa: Access, Insecurity and Internal displacement”, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitar- ian Affairs (OCHA), 10 March 2016. After it joined the regional fight in January 2015, Chad was targeted with guerrilla attacks in and around Lake Chad throughout the year and deadly suicide bombings in N’Djamena and some other localities in June and July. Since January 2016, there have been only small guerrilla operations in the country. Crisis Group interview, security expert, N’Djamena, April 2016. Aside from 2013 kidnappings of Western hostages, Boko Haram’s first at- tack in Cameroon was in March 2014. The country has suffered the most in recent months; 88 were killed in January 2016, 79 in February, 23 in March and sixteen in April. Crisis Group Africa Report N°229, Cameroon: The Threat of Religious Radicalism, 3 September 2015, pp. 17-20; and observa- tions, northern Cameroon, March 2016. Crisis Group plans to publish briefings on Boko Haram in Chad, Cameroon and Niger over the coming months.
8 The controversy over whether Shekau is alive continues; Nigerian authorities have long claimed he was killed in 2013 and replaced by impersonators. Some Cameroonian soldiers in Mabass said Shekau was in Madagali, Adamawa state, 10-27 February 2016. Madagali shares borders with Mabass and Ldamang towns (Mayo Tsanaga), Cameroon. Crisis Group interviews, security forces, Mabass, Cameroon, March 2016. Boko Haram watchers are divided. Compare Andrea Brigaglia, “Abubakar Shekau: The Boko Haram Leader Who Never Came ‘Back from the Dead’”, Annual Re- view of Islam in Africa, vol. 12, no. 1 (2013-2014); Jacob Zenn, “Boko Haram and the many faces of Abubakar Shekau”, African Arguments, 30 September 2014; “Salkida: Shekau alive, still controlling Boko Haram”, The Cable (Nigeria), 16 August 2015; and Crisis Group electronic communication, researcher working on Boko Haram, 14 April 2016.
9 Crisis Group electronic communications, researchers and an analyst working on Boko Haram, April 2016.
10 Kyari Mohammed, Borno in the Rabih Years, 1893-1901: the Rise and Crash of a Predatory State (Maiduguri, 2006). Rabih Fadlallah was a Sudanese warlord and slave trader who conquered the Borno Empire in 1883 and ruled it until 1900, when he was killed by French forces. Rabih’s forces regularly raided the countryside for plunder and to capture slaves.
11 On the LRA’s religious dimension, see Heike Behrend, Alice Lakwena & the Holy Spirits: War in Northern Uganda 1986-97 (Oxford, 1999). On later transformation, see Crisis Group Africa Re- ports N°s 182, The Lord’s Resistance Army: End Game?, 17 November 2011; and 77, Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict, 14 April 2004.
12 Crisis Group interview, international military expert, N’Djamena, Chad, 27 April 2016.
13 Crisis Group electronic communication, researcher working on Boko Haram, 25 March 2016.
14 The pepper trade in south-east Niger resumed in February 2016 after civil society took a stand. “Déclaration de la Société Civile Nigérienne”, Fondation Frantz Fanon, 20 May 2015.
15 Boko Haram is reportedly using groundnut oil as motorcycle fuel. “Boko Haram, facing fuel short- ages, makes its own: security sources, escapee”, Agence France-Presse, 18 April 2016.
16 An estimated $11 million was reportedly paid to Boko Haram for release of captives in five sepa- rate incidents, 2013-2014, in Cameroon’s Far North alone. Crisis Group interviews, administrative and municipal authorities, negotiators, journalists, Yaoundé, Maroua, Mokolo, February-March 2016. “Les contours de la libération des 27 otages enlevés par Boko Haram”, L’oeil du Sahel, 16 October 2014; “Nigerian Islamists got 3.15 USD millions to free French hostages”, Reuters, 26 April 2013. 17 “Boko Haram: 76 starving members surrender to Nigerian military”, Newsweek, 3 March 2016. 18 Drawing on the work of Nigerian commentator Fulan Nasrullah (https://fulansitrep.com), counter- terrorism analyst Jacob Zenn considers Boko Haram is actually two main active organisations that sometimes cooperate: Shekau’s ISWAP, along Lake Chad, by the Niger border and in central Borno state, and Khaled al Barnawi’s Harakat-al-Mujahrin, an Ansaru spin-off content with anonymity, in Cameroon and along its border. “Wilayat West Africa reboots for the Caliphate”, www.isn.thz.ch, 15 September 2015. Nigerian authorities reported al Barnawi’s arrest in April 2016 in Kogi state, far from Cameroon’s border.
19 Crisis Group interview, researcher working on Boko Haram, Paris, 30 March 2016; Adam Higazi, “A Conflict Analysis of Borno and Adamawa States, Northeastern Nigeria”, unpublished field re- port, February 2016.
20 Crisis Group interview, Yaoundé, 25 February 2016.
21 Seventeen such attacks succeeded. Crisis Group interviews, security forces, Maroua, March 2016. 22 Including some East European countries. See “Analysts Weigh Nigeria-Russia Arms Deal”, Voice of America, 10 December 2014; “Nigeria reportedly takes delivery of ‘Super Hinds’ – Analysis”, FighterControl.co.uk, 9 January 2015; “Musings on this week’s deliveries of MRAPs, Armour and Combat Helicopters from China, Belarus and Russia”, Beegeagle's Blog, (https://beegeagle.word press.com/), 15 January 2015; “Nigeria receiving T-72s and other weapons from Czech Republic”, DefenceWeb, 2 February 2015 and “Photo of Chinese-Built CS/VP3 ‘Bigfoot’ MRAP Vehicle of Nige- ria Army”, Defence Blog, 26 August 2015.
23 “Buhari names new Service Chiefs, NSA”, Premium Times, 13 July 2015; Crisis Group interviews, senior military officers, Abuja, January and February 2016; Lieutenant General Tukur Buratai, lec- ture delivered at National Defence College, Abuja, 13 January 2016.
24 Plans to further strengthen military capacity with significant additional security force recruit- ment are under way in Nigeria as well as Cameroon.
25 “Nigeria targets 300 army officers, firms, in widening corruption probe”, Reuters, 25 March 2016; “Why Dasuki will remain in detention – Presidency”, Daily Post, 29 March 2016.
26 In Cameroon, the comités de vigilance are widely praised by security forces and local administra- tion for their role in fighting Boko Haram. Crisis Group interviews, administrative authorities, se- curity forces and vigilante groups, Yaoundé, Maroua and Mora, March 2016. In Chad, many vigilan- te groups were formed at the authorities’ demand after the suicide attacks in Baga Sola in October 2015. In villages, they would stop-and-search newcomers and protect markets and NGO-organised food distribution. They do not always have guns, often carrying spears, machetes or whips. Crisis Group interview, vigilante, Andja (near Baga Sola), Chad, April 2016.
27 “Stars on their shoulders. Blood on their hands. War crimes committed by the Nigerian military”, Amnesty International, 3 June 2015; “Civilian JTF’ members caught on video torturing Boko Haram suspects”, Sahara Reporters, 21 October 2015.
28 The members of LCBC, created to manage the resources from Lake Chad, are Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, as well as the Central African Republic and Libya. Benin, on Nigeria’s western border, also pledged 800 troops to the MNJTF along with LCBC members, in May 2014. In March 2016, a MNJTF communiqué announced Benin was ready to deploy 150,
29 “Stars on their shoulders”, op. cit., p. 12.
30 “Chad troops enter Nigerian town in pursuit of Boko Haram”, Reuters, 3 February 2015. Chad reportedly sent some 400 vehicles and 2,000 soldiers to Cameroon in January and into Nigeria in February 2015. Crisis Group analyst interview in a previous capacity, security actor, N’Djamena, February 2015. The other contingent entered Nigeria from Niger in March 2015.
31 Crisis Group interview, international security officials, N’Djamena, April 2016.
32 Crisis Group interview, MNJTF official, N’Djamena, November 2015.
33 Crisis Group interviews, international security officials, MNJTF officers, N’Djamena, November 2015 and April 2016; MNJTF officers, Mora, Cameroon, March 2016. “Failure to share data ham- pers war on Boko Haram in Africa”, The New York Times, 23 April 2016. For internal communica- tions, Boko Haram has been using cell phones; several years ago Nigeria shut down the network in the north east and is currently pushing hard for all SIM card purchasers to be identified. (In 2015, Nigeria fined South African operator MTN $5.2 billion for failing to provide the identity of 5.2 mil- lion users. The fine is currently the object of negotiation involving the South African authorities.) With the network down, Boko Haram and others would travel east to use the Cameroonian network. In the ongoing offensive, the army has seized many cell phones, as well as laptops powered by solar panels. Nigerian authorities claim to have used seized cell phones to track other members. Western intelligence agencies also track communications. It is unclear how much product is shared with lo- cal allies. Crisis Group interviews, Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria, Washington, 2015-2106.
34 Thus, the EU is about to start giving funds to the African Union (AU) for the MNJTF. It considers the MNJTF inadequately configured to receive funds directly. The AU will use the money to provide in-kind assistance. EU support would have been unavailable if the MNJTF was not a joint command. Some officials from the Lake Chad states have, however, expressed suspicion and frustration, notably about the slow delivery and longer management chain. Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, Paris, March 2016; international official, Addis Ababa, April 2016.
35 Crisis Group interview, diplomats, Abuja, February 2016.
36 Crisis Group Report, Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict, op. cit. Among the books avail- able, see in particular Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos (ed.), Boko Haram. Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria (Ibadan 2014).
37 Ayo Obe, “Environmental Degradation, Climate Change and Conflict: The Lake Chad Basin Area”, Crisis Group, The Future of Conflict, 27 October 2015, https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/ environmental-degradation-climate-change-and-conflict-the-lake-chad-basin-area-6aec2bd9fa25#. ioyvtx95t.
38 Crisis Group Special Report, Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, 14 March 2016. 39 See Janet Roitman, Fiscal Disobedience: An Anthropology of Economic Regulation in Central Africa (Princeton, 2004); Issa Saïbou, Les coupeurs de route: Histoire du banditisme rural et transfrontalier dans le bassin du lac Tchad (Paris, 2011); Marielle Debos, Le métier des armes au Tchad. Le gouvernement d’entre-guerres (Paris, 2013).
40 “Motivations and empty promises. Voices of former Boko Haram combatants and Nigerian youth”, Mercy Corps, April 2016, p. 14.
41 “Stars on their shoulders”, op. cit.; “Human rights under fire: Attacks and violations in Came- roon’s struggle with Boko Haram”, Amnesty International, September 2015.
42 Crisis Group interview, Dakar, 21 April 2016.
43 “Nigerian troops kill 58 Boko Haram insurgents, cut terrorists’ logistics – Army”, Premium Times, 22 March 2016.
44 Christian Seignobos, “Boko Harm et le lac Tchad. Extension ou sanctuarisation?”, Afrique con- temporaine, no. 255 (2016).
45 See “‘Those terrible weeks in their camp’. Boko Haram violence against women and girls in Northeast Nigeria”, Human Rights Watch, October 2014, a report that draws almost exclusively on the cases of Christian abductees but mentions, however, the possibility that rapes are under- reported.
46 Crisis Group interviews, male refugees and former Boko Haram captive, Minawao and Yaoundé, March-April 2016.
47 Ibid. Crisis Group interview, researcher working on Boko Haram, Paris, 29 March 2016.
48 “Motivations and empty promises”, op. cit., p. 15; “Strategy of terror: the suicide bombing girls of Boko Haram”, Der Spiegel, 29 April 2016.
49 Kabiru Umar, convicted for masterminding the Christmas Day 2011 bombing of St. Theresa Catholic church in Madalla, Niger state, which killed at least 44, was from Gagi Village, Sokoto state. Aminu Sadiq Ogwuche, arrested in connection with the 14 April 2014 bombing of a bus station in Nyanya, Abuja, in which about 130 were killed, came from Orokam in Benue state.
50 In what seems like an attempt to manipulate public opinion, some have blamed a number of recent violent clashes in northern Nigeria between ethnic Fulani herdsmen and farmers on Boko Haram. But an escalation in violence could make it a self-fulfilling prophecy. “B/Haram attacking Nigerians under guise of herders/farmers’ feud – Dambazau”, Daily Trust, 15 April 2016. Crisis Group electronic communication, researcher working on Boko Haram and Fulani pastoralism, 27 April 2016.
51 In October 2014, French troops arrested in Niger a senior member of al-Mourabitoune, a jihadist organisation linked to AQIM, who was returning from Nigeria where he was giving Boko Haram media training. Crisis Group interview, Nigerien security official, Niamey, November 2014. Crisis Group Report, Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II), op. cit., pp. 23-26.
52 “Boko Haram and ISIS are collaborating more: US military”, The New York Times, 21 April 2016; also, Jacob Zenn, “Nigerian al-Qaedaism”, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, 2014.
55 “Nigeria Security Tracker” (www.cfr.org). See also Higazi, “A conflict analysis”, op. cit., p. 8. 56 Crisis Group interviews, Nigerian, Cameroonian, Chadian national and international humanitar- ian actors, Abuja, February 2016, Yaoundé, February-March 2016, N’Djamena, April 2016.
57 “Grim tales of rape, child trafficking in displaced persons camps”, International Centre for Inves- tigative Reporting, 29 January 2015. This information was confirmed by a human rights expert. Crisis Group electronic communication, 7 April 2016. Nigeria’s National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), however, denied the report. “NEMA denies allegation of sexual abuse, others in IDP camps”, The Guardian (Nigeria), 16 July 2015.
58 “Boko Haram: it’s about human lives, not territories”, salkida.com, 16 February 2016.
59 “Lake Chad Basin Emergency: Humanitarian Needs and Response Overview 2016”, OCHA, Jan- uary 2016.
60 “Trade seen as key to return to normality in NE Nigeria”, Agence France-Presse, 13 March 2016. 61 Crisis Group interviews, diplomats and humanitarian actors, Abuja, 16-19 February 2016.
62 Crisis Group interviews, Chadian national and international humanitarian actors, N’Djamena, April 2016.
63 However, as a development expert noted, we are still at the stage of an humanitarian emergency, and investments will not resolve important governance challenges. Crisis Group electronic commu- nication, international development expert, 26 April 2016.
Modern Terrorism: Should Religion Bear Any Blame?
DONALD WINCHESTER.
In the wake of recent terror attacks, Western society has jumped to an easy and, it might seem, obvious conclusion. Seeking to eradicate terrorism means discovering the motivations of the terrorists. Not a difficult task, many would say. The perpetrators of the attacks on Glasgow, London, Bali, Madrid, New York and other places have all claimed inspiration from their religion. Osama bin Laden justified the World Trade Center attacks by quoting the Qur’an, while Jim Walker of NoBeliefs.com rejects all subtleties in declaring that “belief causes terrorism.” If religion is the cause, many argue, then surely eradicating all forms of belief would remove terror from our world.
Neuroscience researcher Sam Harris, author of Letter to a Christian Nation, is one who agrees. He contends that religion propagates myths that are dangerous, and that the world would be far better off without them. In an essay titled “Science Must Destroy Religion,” he claims that only when religion is eradicated “will we stand a chance of healing the deepest and most dangerous fractures in our world.” Elsewhere he writes that “intellectual honesty is better (more enlightened, more useful, less dangerous, more in touch with reality, etc.) than dogmatism. The degree to which science is committed to the former, and religion to the latter remains one of the most salient and appalling disparities to be found in human discourse.”
The new U.K. edition of Letter to a Christian Nation features an introduction by celebrated evolutionist Richard Dawkins, with whom Harris appears to be in perfect accord. Dawkins, speaking in a British documentary titled The Trouble With Atheism, declared: “I think that the crimes done in the name of religion really do follow from religious faith. I don’t think anyone could say the same with atheism.”
Statements such as these are becoming more and more prevalent as society attempts to explain the problems that transfix and plague our modern era. The evidence seems to be stacked against religion; and, without close inspection, it might be difficult to discern whether religious belief has any benefits at all. Charles Darwin, Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud proposed a secular worldview well over a century ago, so what need have we of religion? Harris, Dawkins and many others suggest that religion is an outdated and dangerous leftover that a mature society would do well to eradicate. It’s said that secularism offers all the explanations religion once did, without any of the unreasonable violence and hatred. It is the calm, objective societal force that destructive religion can never be.
What both Harris and Dawkins seem to overlook, however, is that religion has never been the unique instigator of violence. Avid followers and enemies of religion alike have acted throughout history in similarly destructive ways. People of both persuasions have at times operated in the same unbending and despotic fashion that many ascribe solely to religion. For every Spanish Inquisition—two and a half centuries of appalling ethnic cleansing—there’s a Sir Francis Galton, the half cousin and follower of Charles Darwin who recommended weeding out the weakest of society through eugenics. It is easy to see the influence Sir Francis’s theory had on confessed admirer Adolf Hitler.
Even a cursory examination of secular societies unearths some exceedingly repulsive and brutal actions, all perpetrated by people who publicly rejected religious belief. According to political philosopher John Gray, “terror was practised during the last century on a scale unequalled . . . [and] much of it was done in the service of secular hopes” (Black Mass, 2007).
The Soviet Union was a professedly secular society. Under Joseph Stalin, it indulged in untold cruelties and murders. The height of Stalin’s brutality, the Great Terror of 1937–38, encompassed 18 months in which hundreds of thousands met their death by firing squad. Untold thousands of others died from starvation, inhumane conditions and sheer viciousness. Life in the forced labor world of the Gulags was recorded by only a few—Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Varlam Shalamov, among others—who braved Soviet censure by publishing their experiences.
Solzhenitsyn retells the story of Anna Skripnikova, who, on the eve of her fifth imprisonment in 1952, was told, “The prison doctor reports you have a blood pressure of 240/120. . . . We’re going to drive it up to 340 so you’ll kick the bucket, you viper, and with no black and blue marks; no beatings; no broken bones. We’ll just not let you sleep.”
Anna was in her fifties at the time and had endured a life of imprisonment for trumped-up charges. And hers was just one of millions of similar stories. The truly frightening aspect of the Soviet terror, though, is that there is no way to accurately assess the extent of its cruelty, as Soviet officials were encouraged to destroy (or fail to create) records of suffering.
Late-18th-century France provides a further example. It is particularly relevant here, as the French Revolution was a powerful inspiration for the Bolsheviks. Indeed, Lenin viewed both the Revolution and the revolutionaries as models for discipline in his new Bolshevik society. He drew lessons from “the Jacobins, who were defeated because they did not guillotine enough people; and . . . the Paris Commune, which was defeated because its leaders did not shoot enough people” (Aleksandr Nekrich and Mikhail Heller, Utopia in Power, 1982, 1986). Many hold the French revolt against the aristocracy as a symbol of the modern world’s embracing of secular freedom and progress. Indeed, the movement’s slogan—Liberté, égalité, fraternité, ou la mort! (Liberty, equality, fraternity, or death!)—retains its strength both in France and around the Western world. What many forget, though, are the atrocities that were committed in the name of these secular ideals.
The Jacobins are notorious examples of malicious secular despots. In the pursuit of a de-Christianized France, some of their leaders, including Jacques Hébert, Pierre Gaspard Chaumette and Joseph Fouché, advocated La Culte de la Raison, the unquestioning adherence to atheistic reason. They determined to force this “culte” on their fractured nation, but their enthusiasm led to the slaughter of thousands of men and women in what historian Christopher Hibbert calls “the worst excesses” of the Revolution. During the 1793 Reign of Terror, Fouché—“one of the most dreaded of the Jacobins”—ultimately “decided that the guillotine was too slow an instrument for their purpose and had over three hundred of their victims mown down by cannon fire” (The Days of the French Revolution, 1980, 1999).
And there are more recent examples. Saddam Hussein led an Iraqi nation that “was thoroughly secular, [ruled] by a western-style legal code,” according to Gray. Yet that did not prevent untold oppression and brutality. The Human Rights Watch estimates that Hussein’s government “murdered or ‘disappeared’ some quarter of a million Iraqis, if not more.”
Does this mean that atheism or secularism is to blame for such slaughter? It would be hard to argue this. It simply shows that in these cases religion is not the cause of violence and terror. The absence of religion did not equal the absence of violence; the Jacobin Terror and Stalin’s purges demonstrate as much. On the other hand, the Spanish Inquisition and Islamic terrorism show that atheism is not the sole cause either. Indeed, many religionists are largely peaceful, as are many secularists. To ascribe the urge to violence to either is plainly unreasonable. Instead, we must search deeper.
What all of these incidents of violence have in common is an overwhelming and blinding desire to impose one’s beliefs on others. Stalin and Hussein aimed for unbridled power; the Jacobins, like today’s al-Qaeda, hoped to convert the world to their own worldview. Even Dawkins’s and Harris’s recent tomes fall inside this tradition, belonging to a genre of books that is among the most ideologically violent in modern publishing. This desire to oppress aggressively is not uncommon; it is evident from the playground to the tyrannical regime.
Nietzsche, if asked, would have placed the responsibility for war and violence with our own conflicting human nature. In his tour de force, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, he wrote, “The body is a great intelligence, a multiplicity with one sense, a war and a peace” (emphasis added). As scientist and theologian Alister McGrath comments, Nietzsche showed that “there seems to be something about human nature which makes our belief systems capable of inspiring both great acts of goodness and great acts of depravity” (Dawkins’ God: Genes, Memes, and the Meaning of Life, 2005). These words call to mind the symbolism of the two trees in the biblical Garden of Eden. Adam and Eve preferred to eat from the tree representing the knowledge of good and evil, an act that brought into being the anomaly of which Nietzsche spoke.
The cause for terror and violence lies somewhere within our inner nature. The apostle James explained this in his epistle, the earliest of the apostolic letters: “Where do you think all these appalling wars and quarrels come from? Do you think they just happen? Think again. They come about because you want your own way. . . . You want what isn’t yours and will risk violence to get your hands on it” (James 4:1–2, The Message Bible).
In effect, blaming terror and violence on religion, as many today are too eager to do, is both dangerously reductive and shirks responsibility for the world. What many forget is that religion, as most of us know it, is a man-made construct, far divorced from the principles and values that God originally intended for humanity. Under this light, religion and atheism are both human designs and are therefore very similar in character. That both can act in aggressive and cruel ways is no surprise, as each emanates from the same source: religion, atheism and terrorism are all products of humanity’s primary and at times violent nature.
SELECTED REFERENCES:
1 John Gray, Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia (2007). 2 Alister McGrath, Dawkins’ God: Genes, Memes, and the Meaning of Life (2005).
Anders Fogh Rasmussen's Keynote Address -Nigeria summit on national security 2016
Anders Fogh Rasmussen
Excellences, ladies and gentlemen. Warm thanks to Professor Oshita O. Oshita, from the institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for the kind introduction. I would also like to thank professor Ifediora. As Director of the Council on African Security and Development he has been instrumental in setting up and organizing this conference.
It is in indeed a pleasure and a great honor to be here today. A special thanks to University of Wisconsin and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for organizing this conference – dedicated to one of the key challenges of our time: terrorism.
In spite of continued efforts to confront and contain terrorism – the evil continues to spread. More and more countries are recording attacks and the number of casualties continues to rise. In 2014 we saw the highest number ever recorded with 32,000 casualties. Few places in this world has been as severely hit by terrorism as Nigeria.
The rise of terrorism globally reflects the fact that the world is on fire. The Middle East is being torn up by war, terrorism and a humanitarian catastrophe which has forced millions of people to flee.
What began as a pro-democracy uprising in Syria has become a tornado of conflict, sucking regional and global powers into an accelerating cycle of violence. The Islamic State terrorist group has carved out a massive power base across Syria and Iraq, and is battling to expand it to Asia and Africa. Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State testifies to this fact. Iran and Saudi Arabia are fighting a proxy war for regional dominance and terrorist groups al-Qaida and Hezbollah are trying to carve out their own spheres of control.
The effects have already reached far beyond the shores of the Mediterranean and the streets of Damascus. Islamic State bombs have caused carnage in Paris and Istanbul, Beirut and Brussels; jihadist groups inspired the San Bernardino shooters in California to commit the deadliest terror attacks on US soil since 9/11. The conflicts in the Middle East have sent millions of people fleeing into Europe, straining the continent's ability to take them in to breaking point.
In Syria and Iraq, Yemen and Libya, the body of the state as we know it has collapsed, and hostile powers and terrorist groups are gathering like vultures to pick over the remains.
Not since the Balkans a century ago has one region held so much potential for global disaster. Shia against Sunni, Russia against Turkey, Iran against Saudi Arabia, Islamic State against the West: Any one of these contests could provide the flash-point for a global conflagration.
The Syrian disaster is an example of how conflicts can escalate out of control and develop into a broader threat when the U.S. hesitates to intervene. In blood and treasure, Syria is a human tragedy and a great loss. Strategically, it is a calamity: An example that reckless autocrats and brutal terrorists will fill the vacuum when the United States and its allies retreat.
There is a link between the American reluctance to use hard power and this outbreak of fire. If the United States retrenches and retreats, or even if the world thinks that American restraint reflects a lack of willingness to engage in preventing and resolving conflicts by using military force if need be, it leaves a vacuum that will be filled by the bad guys.
I am deeply concerned about this situation. We must reinforce our fight against terrorism.
The efforts to counter terrorism should be centered around three main stands of work: The hard security measures. Economic development and integration. A stronger democratic voice in the world.
First, hard security.
Nigeria is a compelling example that political leadership and hard security are necessary if you want to fight the the bad guys. Nigeria’s military has made major progress against the militants and Boko Haram is no longer occupying large parts of Nigeria. The army is better organized and the President has clamped down on the corruption that had diverted funds from the armed forces. I would like to congratulate President Buhari on this significant achievement.
The threat of Boko Haram caught the world’s attention in in April 2014 when fighters raided and kidnapped nearly 300 school girls studying for their exam. The fact that more than 200 of these girls are still held in captivity highlights that the security situation on the ground is still not good enough.
The military’s successes have weakened Boko Haram, but not eliminated the threat. The organization has – for now - morphed into a group of well-organized bandits focusing on urban terrorist tactics and assaults on “soft” targets. It has proven difficult for Nigeria to defend itself against such sporadic assaults on smaller settlements and military outposts. Doing so will require improved intelligence and sustained efforts to degrade the technical skills and specialized supplies of the militants. It is still too early to conclude whether or not Boko Haram continues to represent an existential threat to the country.
And although Boko Haram has dramatically lost territory in Nigeria, its spread across the region shows few signs of being contained. Under Mr. Buhari, Nigeria has cooperated more with Chad and Niger to fight Boko Haram; but to prevent Boko Haram’s further consolidation, regional partners should take a more consistent and coordinated approach, in tandem with international support. This would include broadening the mobilization of the Multinational Joint Task Force, full funding of the force’s estimated $700 million budget, and appropriate cooperation on intelligence, logistics, and training from partners outside the region.
Furthermore, we have seen the Niger Delta Avengers hit Nigeria’s oil-output severely. The Avengers called on oil majors operating in Nigeria to cease operations within two weeks or face more attacks. We have also seen indigenous tribes of herdsmen causing instability, havoc and fear in the middle belt. Determined fight against these terrorists is also necessary, alongside infrastructure investments to promote a positive economic development.
The fight against the Islamic State in the Middle East shows that hard power is a crucial element in the fight against terrorism. The U.S.-led coalition began bombing the Islamic State after the group seized large swathes of territory in Iraq and Syria in mid-2014. A dozen nations have been involved in airstrikes, although the United States has carried out more than seventy percent.
There is clear evidence that the containment strategy is working. The US led coalition has forced Islamic State to retreat from 40% of its territory in Iraq and 10% of its territory in Syria. The weakening of its hold over the territory it has reduced its ability to extract resources.
Perhaps because this strategy has been effective, Islamic State is increasingly conducting brutal attacks abroad. The coalition against Islamic State has been less successful in undercutting Islamic State's ideological appeal. These are in many ways harder problems than military containment.
With the attacks on Brussels and Paris the threat of terrorism looms large in the minds of many Europeans – and our threat levels remain high. Our intelligence services are doing an incredible job. But the Islamic State sponsored attacks on Brussels and Paris has also highlighted that further urgent improvements to information sharing and border security are necessary — especially related to the use of a common database for DNA, fingerprints, and car license plates for suspected terrorists.
So, first and foremost we must reinforce our hard security measures to combat terrorism.
Next, economic development and integration.
While more should be done to improve counter-terrorism measures in our countries, we also have to consider new ways to to confront and contain violent extremism. It is right to be alert to external threats, but we also have a responsibility to spell out what must be done internally, within our borders. Often, the terrorists who commit the atrocities come from within. In order to work effectively, we need to better understand the root causes of why people growing up in our democratic societies choose to declare allegiance to Islamic State, travel to conflict zones in the Middle East and return as radicalized and violent young individuals.
The enemy we are facing is often protected by the anonymity of urban suburbs. In these places we need a strategy on how to enhance security, but also on how to integrate these people into our societies – through employment, education and a sense of national identity. We also need to improve the way we reintegrate returning foreign fighters, who are not dangerous.
Perhaps the biggest challenge facing our anti-ISIS campaign is countering the ideology, which brings the terrorist organization new followers. Islamic State styles itself an orthodox Islamist group. Actually, it is also a cult of violence. The combination draws significant numbers of people to its banner.
In order to counter the homegrown terrorism, we need a value based integration: realize that integration is much more than just providing jobs and education. Real integration is also to demand respect for the principles upon which our liberal democratic societies are built.
Firstly, we should increasingly give words to what it means to be a democrat in the 21st century. Refugees and migrants should pledge allegiance to principles such as democracy, minority protection, gender equality and rule of law, and in school kids should learn how these ideals work in practice.
Secondly, we have to counter radical interpretations of Islam. One Arab state has enormous influence on the interpretation of Islam worldwide: Saudi Arabia. The country spends vast sums supporting the building of mosques and Islamic educational institutions around the world. These institutions spread an orthodox version of Islam that share similarities with the version Islamic State is subscribing to. This matter should become a regular feature of public and private diplomacy in our dialogue with Riyadh.
And thirdly, we must step up our work on counter-propaganda. Islamic State started a propaganda arms race and our counter strategies have not been effective enough.
An overarching problem in Nigeria is the split between a mostly Muslim north and a predominantly Christian south, with its 180 million people belonging to 250 ethnic groups and speaking more than 500 languages. So differences often manifest along religious or tribal lines. Politicians have often fanned the flames by financing thugs or favoring one group over another.
The profound demographic, socioeconomic, and political upheavals triggered by Boko Haram’s activities in the northeast, particularly in Borno State, have further impoverished a region that was already struggling and have deepened communal tensions. If these issues aren’t addressed, it will only be a matter of time until new violent non-state actors emerge. Postwar reconstruction effort, whose success will determine whether northeastern Nigeria continues to be a source of instability in West Africa.
The only way to counter the forces that threaten to pull Nigeria apart is essentially to help people out of poverty. Mr Buhari has made a start by raising spending on education. But more should be done to boosting economic growth, which has ground to a pace slower than population growth – while combating corruption. Without greater opportunities, the frustrations of the young and uneducated will only worsen – creating fertile grounds for extremists.
An improvement of the security situation in Nigeria is a must in this regard. Terrorism has a tremendous negative effect on foreign investments. As an example, it is estimated that terrorism caused foreign direct investment flows into Nigeria to drop $6.1 billion in 2010 – a decline of nearly 30% on the prvious year. On top of that Nigeria suffers from declining oil prices. The public deficit has grown, the stock market has gone down, domestic oil producers are struggling to pay interests on the loan which could lead to a banking crisis. The government response has been a mildly expansionary budget, blocking imports and tying the Naira to the dollar. I’m not going to interfere with domestic Nigerian politics. But in my opinion the current situation should be addressed by ending the fuel subsidies, allowing free trade and letting the Naira float freely. Otherwise, you will just create a black market. For many Nigerian businesses it is a choice between the black market or to die.
Third, an Alliance for Democracy.
Ladies and gentlemen. Whether you are in Jakarta, Washington, London or Abuja the key objective for terrorist organization such as Al Qaeda, Islamic State and Boko Haram is essentially the same - to undermine our way of life by replacing democracy with tyranny, rule of law with Sharia, minority protection with oppression.
Even when our systems prove immune to direct attacks from terrorist groups, fear creeps in and our societies transform in an attempt to counter the threat of terrorism. You see that in Europe where people’s privacy and civil liberties are under pressure as intelligence services are exploring new ways to counter the threat of terror; and in Nigeria where the local population is finding it difficult to trust people who has been held by Boko Haram. A recent Unisef report documented this distrust, quoting a Nigerian community leader who called the babies fathered by Boko Haram fighters “hyenas among dogs.”
There is a need to counter this threat to our way of life. As terrorist groups become more sophisticated and global in their reach – the free world should respond accordingly. In spite of much optimism following the end of the Cold War, we learned the hard way that there was no universal agreement on the unparalleled strength of liberal capitalism and democracy.
To create a stronger global liberal democratic community that can counter the threats from tyranny, oppression and global terrorism, we need to work together and I believe the United States is the only nation on earth which can front this important task. The next American president should use his or her convening power to bring together the world's liberal democracies in a strong 'Alliance for Democracy.'
Such an alliance would bring together nations from around the world whose common characteristic would be that they are democracies. And precisely that would be the alliance's main strength: It would be a community of shared values, individual liberty, economic freedom, democracy and the rule of law; a community which would bolster the identity and potency of democracy in a world where the forces of oppression are trying to regain ground.
Overall, the objective of the Alliance would be to create a forum where the world's democracies could meet on a regular basis to discuss global issues, coordinate their policies and possibly take joint action to reinforce liberal democratic values around the world.
The Alliance for Democracy should – among other things – help to confront common security challenges, including terrorism. The democracies could enhance their intelligence cooperation to find out where the terrorists are, strengthen financial cooperation to locate their sources of finance, dry them up and block them, and improve law enforcement and judicial cooperation to apprehend them, try them and jail them.
I firmly believe, we need a world-wide pact based on freedom and security. Terrorists aim to threaten our freedom because they know it is what makes our societies attractive and strong.
From a military point of view, states and international organizations engaged in military operations should learn from previous mistakes in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Any military operation should have an 'Operation Wealth of Nation' embedded in it, and strong alliances are crucial in order to finance and sustain these long-term engagements. An “Operation Wealth of Nation” would be a program for growth and job creation.
In spite of continued efforts to counter global terrorism, we still have not managed to develop an effective formula to fight terrorism. This clearly calls for a reassessment of our strategy against terrorism.
Military power and counter terrorism measures are necessary tools in the fight against terrorism and insurgency, and Nigeria can use the de-radicalization program to dry up the reservoir of disenchanted youths from which Boko Haram recruits. But these measures should always be accompanied by strategies on how to restore peace and improve people’s faith in their own future. As social degradation, poverty and cultural exclusion are creating grounds for extremist groups. Failing to address the root causes enables new terrorists’ groups to emerge rapidly – as seen in the case of Islamic State.
Internationally we need to do more to prevent and contain terrorism. The terrorist groups of today have a global reach and they apply many of the same tactics in the countries they operate. In order to be on the for-front, we also need a global approach.
An enhanced global effort to fight terrorism should be led by the United States. We need a policeman to restore order; we need a fireman to put out the fire; we need a mayor, smart and sensible, to lead the rebuilding. And we need America to play all these roles. No other country in the world can do it.
It is therefore truly concerning to follow the US presidential nomination race where the call for isolationism in the United States is growing louder by the day.
This is a dangerous philosophy, because it is so wrong. Autocrats and terrorists are tempted to test their room for maneuver and the determination of the free world, and in particular of the United States. History has shown time and again that the bulwarks of the ocean are no defense against a hostile and aggressive world. Imperial Germany proved it in 1917; Imperial Japan did it again in 1940; al-Qaida did it on 9/11. The main thing that has changed since then is the rise of the internet, with all the dangers of radicalization and cyber-crime that it offers. It would be hard to argue that this has made the world a safer place.
In order to create bulwark against the threat international terrorism is posing to our societies, I would urge the next US president renew US leadership in the world. One way to do this would be to create an “Alliance for Democracy” which can work in tandem with the UN and regional organizations to improve cooperation between democracies across the world in our endeavor to counter tyranny, oppression and global terrorism.
Counterinsurgency And Community Development
Ben Oppenheim.
Over the past decade, community development, a program design that inverts standard foreign aid models by putting the poor in charge of shaping and implementing development projects, has reemerged as a central mechanism for the delivery of aid in conflict zones.2Although hard figures are limited, a few data points indicate that community development’s overall growth has been rapid: from 1989 to 2003, the share of World Bank projects with a community development component rose from 2 to 25 percent of the total portfolio; by 2007, more than 9 percent of World Bank spending went to community interventions.3 Community development programs are among the largest and most significant aid interventions in a number of conflict-affected countries and subregions, including Afghanistan, southern Thailand, the Philippines, western Colombia, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, Uganda, Nepal, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
The rapid rise of community development has been in part driven by its operational simplicity and robustness. Aid practitioners argue that by channeling assistance directly to the grassroots, community-level interventions can launch quickly, scale rapidly and flexibly, remain functional under insecure, unstable conditions, and deliver benefits that are better configured to local needs.4 But community development’s rise has been driven by a deeper set of ambitions for aid: to mobilize the poor to control their own development and demand better governance, and to transform government to make it more relevant and responsive. The goal of community development, in short, is to build a new social contract between citizen and state.
The proposition I advance in this essay is that the mechanisms community development uses to reconstruct the social contract also act to embed state institutions within the grassroots. Community development functions, in effect, as an instrument for state-building. In nonconflict areas, the downward flow of resources and upward flow of participation enabled by community development represent a mechanism for citizens to receive more and better government. In conflict areas, the systems that enable this reciprocal flow can closely parallel civil counterinsurgency operations.
The point is not that community interventions are cloaked counterinsurgency projects—I argue that the two practices undertake fundamentally different forms of legitimation—but that community development’s operations mirror the state-building elements of civil counterinsurgency. From the perspective of both insurgent groups and governments combating insurrections, community development may not be a politically inert poverty reduction technology but an intervention that supports the reach of the state, particularly in contexts where the state and insurgents are competing at the grassroots by providing governance and public services. Development practitioners must factor these local understandings of their projects, and the potential responses by insurgents and counterinsurgents alike, into their own strategies and program designs.
Development from the Bottom Up
Pioneered in the 1950s, community development offered a vision of social transformation that diverged from the various iterations of modernization theory that dominated foreign aid for much of the twentieth century. While modernization theory envisioned development as a teleological process of engineered social change, piloted by technocrats and delivered through large-scale interventions and injections of capital and expertise, community development attempted to spur economic transformation by leveraging the knowledge and participation of the rural poor and providing small-scale projects—irrigation systems, agricultural extension services, rural credit systems—carefully tailored to local needs.5 Over time, the organizational systems underlying the two models converged. Early community development interventions were decentralized and heterogeneous, but as these were taken to scale as national programs, community development itself became bureaucratized, and the technology of community organization was integrated into national centralized planning and management.6
Just as early community development practice absorbed modernization theory’s emphasis on central planning, it also absorbed modernization theory’s tight linkages to the logic of the Cold War.7 Community development was seen by the West as a coherent ideological alternative to communism, and its emphasis on stimulating rural economic growth, localized political mobilization of the poor, and attempts to bring government and citizens together to improve social welfare were all viewed as mechanisms which could mitigate the risk of rural insurgency.8
Community development’s first heyday lasted perhaps a decade, cut off as it failed to quickly boost the income of the rural poor, as aid policy priorities shifted toward the nascent green revolution, and as elite capture and other implementation challenges became apparent.9 The model reemerged in the 1990s from a confluence of influences: growing critiques of the failures of large-scale, top-down aid programs; increasing recognition that local knowledge and participation were critical to the success of aid interventions; and a rising belief that the means and ends of aid programs should be to empower the poor.10 Contemporary community development programs retain the basic assumptions and operations of early models, with one key difference: while the typical first-generation program was vertically integrated, run at a national scale by a specialized government ministry, the modal contemporary intervention is fragmented, with multilateral and nongovernmental organizations occupying key spaces in the development supply chain, particularly in program design and project implementation.11
Community development programs work by building capacity for collective action at the village level. Although program designs vary widely, community development interventions have two central components.12 The first is local participation. Communities hold elections to form village development committees, which directly receive flows of aid money and coordinate communal decision-making over where and how the money is to be spent. The theory underlying participation is that the experience of authentic participation in local elections and communal deliberation will help to cement open decision-making processes at the village level.13 External agents play a critical role in this process.14 The model assumes that while communities possess the knowledge necessary to guide their own development, they must still be politically mobilized and trained to include minority and vulnerable groups in communal deliberations.
The second component is organizational linkage. New village institutions are typically connected with central or local government units, which provide technical and financial support as communities design and launch small-scale development projects.15 The goal of linkage is to expose government to socially mobilized and organized communities, so that citizens can extract support and better performance from the state.16 The form of this exposure is limited and technical: government planners meet with communities and village committees to discuss their goals and jointly make decisions over where and how government can provide training, funding, and other inputs to support community-led projects. The theory is that once citizens have been exposed to democratic, accountable decision-making processes at the village level, they will begin to press for greater government transparency, accountability, and public service provision.17 The model also contains a more explicitly political project: for collaboration and contact to build the “notion of government-community relationship.”18 The World Bank often attempts to amplify these effects by pairing community development with decentralization programs, which push funding and authority from central to local governments. The intended net effect is for citizens to have leverage over more state resources and decisions.
Community development’s narrative centers on empowering citizens to make formal institutions more legitimate, accountable, and responsive. This narrative explicitly rests on liberal theory. It locates political legitimacy as flowing from democratic decision-making, and so community interventions attempt to foster procedurally transparent, open, and fair governance by building new village institutions to transform local decision-making dynamics.19 However, community development’s second element, organizational linkage, is not liberal in the same sense. It does not provide citizens with a specific constellation of rights and powers. Instead, it aims to improve government responsiveness by increasing contact between citizen and state, providing more surface area for the ideas and demands of the public to permeate into state institutions, and enabling government to become more aware of citizens’ needs.20
Community development’s activities function as a kind of latent state-building. Unlike conventional models of state-building, community development is not designed to increase the power of formal institutions but instead to build grassroots anchoring points for the state, which enable routinized contact and collaboration with citizens. This process unfolds in two steps. First, in order for communities to begin to identify and aggregate preferences, they must be organized to hold community deliberations that meet minimum standards of social inclusion and transparency, and to carry out elections which meet minimum standards of fairness. Second, in order for citizens to coherently and effectively elicit better performance from government, the pace of interaction between communities and the state must be significantly increased so that community needs and preferences can flow, by osmosis, into the state. The first step requires the presence of external community organizers and facilitators; the second, the formation of new nodes of village authority that are networked with outside organizations. The overall result is much greater connectivity between the village and the state.
Insurgent Governance and Civil Counterinsurgency: Competition through Grassroots State-Building
Counterinsurgency first emerged as a coherent doctrine and body of practice during the wars of national liberation in the fading colonial period.21 David Kilcullen captures its core attributes as follows:
. . . classical counterinsurgency, a discipline that emerged in the 1950s but has much older roots in imperial policing and colonial small wars, is “population-centric.” It focuses on the population, seeking to protect it from harm by—or interaction with—the insurgent, competing with the insurgent for influence and control at the grassroots level. Its basic assumption is that the insurgency is a mass social phenomenon, that the enemy rides and manipulates a social wave consisting of genuine popular grievances.22
Although individual campaigns vary widely across space and time, configured in each instance to face specific insurgent organizations and tactics, both classical and contemporary counterinsurgency doctrines prescribe a carefully balanced mixture of force and inducement.23 Counterinsurgents employ force in order to destroy insurgent organizational structures and retain (or regain) territory. Yet counterinsurgency differs greatly from a pure suppression campaign, in which state forces utilize widespread, largely indiscriminate violence.24
A suppression campaign functions through fear. During conflict, the state attempts to erode the insurgency’s base of support by vastly escalating the risk and potential costs faced by the rebels’ civilian sympathizers and supporters. Intense violence serves a long-term political objective: preventing further uprisings by instilling lasting fear and destroying productive assets that might support another insurrection. The sort of violence prescribed by counterinsurgency doctrine is precisely the inverse: relatively discriminate force, calibrated to contain the insurgency and to successively clear and hold territory so that the state can provide better governance and development. The provision of governance and development, shorthanded as civil affairs, is designed to undercut insurgency by competing for the hearts and minds of the populace.25
Counterinsurgents face an uphill battle in competing for popular support. While insurgencies are almost inevitably outnumbered, outspent, and outgunned, they operate with several advantages. Insurgent fighters and organizational structures are typically tied to the communities in which they operate by long-standing social relationships, which provide rebels with local intelligence, resources, and cover. The state, by contrast, is often alien and weak, with intermittent or limited presence and capability to provide public goods to the grassroots.26 Insurgents exploit this vacuum and attempt to amplify their support within the populace by constructing competing governance systems to provide civil administration and public services.27
A wide range of armed movements go into the governance business. In territories held by Colombia’s Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the insurgents have provided social services, including healthcare and education, as well as core governance functions, including policing and dispute resolution and adjudication.28 In Lebanon, Hezbollah has provided health clinics, education, and loans and has implemented over 10,000 small development projects.29 Sri Lanka’s (former) rebels, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), built a rebel state with strong policing and judicial systems, as well as semi-autonomous social welfare organizations that provided education along with humanitarian relief and reconstruction after the 2004 tsunami.30
Insurgent governance is by no means universal; numerous rebel groups function without ever constructing systems to administer territory and provide services. But insurgent governance is nonetheless widespread, because it serves a range of functions.31 Most immediately, the provision of social services helps insurgents expand local support networks and mobilize new recruits.32 Over the medium term, building governance systems allows insurgents to tax and extract resources and to regulate behavior, inflict punishment, and intimidate allies of the state. And most critically, governance helps to legitimate insurgent political control and establish the insurgent organization as a plausible long-term alternative to the existing regime.
The civil affairs elements of counterinsurgency are designed to mirror and neutralize insurgent governance by establishing the state’s presence at the grassroots. The core of counterinsurgency is a competitive state-building project, designed to make the state more legitimate, by providing public services, and more visible, by establishing nodes of local governance.33
Both classical and contemporary counterinsurgency theories emphasize grassroots state-building, but with differing underlying theories of legitimation. Classical theory placed a strong emphasis on grassroots political participation. The work of David Galula, a military theorist and veteran of France’s counterinsurgency campaign in Algeria, perhaps best captures this approach. Galula argued that, following the removal of insurgent military forces, local elections were necessary to “obtain the active support of the population” and to decisively defeat the remaining insurgent political infrastructure.34 Galula strongly advised that any elections be free and fair, arguing that leaders imposed from above would be no better than puppets, who would command little respect or responsiveness from the population. In the near term, elected leaders would build support by running local government and managing economic development projects. Over the long term, Galula suggested that local leaders should be woven into a national political party connected with the counterinsurgent regime, building an institutionalized interface between citizen and state.35
Contemporary counterinsurgency theory retains the classicists’ emphasis on local institution-building. But, as Lake argues, contemporary state-building cum counterinsurgency is rooted in social contract rather than liberal theory. Contemporary counterinsurgency theory assumes that populations are willing to give their loyalty if political institutions meet their basic needs; democratic governance is not enough to secure support.36 In order to attract support from the agnostic populace, counterinsurgents demonstrate their capability and their commitment to the public good by providing security, health, education, and livelihoods.37 Local institution-building is a means to this end. Contemporary counterinsurgency campaigns engage existing community leaders, such as village shuras in Afghanistan, or build new governance structures, such as local councils in Iraq, from scratch.38 But there is no embedded theory of liberalism underpinning the extension of the state to the grassroots. The goal of contemporary counterinsurgent state-building is to elicit an upward flow of information. What is sought is not political participation but usable data on local needs to inform the delivery of public goods and actionable intelligence to inform military action.39Nonetheless, its guiding strategy would remain quite comprehensible to Galula, namely, to “build (or rebuild) a political machine from the population upward.”40
Parallels in Practice
Community development and civil counterinsurgency are, at their core, state-building projects. The kind of state-building that they undertake is more limited than conventional attempts to expand the power of the state: neither model attempts to expand the power of central government institutions to coerce, or to compel.41 Instead, the argument that I have advanced is that community development and counterinsurgency attempt to increase thescope of the state: to expand its geographic reach and the range of social services it provides, and to increase its presence in daily life.42
If both models work to increase the scope of the state, they do so for different reasons. The two interventions are motivated by a mixture of social contract and liberal theory, but the model of legitimacy underlying each is distinct. Community development rests on the belief that bottom-up democratization and greater citizen input will yield more responsive and legitimate state institutions. Civil counterinsurgency rests on the belief that legitimacy flows from state performance and the provision of public services.
But if the underlying theory differs, the operational aspects of each intervention are closely analogous. Community development and civil counterinsurgency rely on a shared mechanism of intervention: establishing greater connectivity between state institutions and nodes of village authority, and stimulating an upward flow of information. In this sense, both community development and counterinsurgency share a critical attribute with conventional state-building: they are designed to make society “legible” by providing the state with information on its population, “their wealth . . . their location, their very identity.”43
The tacit assumption underpinning the use of community development in conflict areas is that insurgents will perceive aid as politically neutral (or, possibly, politically unassailable). The first assumption is questionable. In contexts where insurgents and the state are locked in a process of competitive state-building, each attempting to win public support by establishing a presence and a flow of public services at the grassroots, the means and ends of community development and civil counterinsurgency may be effectively indistinguishable.
To date, we know relatively little about how insurgents understand the purposes and implications of community development interventions. In the following section, I explore insurgent interpretations of a large-scale community development program in the Philippines, KALAHI-CIDSS. The data are limited, but the case is illustrative: press releases and communiqués from the New People’s Army (NPA), a rural communist insurgency, show that the NPA understood and interpreted KALAHI through the lens of Philippine counterinsurgency policy. The government appears to have held a nuanced (or bureaucratically varied) view of community development, characterizing it both as a poverty reduction and counterinsurgency intervention.
Community Development through the Lens of Counterinsurgency in the Philippines
Insurgency is one of the primary political constants in recent Philippine history. Insurrections against successive colonial rulers—the United States and, during the Second World War, Japan—were followed by a rural, peasant-based insurgency through the late 1940s and early 1950s. The insurgent group, the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines known as the Hukbalahap, had initially formed to resist Japanese occupation but rose up against the postwar Philippine government and its American backers to contest inegalitarian land distribution and tenancy rights and deep rural poverty.44 By 1954 the Hukbalahap had been defeated by an aggressive suppression campaign, but the insurgency reappeared in 1969 in the form of a renewed armed wing, the New People’s Army (CPP-NPA).
The CPP-NPA has persisted across the past five decades, despite internal political divisions and episodic intensifications of the Philippine state’s counterinsurgency efforts. The insurgency’s core narrative continues to emphasize rural inequality, and the movement’s strategy is one of protracted people’s war, a steadily developing guerrilla movement, organized at the rural grassroots, drawing predominantly on the peasantry for recruits, material support, and cover.45
In areas where the CPP-NPA has established a robust presence, it organizes aid projects, principally small-scale infrastructural interventions, and provides community governance functions.46 The means by which the insurgency builds organizational structures at the village level roughly parallels the processes of community development: agents are dispatched to assess needs and mobilize the local population around social, economic, or political deficits and grievances, using a mixture of small group discussions, semi-formal training, village meetings and rallies to build local solidarity.47 When sufficient support has been cultivated and the guerrillas have identified potential local leaders, a “people’s organizing committee” is established at the village level, and a CPP-NPA cell formed to provide recruits, intelligence, money, and materiel.48
Although the Philippines faces other insurgent pressures, most importantly a long-running Moro secessionist movement centered on the southern island of Mindanao, the government has long regarded the CPP-NPA as the primary military threat facing the state, and its counterinsurgency strategies have historically reflected the challenges of controlling rural hinterlands with limited civil administration presence. Counterinsurgency plans have lurched over time between suppression campaigns and predominantly civil efforts to contain the CPP-NPA. The two most recent plans, Bantay-Laya (2002–5, extended through 2010) and Bayanihan (2011–), reflect the growing influence of civil counterinsurgency doctrine, in addition to the use of development assistance and linkages with communities to combat insurgency.
Soon after Bantay-Laya was put in place, the government of the Philippines partnered with the World Bank to launch KALAHI-CIDSS, a national community-driven development initiative initially funded at over $182 million.49 KALAHI’s designers at the World Bank drew explicit inspiration from the Bank’s Kecamatan Development Program in Indonesia, a widely cited community development intervention which focused on empowerment and poverty reduction. Initial bank project appraisals and situational analyses oriented the KALAHI-CIDSS project within the Philippine government’s ongoing “war on poverty,” and they cited this goal, along with community empowerment and improved government transparency and accountability, as core program objectives.50 Formal risk assessments focused on the problems of elite capture and reliability of local government partners and did not address the potential risks arising from the ongoing insurgency.51
KALAHI involves robust community engagement and organization at the village level, as well as a high level of connectivity between the community and both central and local government authorities. At the inception of the project, each village in the program holds a community assembly to elect a volunteer committee to oversee the aid program. The committee leads a community-wide appraisal of village needs; drafts and vets proposals for projects; and presents the proposals for village projects at a municipal forum, where they are ranked on the basis of feasibility and potential poverty-reduction impact, and a subset funded.
The state is heavily engaged throughout the project. Regional program managers attached to a national ministry, the Department of Social Welfare and Development, are involved in the screening and selection of village proposals, overseeing municipal teams that provide technical support (engineering, community mobilization, financial management and bookkeeping) to the community committees. Local government staff partner with community members to design project proposals, and they receive training alongside community members when projects are approved for implementation.52
The Philippine government’s understanding of the program’s goals and functions was nuanced. On the one hand, the presidential memorandum officially adopting KALAHI as a national government program cited the intervention as “the embodiment of the government’s poverty reduction initiatives.”53 On the other hand, numerous actors and institutions in the state framed KALAHI as a potential tool to address the causes of insurgency. In 2003, as KALAHI launched, a deputy advisor to the president of the Philippines described it as an “indispensable mechanism against poverty and insurgency,” noting that the government viewed KALAHI as a tool to erode support for insurgent groups by countering insurgent critiques of bad governance and improving public perceptions of the state.54
KALAHI’s initial round of pilot interventions also included a model that specifically focused on conflict-affected areas. While pilot programs serve an important technical function by providing early feedback on implementation and potential failure points, the government also described KALAHI’s conflict prototype as “a major pillar in the government’s strategy of combating internal security problems.”55 Finally, the government’s 2004–10 Medium-Term Development Plan called for instruments to address the root causes of insurgency, especially poverty, and noted that KALAHI would serve this function in NPA-affected areas.56
If elements within the Philippine government viewed KALAHI as a weapon against insurgency, the New People’s Army shared its perception. In a number of public statements, the CPP-NPA has denounced community development as a de facto counterinsurgency program. Their most direct attack is simply that community development is a cynical attempt to buy support. The CPP-NPA argues that KALAHI is intended to “`soften’ the locals for coming military campaigns” by the armed forces and erode support for the NPA in areas where the insurgency has strong backing.57 The NPA views KALAHI as an effort to improve the public image of the military, “deodorizing” its reputation by providing development projects and coordinating propaganda in support of military counterinsurgency.58 Finally, the NPA suggests that community development functions as an intelligence-gathering mechanism, describing KALAHI as designed to “infiltrate communities”; this claim links with broader insurgent narratives regarding the government’s utilization of nongovernmental and civil society organizations to gather intelligence.59
Insurgent interpretations of the strategy underlying KALAHI are shaped by the broader environment of counterinsurgency and competitive state-building. The Bayanihan counterinsurgency plan argued that inequality and relative deprivation are important drivers of insurgency, suggesting that efforts to address these problems could aid in the CPP-NPA’s decline.60 Insurgents, in turn, appear to have interpreted KALAHI’s emphasis on poverty reduction, and in particular its targeting of the very poorest regions for development assistance, in terms of social contract state-building—as an effort to legitimate the state via service provision.
Insurgent interpretations of community development’s mechanisms are also revealing. KALAHI unfolded across two successive counterinsurgency plans, Bantay-Laya and Bayanihan. Although Bantay-Laya emphasized the aggressive use of force to dismantle insurgent networks, it also framed military counterinsurgency as a means to create a safe space for civilian agencies to function and launch development projects.61 Local government units were tasked to play the lead role in development, relying on nongovernmental organizations, where possible, to create trusted links to the grassroots, particularly in areas with limited or contested prior civil administration. The government’s current operational plan, Bayanihan, advanced these efforts significantly, framing counterinsurgency as a “whole of nation” approach involving partnerships between the armed forces, local government, local community-based and nongovernmental organizations, and utilizing development as a strategic tool to combat insurgency.62 Within these frameworks, the CPP-NPA read efforts to connect the state to the grassroots, whether through civilian agencies, nongovernmental organizations, or other instruments, as infiltration and counterguerrilla organization at the grassroots.
If the CPP-NPA viewed KALAHI as a mechanism to expand the reach of the state and infiltrate communities, how has it responded? Emerging empirical evidence suggests that on the whole, the program may have stimulated violence. One analysis by Crost, Felter, and Johnston exploits the aid-targeting criteria of the KALAHI project to identify its influence on insurgency. KALAHI employed an arbitrary cutoff point to determine whether communities were eligible for aid: each municipality was ranked according to a composite poverty scale, which was derived from household income and expenditure data and rural accessibility surveys. Only the poorest 25 percent of municipalities within each province were included in the program.63
By comparing the intensity of violence in municipalities which just barely qualified for inclusion against those which just barely missed inclusion, Crost et al. estimate the impact of KALAHI-CIDSS on insurgent violence and find that KALAHI municipalities experienced a sharp uptick in attacks following announcement of their inclusion in the project.64 Municipalities which were just under the poverty line and qualified for KALAHI funds suffered 90 percent more conflict-related casualties during each year of the project than those that just missed inclusion in the project, roughly one additional casualty per municipality per year.65 A second study by Arcand, Bah, and Labonne also finds that KALAHI activity was associated with increased violence. Drawing on newspaper reports to reconstruct a partial record of insurgent violence, they find that municipalities which were included in KALAHI experienced a greater number of clashes than those that missed the poverty line threshold and were excluded; in total, clashes involving the CPP-NPA increased by over 40 percent.66 Crost et al. are cautious regarding the causes of elevated violence, but they note that insurgents may be motivated to launch attacks in order to disrupt the implementation of community development projects that could transfer local support to the state. The emerging picture is murky, but it suggests that community development increased the intensity of competition over the grassroots.
Conclusion
Scholars have long recognized that development interventions have the effect, sometimes unintentional, of extending state power.67 From the vantage point of aid practitioners, community development is designed to do the opposite. It is often articulated as a subversive model that inverts the power relationships that arise during interventions into the lives of the poor, by shifting authority from aid providers and the state to newly empowered citizens.
While community development is disinterested in building the state’s bureaucratic or coercive power, it can still function to legitimate and extend the scope of state institutions. In order for community development to reform the state, it must first alter and network the village. Communities must be trained and mobilized behind a local elected body; they must be brought into closer contact with the state, so that officials become more aware of and more responsive to their needs. I have argued above that the greater connectivity between village institutions and state, both in terms of new upward flows of information and the creation of systems for routinized cooperation, functions as a kind of state-building.
Community development has been increasingly deployed in conflict areas, in large part because it holds out a model to repair communities as well as the relationship between citizens and the state.68 The implicit assumption is that a project to build a more expansive, more responsive, and more situationally aware state will be interpreted as neutral, or effectively shielded from violence because of the benefits it provides to citizens.
Insurgent perceptions of KALAHI-CIDSS in the Philippines suggest that this assumption may be vulnerable. The insurgent CPP-NPA made sense of KALAHI through a reading of the Philippine government’s counterinsurgency plans, identifying the upward flow of participation and information from village to state as a form of intelligence-gathering, and the downward flow of aid as an attempt to win hearts and minds through public goods provision. Curiously, at least in their public statements, the insurgents ignore the program’s attempt to build legitimacy through political participation, potentially an equal or more powerful weapon against insurgent organizing and recruitment.
This case, as I note above, is illustrative of the point that community development may not function independently of the conflicts into which it is injected. This is not to suggest that community development projects will automatically be interpreted as tacit counterinsurgency efforts, or that aid interventions will become targets of insurgent violence when deployed amid ongoing asymmetric wars. The relative neutrality of community development might depend on a set of contextual factors: the structure and aims of the insurgency; the relative emphasis placed on civil counterinsurgency by the state (or its backers); and, as I argue in this essay, the extent to which community development competes with insurgent organizing, and especially governance, at the grassroots.
With these potential scope conditions in mind, the Philippines case illustrates several lessons for the use of community development models in conflict areas. First and most simply, it is unlikely that aid agencies, governments, and insurgents will share a common understanding of the purposes and practices of aid, or—just as importantly—that understandings within these organizations will be consistent and coherent. Second, and relatedly, although development interventions may have their own internal logic, quite distinct from counterinsurgency, they may fit neatly within local counterinsurgency frameworks and practices. Development organizations will need to explicitly analyze counterinsurgency policies and take their implications for program implementation and risk management into account. If not, aid will be blind to politics. Insurgents are not.
NOTES
I would like to thank Nat J. Colletta, Benjamin Crost, Nils Gilman, Daniel Immerwahr, Samuel Moyn, Keally McBride, and Benjamin Aldes Wurgaft. This essay benefited from feedback from Humanity‘s editors and referees, from discussions with participants at a symposium on Humanitarianism and Militarism held at Columbia University. All errors are my own.
1. W. W. Rostow, “Guerrilla Warfare in the Underdeveloped Areas” (speech delivered at the U.S. Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, June 28, 1961), in theDepartment of State Bulletin 45 (1961): 236.
2. In this essay, I focus on what is now called community-driven development, the largest and most significant of several community-centric approaches employed by international development organizations. Unlike other grassroots approaches, such as community-baseddevelopment, community-driven development projects are not simply executed at the village level but actively involve community members in the design and implementation of subprojects. On the family tree of community development models, see Ghazala Mansuri and Vijayendra Rao, “Community-Based and -Driven Development: A Critical Review,” World Bank Research Observer 19, no. 1 (2004): 1–2.
3. The World Bank has only recently begun to track community development lending and grants. World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, The Effectiveness of World Bank Support for Community-Based and -Driven Development: An OED Evaluation(Washington, D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2005), xii–xiii, ix; World Bank, World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2007).
4. Philippe Dongier et al., “Community-Driven Development,” World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Sourcebook, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2003). Available online at http://go.worldbank.org/FAURGRFIP0 (accessed February 2, 2012). See also Kathleen Kuehnast, Joanna de Berry, and Naila Ahmed, “Community-Driven Development in the Context of Conflict-Affected Countries: Challenges and Opportunities,” Report No. 36425-GLB (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Social Development Department, 2006).
5. For instance, W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).
6. Hans P. Binswanger-Mkhize et al., “Historical Roots and Evolution of Community Driven Development,” in Local and Community Driven Development: Moving to Scale in Theory and Practice, ed. Hans P. Binswanger-Mkhize, Jacomina P. de Regt, and Stephen Spector (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2010), 27, 29, 31. See also Irwin T. Sanders, “The Concept of Community Development,” in Community Development as a Process, ed. Lee J. Cary (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1989), 9–10.
7. Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007).
8. Lane E. Holdcroft, “The Rise and Fall of Community Development in Developing Countries, 1950–65: A Critical Analysis and an Annotated Bibliography,” Michigan State University Rural Development Papers 2 (East Lansing: MSU Department of Agricultural Economics, 1978), 2, 8, 10, 12, 26–27. See also Louis Miniclier, “Community Development as a Vehicle for U.S. Foreign Aid,” Community Development Journal 4, no. 1 (1969): 8.
9. David Korten, “Community Organization and Rural Development: A Learning Process Approach,” Public Administration Review 40, no. 5 (1980): 482. See also Miniclier, “Community Development,” 8; Holdcroft, “Rise and Fall,” 2, 8, 10, 12, 26–27; Korten, “Community Organization,” 482.
10. Mansuri and Rao, “Community-Based and -Driven Development,” 4–5. On empowerment, notably Robert Chambers, Rural Development: Putting the Last First(London: Longman, 1983). See also Dongier et al., “Community-Driven Development,” 304, 307; Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1999).
11. Holdcroft, “Rise and Fall,” 12.
12. World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, Effectiveness, 2. See also William M. Biddle, “The `Fuzziness’ of Definition of Community Development,” Community Development Journal 1, no. 2 (1966): 5–12.
13. Mansuri and Rao, “Community-Based and -Driven Development,” 1–2.
14. Ibid. See also Hans P. Binswanger and Tuu-Van Nguye, “Scaling Up Community-Driven Development for Dummies,” World Bank website (2004), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCDD/550121-1138894027792/20806801/Scaling0Up0CDD0for0Dummies.pdf (accessed February 2, 2012).
15. David K. Leonard, “Analyzing the Organizational Requirements for Serving the Rural Poor,” in Institutions of Rural Development for the Poor: Decentralization and Organizational Linkages, ed. David K. Leonard and Dale Rogers Marshall (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, 1982), 6, 35–7.
16. Arne Strand et al., “Community Driven Development in Contexts of Conflict,” paper commissioned by the Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network of the World Bank (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2003), 16.
17. Patrick Barron, “CDD in Post-Conflict and Conflict-Affected Areas: Experiences from East Asia,” background paper prepared for the World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Publications 2011), 17. See also Monica Das Gupta, Helene Grandvoinnet, and Mattia Romani, “State-Community Synergies in Community-Driven Development,” Journal of Development Studies 40, no. 3 (2004): 45–48.
18. World Bank, draft note, “Community-Driven Conflict Recovery: From Reconstruction to Development,” World Bank website (n.d.), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSF/Resources/395669-1126194965141/1635383-1154459301238/CDR-CDD.pdf, 7 (accessed February 2, 2012). See also Sarah Cliffe, Scott Guggenheim, and Markus Kostner, “Community-Driven Reconstruction as an Instrument in War-to-Peace Transitions” (working paper, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit of the World Bank, 2003).
19. On liberal theory and institution-building, see Roland Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,” Review of International Studies 36, no. 2 (2010): 337–65; and David Lake,”The Practice and Theory of U.S. State-Building,” Journal of Intervention and State-Building 4, no. 3 (2010): 268–69.
20. Alan Whaites calls this dynamic responsive state-building. See Whaites, “States in Development: Understanding State-Building” (working paper, UK Department for International Development, 2008), 10; Barron, “CDD in Post-Conflict and Conflict-Affected Areas,” 17.
21. David Kilcullen, “Counter-Insurgency Redux,” Survival 48, no. 4 (2006): 111.
22. David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), xv. Some counterinsurgency theorists have challenged the assumption of popular support. Charles Wolf, for instance, argued that the “inputs” for insurgency—recruits, food, information—are simply costs which insurgencies meet either through cultivating popular support or extracting resources through coercion. Wolf, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New Myths and Old Realities,” RAND Corporation report P-3132–1 (1965), 10.
23. Kelly Greenhill and Paul Staniland, “Ten Ways to Lose at Counterinsurgency,” Civil Wars9, no. 4 (2007): 404; see also U.S. Army and Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency: Field Manual 3–24 (Washington, D.C., 2006), 1–3, 1–5 to 1–7; Kilcullen, “Counter-Insurgency Redux,” 111. On prescriptions, refer to Daniel Branch and Elisabeth Wood, “Revisiting Counterinsurgency,” Politics and Society 38, no. 3 (2010): 5. See also Kalev Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (May/June 2005): 8–12; and Frank G. Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency,” Parameters 37, no. 2 (2007): 71–87.
24. Thank you to Nils Gilman for raising this point.
25. Stephen Biddle notes that counterinsurgency theory assumes that the public will be largely undecided. See his comments in the book review symposium “The New U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual as Political Science and Political Praxis,” Perspectives on Politics 6, no. 2 (2008): 348. See also Colleen Bell and Brad Evans, “Terrorism to Insurgency: Mapping the Post-Intervention Security Terrain,” Journal of Intervention and State-Building 4, no. 4 (2010): 377; and U.S. Army and Marine Corps,Counterinsurgency, 1–20.
26. David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency,” Military Review 86, no. 3 (2006): 2; Angel Rabasa and John E. Peters, “Dimensions of Ungovernability,” in Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks, ed. Angel Rabasa (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corp., 2007), 7–9. See also Kilcullen, “Counter-Insurgency Redux,” 112.
27. On this concept, see Robert W. McColl, “The Insurgent State: Territorial Bases of Revolution,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 59, no. 4 (1969): 613–31. See also Nelson Kasfir, “Guerrilla Governance: Patterns and Explanations” (paper presented at the Yale Seminar on Order, Conflict and Violence, New Haven, October 29, 2008); and Zachariah Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2011).
28. Román D. Ortiz, “Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 25, no. 2 (2002): 127–43; and Zachariah Cherian Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2011), 2.
29. Melani Cammet, “Habitat for Hezbollah,” Foreign Policy, August 17, 2006.
30. See, for instance, Kristian Stokke, “Building the Tamil Eelam State: Emerging State Institutions and Forms of Governance in LTTE-Controlled Areas in Sri Lanka,” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 6 (2006): 1021–40.
31. McColl, “Insurgent State,” 614.
32. U.S. Army and Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency, 1–7, 1–9; and Ortiz, “Insurgent Strategies,” 130–31. See also Stathis Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, “International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict,”American Political Science Review 104, no. 3 (2010): 420–21.
33. See Stathis Kalyvas’s comments in “Counterinsurgency Field Manual as Political Science and Political Praxis,” 351.
34. See David Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964), 92.
35. Ibid., 95–96.
36. Lake, “Practice and Theory,” 258, 273–74.
37. D. Michael Shafer, “The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency,” Political Science Quarterly 103, no. 1 (1988): 63–64. See also U.S. Army and Marine Corps,Counterinsurgency, 1–1, 1–21, 5–14 to 5–17; Robert R. Tomes, “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare,” Parameters 34, no. 1 (2004): 17–18, 24; and David C. Gompert et al., Reconstruction under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corp., 2009), 8–11.
38. U.S. Army and Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency, 5–16.
39. Tomes, “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare,” 19.
40. Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare, 96–98.
41. James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998), 94–96.
42. Gompert et al., “Reconstruction under Fire,” 8–11. See also Francis Fukuyama, “The Imperative of State-Building,” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 2 (2004): 21–23.
43. Ibid., 2.
44. Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
45. See International Crisis Group, “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks,” Asia Report, February 14, 2011, 3–10; and Jose P. Magno Jr., and A. James Gregor, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines,” Asian Survey 26, no. 5 (1986): 501–17.
46. Paz Verdades M. Santos, “Centre of Gravity: The New People’s Army in the Bicol Region,” in Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines, ed. Diana Rodriguez (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), 46–47.
47. James Putzel, “Managing the `Main Force’: The Communist Party and Peasantry in the Philippines,” Philippine Journal of Third World Studies 11, no. 3 (1996): 137, 142.
48. Santos, “Centre of Gravity,” 46; Magno Jr., and Gregor, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines,” 504–5.
49. Although nationally scaled, KALAHI focuses spending on highly impoverished communities through two levels of targeting: only the forty-two poorest provinces in the Philippines were included in the program, and within each included province, only the 25 percent poorest municipalities are eligible for aid. See Dave Llorito, Erika Lacson, and Elisabeth Mealey, “WB Approves US$59.1M Additional Financing for Community-Driven Development Projects in the Philippines,” World Bank website, September 30, 2010, http://go.worldbank.org/FB1WOQRIU0 (accessed February 2, 2012).
50. World Bank, “Project Appraisal Document . . . for the Kapitbisig Laban Sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services (KALAHI-CIDSS) Project,” Report No. 24642–PH (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Environment and Social Development Unit, East Asia and Pacific Region, 2002), 2–3. See also KALAHI-CIDSS Manual for Area Coordinators and Community Facilitators (2004), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSF/Resources/395669-1124228448379/1563169-1135701058749/Philippines–KalahiCIDSS–Manual.pdf (accessed February 2, 2012), 1–2. It should be noted that an additional $59 million extension to the KALAHI program explicitly aimed to bring the program to conflict-affected areas, citing conflict mitigation as a program objective. See World Bank, “Project Paper on a Proposed Additional Loan . . . for the Kapitbisig Laban Sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services (KALAHI-CIDSS) Project,” Report No: 56355-PH (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Philippines Sustainable Development Unit, 2010), 5, 12.
51. World Bank, “Project Appraisal Document . . . (KALAHI-CIDSS),” Report No. 24624–PH (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Environment and Social Development Unit, East Asia and Pacific Region, 2002), 6, 8, 28–30. See also Report No. PID11067 (2002).
52. For a detailed discussion of project design and implementation, see Andrew Parker, Yumi Sera, and Bhuvan Bhatnagar, “Empowering the Poor: The KALAHI-CIDSS Community-Driven Development Project. A Toolkit of Concepts and Cases” (Pasig City: World Bank, 2005), 28–35.
53. Memorandum Circular No. 33, “Institutionalizing the Kapit Laban Sa Kahirapan (KALAHI) as the Government’s Program for Poverty Reduction,” reproduced in National Anti-Poverty Commission, KALAHI Convergence: Working Together for Poverty Reduction(Quezon City, 2005), 115.
54. Virgilio Leyretana, “KALAHI: An Indispensable Mechanism against Poverty and Insurgency,” speech cited in Ben Reid, “Securitising Participation in the Philippines: KALAHI and Community-Driven Development,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 41, no. 1 (2011): 60.
55. National Anti-Poverty Commission, KALAHI Convergence, 63–65.
56. National Economic Development Authority, “Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan 2004–2010” (2004), http://www.neda.gov.ph/ads/mtpdp/MTPDP2004–2010/MTPDP%d202004–2010%20NEDA%20v11–12.pdf (accessed February 2, 2012), 180–81.
57. “Philippines for Sale,” Ang Bayan, October 7, 2010, 5. Ang Bayan is the “official news organ of the Communist Party of the Philippines, issued by the Communist Party of the Philippines’ Central Committee.”
58. Fr. Santiago Salas, press release, National Democratic Front of the Philippines-Eastern Visayas, September 29, 2010, http://www.philippinerevolution.net/statements/mcc-grant-for-samar-is-funding-for-war-in-line-with-the-us-counter-insurgency-guide (accessed February 2, 2012); press release, Information Bureau of the Communist Party of the Philippines, “U.S. military involvement in AFP counter-guerilla operations in Bicol,” February 16, 2003, http://www.philipdpinerevolution.net/statements/us-military-involvement-in-afp-counter-guerilla-operations-in-bicol (accessed February 2, 2012).
59. Jorge “Ka Oris” Madlos, press release, National Democratic Front of the Philippines-Mindanao, October 10, 2010, http://www.arkibongbayan.org/2010/2010–10Oct02–100days/doc/ndf%20minda.txt (accessed February 2, 2012). The National Democratic Front is a broad coalition of left-wing political movements, including the CPP-NPA. See also Central Committee, Communist Party of the Philippines, “Message of the CPP Central Committee to the NPA Red Commanders and Fighters,” March 28, 2011, http://www.ndfp.net/joom15/index.php/readings-mainmenu-73/1060–message-of-the-cpp-central-committee-to-the-npa-red-commanders-and-fighters.html (accessed February 2, 2012).
60. Armed Forces of the Philippines Internal Peace and Security Plan, “Bayanihan,” http://www.afp.mil.ph/pdf/IPSP%20Bayanihan.pdf (accessed February 2, 2012), 7–8, 26, 30–32. While the counterinsurgency plan’s overall policy framework is publicly available, the operational plan and campaign details have, of course, not been released.
61. Renato Cruz de Castro, “The Twenty-First Century Armed Forces of the Philippines: Orphans of Counter-Insurgency or Military Geared for the Long War of the Century?”Contemporary Politics 16, no. 2 (2010): 160.
62. “Bayanihan,” 7–8, 26, 30–32.
63. Benjamin Crost, Joseph Felter, and Patrick Johnston, “Aid under Fire: Development Projects and Civil Conflict” (working paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2010), 17–21.
John O. Ifediora's opening remarks -Nigeria summit on national security 2016
As Africans, and Nigerians in particular, grapple with the various manifestations of growing pains – population overflow, dwindling natural resources, bureaucratic corruption, and burdensome bureaucracy, the debilitating sectarian violence and insurgencies of recent years make these growing pains even more painful. From West Africa to East Africa, Boko Haram and al-Shabab remind Africans and the global community that all is not well in the African continent; that ethnic divide, religious tensions, cultural differences, bad governance, and the scramble for Africa’s natural resources by foreign interests have brought about immense transformational impulses and pressures that are beyond the institutional capacities of constituent states. As a consequence, disaffected groups deprived of access to modern existence, effective public service, essential social infrastructure, and functional educational facilities have chosen to take up arms against their fellow Africans.
The atrocities of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria remain unspeakable as it is despicable; the total disregard for human life and the social institutions that define Nigeria as a nation-state makes the group a scourge that must be contained and neutralized either through diplomacy or muscular intervention. In the midst of a rapidly contracting economy, unsustainable high unemployment, and an inflation rate that threatens the economic viability of the average citizen, the existential threats of terrorism from competing groups in northern and southern Nigeria properly engage and offend our collective sensibilities. And because the territorial integrity of the Chad Basin nation-states has been breached by foreign fighters sympathetic to the claims and grievances of their religious and cultural affiliates in Nigeria, the regional and potential global reach of Boko Haram is no longer speculative.
The global community is at risk from the likes of Boko Haram; to curb this risk, a responsible and effective set of policy measures must be deployed with proper care to protect the innocent and basic human rights. These insurgents, in as much as their acts against humanity are despicable, have grievances that must be addressed; and the sooner the better. This summit is designed to find means to redress their grievances, and to end all forms terroristic acts against civilized polities through humane and expedient means. Sometimes the use of force to subdue those bent on destabilizing societies is unavoidable, but first, peacefully engage and listen.
Welcome to the summit!
Professor John O. Ifediora
Director and Editor-in-chief
Council on African Security And Development
What does democracy mean to Nigerians?
Nnamdi Awa-Kalu.
“Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.…”
These words, spoken by Winston Churchill in the House of Commons many years ago, address a wearied view of the democratic concept as a system of government which would be unfit for use but for the fact that the other systems of government which have been practiced are even more unfit. Why then does Nigeria insist on celebrating this concept “democracy” when a historic figure as famous as Churchill, perhaps the most famous wartime leader in the Western world (or at least the most oft-quoted) has spoken of its imperfection? It would seem that Churchill’s perspective on democracy conceives of it as a work in progress, capable of further refinement and prone to error. The words, ‘no one pretends that democracy is perfect’, point to the fact that Churchill was not alone at the time in decrying the failings of democracy. It is these observations that have prompted this writer, on the brink of Democracy Day, May 29, 2016, a day held sacred by the Nigerian peoples for symbolic reasons, to ask what is so good about democracy that it is celebrated in Nigeria?
At the time of Churchill’s prominence- at least at the time the quote above was recorded- the world was just recovering from World War II. In the years preceding that global conflict, Western Europe was on the brink of being overrun by a rising tide of fascist ideology, championed in the main by Benito Mussolini of Italy and the dread Adolf Hitler of Germany. As a counterpoint to that threat, communism had taken hold in Eastern Europe with its focal point in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). It would go on to tilt towards the totalitarian formulation which enthroned Joseph Stalin in the USSR and precipitated the Cold War. Forced to ally itself with the Soviets during the war to defeat Hitler and Mussolini, the United Kingdom found itself a major exponent of democracy having to acknowledge and live with the realities of undemocratic government practised by its allies. One can conclude along those lines that Churchill’s statement as then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom was fashioned in the light of these countervailing ideologies.
On May 29, 1999 as is well known, Nigeria completed its transition to democracy after 16 years of autocratic rule by a procession of military leaders. Rtd General Olusegun Obasanjo assumed office as President in this new era, in what was a poignant irony: it was President Obasanjo who oversaw the last transition to democracy in 1979 after three years at the helm of a military junta.
This writer recalls the events of that day with clarity. When President Obasanjo took his oath of office, he promised in his speech that there would be ‘no sacred cows’. On this return to the promised land of equality and fraternity that democracy represents, there was a sense of the cloud of dictatorial inequity being dispelled, of the jackboots of Nigeria’s supreme military leaders retreating one final time. Many lives had been claimed by the strong hand of totalitarian rule for daring to dream that an elected president would sit in deliberation over Nigerian issues together with other elected Nigerians in a representative government. Many lives had been lost in the struggle to achieve, by coup d’etat, the restoration of ideals to which the quest for independence was anchored in the run up to 1960. Some would argue that, for symbolic value, Democracy Day is just as significant as Independence Day in the context of Nigerian history.
Indeed, this year marks the first such celebration of democracy since 1999 at which the country would have been longer a democracy than it had dwelt in the shadow of military rule. It is the 17th Democracy Day anniversary since 1999, one year longer than the 16 during which Generals Buhari, Babangida and Abacha helmed the Federal Government. In another remarkable irony, it is President Buhari who will ring in the festivities. He was installed as President at the start of the last military era, when a coup d’etat wrested power from the Shehu Shagari-led democratic government in 1983. His inauguration at this time last year was seen as the first real triumph of people power- the first real expression of a collective will by Nigerians- to elect a leader of their choice since May 29, 1999. In the intervening years, stuffed ballot boxes, godfatherism and litigated election results made the headlines, shunting voter power to the fringes. In spite of the fact that May 29 is a National Holiday, the public engaged only in muted celebration year after year following the euphoria of the first day.
Taking stock of democracy in Nigeria is a difficult task, to be undertaken with unbridled optimism and the hagiographer’s (lack of) attention to (negative) detail. In the last 17 years, there have been several firsts. The election of Shehu Musa Yar’Adua as President in 2007 represented the first handover by one elected President to another in Nigerian history, and it went off without a hitch. The election of Rtd General Muhammadu Buhari last year was the first time a ruling party had passed the torch to the opposition in Nigerian history. The same period has seen the assumption of presidential office by a sitting Vice President following the unfortunate passing of the incumbent. This last event tested the shaky foundations of Nigeria’s democracy as it raised uncontemplated constitutional questions that had to be resolved in real time, revealing to the public the import of separation of powers in full.
A democratic society, aware of its human rights and liberties, which is what democracy seeks to protect in the main, benefits from several concurrent concepts. An independent judiciary is at the fore of these benefits. The fear and paranoia which dominate the military era psyche often obstruct this independence.
Since 1999, the Nigerian judiciary has pronounced weighty judgments on several aspects of Nigerian political life, re-jigging settled wisdoms of electoral participation and resource control, and generally re-denominating the argument on federalism. PDP v INEC, the landmark case in which the principle of substitution of party candidates was established, is one such case. And now it is common knowledge that the Nigerian voter goes to the polls to elect a party first and a candidate second, with the party having primacy over its choice of candidate. Several cases brought by state governments against the federation demonstrated the cardinal rule of a federal system, that differing levels of autonomy are dispersed across the tiers of government in Nigeria. It is arguable that these strides would have been impossible without democracy.
Of course, there are downsides. Nigerians love the expression ‘nature abhors a vacuum’ and use it both for cases where it is apt and on occasions where it is entirely inapposite. In the spirit of filling vacuums, democracy replaced military autocracy, for better or worse, and with the awesome powers of coercion that a military despot has at his disposal gone, it appears that democratic Nigeria has turned to corruption as a tool of control. Wealthy leaders, allegedly fattened on inflated contracts and the returns of political patronage, keep their constituents in check by controlling the outflow of capital in a country heavily dependent on government spending for survival. As a consequence, the public perception of standards of governance is not positive and there are whisperings that some would prefer a return to the military, despite the disappearances, the deaths and the deprivation that pockmarked that period in history. Perhaps, this is the reason for the election of two past military heads as presidents in the new democracy. Perhaps Nigerians are yearning for the past.
Now, one year into the President Buhari administration, Nigeria celebrates another Democracy Day. Recently, Professor Ben Nwabueze denounced his ‘intellectual capacity’ to govern Nigeria and railed against Nigerians for electing him. In his view, “His election cannot but portray Nigerians as incapable of learning from past experience, a people lacking the degree of political maturity and sagacity required for the successful working of constitutional democracy”. No doubt, the venerated academic is notorious for his contempt for Nigerian leaders by whatever name and his statement does not come as a shock to anyone familiar with his work as an elder statesman and civil society advocate. However, if the quote above is parsed for meaning, it becomes clear that the indictment is on Nigerians themselves and not necessarily against the President.
Churchill, again, spoke fondly of democracy when he said, “At the bottom of all the tributes paid to democracy is the little man, walking into the little booth, with a little pencil, making a little cross on a little bit of paper—no amount of rhetoric or voluminous discussion can possibly diminish the overwhelming importance of that point”. It is the voter- the ‘little man (or woman) walking into the little booth’ to attempt to affect politics and government with his ballot- it is that person that matters. It is only when that person is able to make a decision in the security that the decision taken will eventually matter, that it will not be circumscribed by the backdoor activities of others who are only pretending at democracy, that we can celebrate democracy. While the evidence continues to point at the kind of ‘fantastic corruption’ mentioned by UK Prime Minister David Cameron- ill-advised though he was- it would appear that there is nothing concrete to celebrate.
Thus, on May 29, 2016, this writer will put aside the novelties that surround this auspicious anniversary of Democracy Day. There should be no garlands or rhetoric, no trumpets or declarations, rather there should be quiet reflection on the fact that after 17 years, Nigeria still stands on the starting line of democracy in many ways. There is still much work to be done.
The UK anti-corruption summit: First, strengthen domestic institutions
Owen Barder and Charles Kenny.
One of the ways China handles its convicted corruption officials is to execute them; we do not recommend this approach. It is far better to improve social institutions. The recent UK-anti-corruption summit is a good beginning. “For too long there has been a taboo about tackling [corruption] head on. The summit will change that.” That, at least, is the optimistic pronouncement from the leader of Her Majesty’s Government ahead of the UK anti-corruption summit in London this week. Led from the front by Prime Minister David Cameron, the event aims to "[step] up global action to expose, punish and drive out corruption in all walks of life."
With the leaders of, among others, Afghanistan, Colombia, Nigeria and Norway in attendance, along with the heads of the World Bank and IMF and representatives from the business, legal and NGO sectors, the summit will aim to agree on a package of practical steps to expose and drive out corruption. It will be preceded by a day-long conference, Tackling Corruption Together, which features panels that will consider, among other topics, how the international community can work together to lift the lid on practices that allow the corrupt to act with impunity, and to ensure justice for those affected.
Summit attendees will be invited to sign up to the first-ever global declaration against corruption. But beyond the signatures, deliberations, and rhetoric, what concrete actions could come out of the summit that would help reduce corruption and the global poverty that it helps to perpetuate? We’ll hear from Owen Barder first, and then Charles Kenny.
Owen Barder:
There has been an important shift in the discussion about corruption. For much of the post-colonial period, Europe and America have talked about corruption as a problem that affects other countries – a sort of neglected tropical disease that western medicine can help to eliminate.
There is growing recognition that we in the west have been part of the problem (though by no means all). In 2012 David Cameron called for the developed world to “get our own house in order” and he used the UK’s presidency of the G-8 the following year to put a number of issues on the table that would help to do just that. Here’s what I’d like to see come out of the summit:
More countries joining the UK and Australia in establishing and publishing the true owners of each company they register (so-called “public registries of beneficial ownership”).
Companies being required to report publicly how much profit they earn, and how much tax they pay, in each country where they work (so-called “country by country reporting”).
The spread of these norms by denying access to our economies for anonymous shell companies – no anonymous company should be able to buy property in the UK, get a government contract, or use the British courts to uphold a contract.
Charles Kenny:
I’d echo Owen’s welcome of the changed discussion around corruption, recognizing it is a global issue, not just a problem of poor countries. It would be good to see a further shift towards recognizing that for all of the challenges of corruption, many developing countries are seeing progress in wealth, health, and broader wellbeing that is historically unprecedented. The anti-corruption discussion should be about speeding that process, not reinforcing a toxic and inaccurate worldview that sees developing countries as suffering an incurable cancer, or as rat holes where taxes, investment and aid are simply wasted. But, beyond tone, here are three things I’d like to see in the summit communique:
More governments joining the lead taken by the UK, Slovakia, Georgia, and Colombia (amongst others) in routinely publishing the full text of government contracts with private firms. The key principle that countries should sign up to: open by default. And they should commit to make it easy to link those contracts with budget details and outcome details – using the Open Contracting Data Standard, for example. Finally on contracts, participants should commit to ensure that commercial secrecy isn’t used illegitimately to block information release (discussed in this report). Open contracting for power provision is a lot less valuable if we can’t figure out the price paid per kilowatt hour, for example. Similarly, open contracting in health should involve publishing the prices paid for drugs.
Results measurement highlighted as a key anti-corruption tool. My draft book (comments still very welcome!) discusses what happens if governments (and aid agencies) focus on tracking payments for goods and services to the exclusion of a proper emphasis on getting what they paid for in terms of outcomes. Tracking receipts over results can simply move corruption from inflated pricing or financial theft to skimping on delivery – which can be considerably more harmful in terms of development outcomes. We need accountants as part of an anti-corruption strategy, but we need engineers and survey specialists, too.
An explicit recognition that anti-corruption responses can have unintended consequences, and solutions to limit that problem. Know your customer (KYC) regulations might limit the flow of corrupt financing, but can also make it more difficult to send remittances to some of the world’s poorest people. Tax treaties might increase revenues in signatory countries, but could exclude less-developed countries that need the revenues most. Delivering aid through consulting firms based in donor countries might help reduce leakage, but also leads to less effective assistance overall. Corruption slows development. Anti-corruption tools shouldn’t slow development even more.